13 research outputs found

    Taking a Closer Look at Flight Crew Handling of Complex Failures: Ten Case Studies

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    Non-normal events, in particular system failures with serious operational impact are rare in flight operations. These events are not always easy to handle by flight crews. The aim of the performed study is to determine where in this process potential issues may lie. Ten incident reports are studied using a newly developed operational issue analysis framework. The framework is used to determine whether and how the current interfaces communicate the initial functional impact and functional impact delayed in time. Additionally, results from pilot interviews are presented which identified three phases of non-normal event handling: fault detection, fault management and strategic planning. Analysis of the ten cases shows that current alert systems are mainly supporting the first two phases while the strategic planning phase, requiring higher level functional information integrated into the operational context as well as failure impact later in time, is relying almost entirely on pilot knowledge and reasoning

    The effect of surprise on upset recovery performance

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    Introducing the element of surprise is one of the main challenges in simulator training of in-flight emergencies. In this simulator study, we investigated the differences in performance between predictable and surprising circumstances, in order to obtain insight into the transfer of training between predictable training settings and surprising circumstances in operational practice. This was done by testing twenty airline pilots who recovered from an aerodynamic stall in two conditions: one anticipation condition and one surprise condition. All pilots practiced beforehand using predictable, or nonsurprising scenarios. The results show that pilots had significantly more difficulties in adhering to components of the FAA-commissioned recovery template in the surprise condition compared to the anticipation condition. These results suggest that predictable training may not be enough to prevent serious performance decrements under surprise

    Pilot evaluations of a non-verbal startle and surprise management method, tested during airline recurrent simulator training

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    Aviation safety organizations have recommended that airline pilots are trained for startle and surprise. However, little information is available on useful training interventions. Therefore, a training intervention trial was executed during airline recurrent simulator training. The method consisted of a slow visual scan from the side-window, over the instruments, ending with facing the other pilot. Following a recorded video instruction, 38 airline pilots in two-pilot crews performed a training scenario in which they could apply the method. Data on application and evaluation of the method were obtained from each pilot. Few pilots actually applied the method (18.4%), and many gave low ratings to applicability of the method in the scenario, as well as in operational practice. Results show that a startle management method, as well as manner in which it is trained, should be carefully evaluated before being implemented in training practice
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