24 research outputs found
"Actual" does not imply "feasible"
The familiar complaint that some ambitious proposal is infeasible naturally invites the following response: Once upon a time, the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of women seemed infeasible, yet these things were actually achieved. Presumably, then, many of those things that seem infeasible in our own time may well be achieved too and, thus, turn out to have been perfectly feasible after all. The Appeal to History, as we call it, is a bad argument. It is not true that if some desirable state of affairs was actually achieved, then it was feasible that it was achieved. “Actual” does not imply “feasible,” as we put it. Here is our objection. “Feasible” implies “not counterfactually fluky.” But “actual” does not imply “not counterfactually fluky.” So, “actual” does not imply “feasible.” While something like the Flukiness Objection is sometimes hinted at in the context of the related literature on abilities, it has not been developed in any detail, and both premises are inadequately motivated. We offer a novel articulation of the Flukiness Objection that is both more precise and better motivated. Our conclusions have important implications, not only for the admissible use of history in normative argument, but also by potentially circumscribing the normative claims that are applicable to us
Free will, punishment and criminal responsibility
Retributive attitudes are deeply held and widespread in the general population and
most legal systems incorporate retributive elements. It is probably also the dominant
theory of punishment among contemporary philosophers of criminal justice.
However, retributivism relies on conceptions of free will and responsibility that
have, for millennia, fundamentally divided those who have thought seriously about
the subject.
Our legal system upholds the principle that the responsibility of the offender has to
be proven beyond reasonable doubt, before the accused can be punished. In view of
the intractable doubts surrounding the soundness of retributivism’s very conception
of responsibility, my thesis argues that it is ethically dubious to punish individuals
for solely retributive reasons. Instead, my thesis proposes that a person should only
be punished if the main theories of punishment agree that punishing that person is
appropriate – I call this ‘the convergence requirement’. This approach, I argue, is in
accordance with the considerations underlying the beyond reasonable doubt standard.
In addition to considering the question of ‘whom to punish’ my thesis considers what
methods of responding to criminal behaviour are acceptable. In particular, it attempts
to explain, without appealing to the contested notions of free will or retributive
desert, what is problematic about ‘manipulative’ methods of dealing with criminal
offenders (focussing in particular on the possibility of modifying their behaviour
through neurological interventions). The final part of this thesis also gives an
overview of some of the practical implications for Scots criminal law of taking
doubts about free will and retributivism seriously. Given the severe treatment that
offenders undergo within the Scottish penal system (e.g. deprivation of liberty,
stigma) and the high rate of recidivism, it is important to consider whether our
current penal practices are justified, what alternatives are available and what goals
and values should guide attempts at reforming the system
Vihvelin on Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Actual-Sequence View
This is a critical discussion of Vihvelin's recent book Causes, Laws, and Free Will. I discuss Vihvelin's ideas on Frankfurt-style cases and the actual-sequence view of freedom that is inspired by them.12 month embargo. First available online 11 November 2014.This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]