Rot at the roots? Examining public timing infrastructure

© 2016 IEEE. Timekeeping is central to network measurement. In typical systems, its accuracy is ultimately dependent on the forest of timeservers accessible over the network, whose roots are the stratum-1 timeservers, which benefit from reference hardware. It is essential that these servers are accurate and reliable, and it is commonly assumed that this is the case. We put this belief to the test through an examination of around 100 publicly accessible stratum-1 servers, using datasets spanning over 3 years, collected in a testbed with reference timestamping. We develop a methodology capable of disambiguating the effects of routing changes, congestion related variability, and server anomalies on timestamps. We use it to make a first assessment of the health of (public) network timing, by reporting on the type, severity, and frequency of anomalies we encounter

Network timing and the 2015 leap second

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016. Using a testbed with reference timestamping, we collected timing data from public Stratum-1 NTP servers during the leap second event of end-June 2015. We found a wide variety of anomalous serverside behaviors, both at the NTP protocol level and in the server clocks themselves, which can last days or even weeks after the event. Out of 176 servers, only 61% had no erroneous behavior related to the leap second event that we could detect