Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?

Competitive high ranking positions are largely occupied by men, and women remain scarce in engineering and sciences. Explanations for these occupational differences focus on discrimination and preferences for work hours and field of study. We examine if absent these factors gender differences in occupations may still occur. Specifically we explore whether women and men, on a leveled playing field, differ in their selection into competitive environments. Men and women in a laboratory experiment perform a real task under a non-competitive piece rate and a competitive tournament scheme. Although there are no gender differences in performance under either compensation, there is a substantial gender difference when participants subsequently choose the scheme they want to apply to their next performance. Twice as many men as women choose the tournament over the piece rate. This gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance either before or after the entry decision. Furthermore, while men are more optimistic about their relative performance, differences in beliefs only explain a small share of the gap in tournament entry. In a final task we assess the impact of non-tournament-specific factors, such as risk and feedback aversion, on the gender difference in compensation choice. We conclude that even controlling for these general factors, there is a large residual gender gap in tournament entry.

Investment Utilisation, Adjustment Costs, and Technical Efficiency in Danish Pig Farms

In this paper, we present a theoretical model for adjustment costs and investment utilisation that illustrates their causes and types and shows in which phases of an investment they occur. Furthermore, we develop an empirical framework for analysing the size and the timing of adjustment costs and investment utilisation. We apply this methodology to a large panel data set of Danish pig producers with 9,281 observations between 1996 and 2008. The paper further contributes with a thorough discussion of the calculation and deflation of capital input from microeconomic data. We estimate an output distance function as a stochastic frontier model and explain the estimated technical inefficiencies with lagged investments, farm size and age of the farmer. We allow for interaction effects between these variables and derive the formula for calculating the marginal effects on technical efficiency. The results show that investments have a negative effect on farm efficiency in the year of the investment and the year after accruing from adjustment costs. There is a large positive effect on efficiency two and three years after the investment. The farmer’s age and the farm size significantly influence technical efficiency, as well as the effect of investments on adjustment costs and investment utilisation. These results are robust to different ways of measuring capital.investment utilisation, adjustment costs, stochastic frontier analysis, technical efficiency, pig production, Denmark

Why Announce Leadership Contributions? An Experimental Study of the Signaling and Reciprocity Hypotheses

Why do fundraisers announce initial contributions to their charity?Potential explanations are that these announcements cause future donors to increase their contributions, either because they want to reciprocate the generosity of earlier donors, or because the initial contributions are seen as a signal of the charity's quality.Using experimental methods we investigate these two hypotheses.When only the first donor is informed of the public good's quality, subjects not only copy the initial contribution, but the first donor also correctly anticipates this response.While this result is consistent with both the signaling and the reciprocity explanations, the latter is unlikely to be the driving force.The reason is that announcements have no effect on contribution levels when the quality of the public good is common knowledge.Thus our results provide strong support for the signaling hypothesis.funds;information;public goods

Optimal Pricing and Endogenous Herding

We consider a monopolist who sells indetical objects of common but unknown value in a herding-prone environment. Buyers make their purchasing decisions sequentially, and rely on a private signal as well as previous buyers´actions to infer the common value of the object. The model applies to a variety of cases, such as the introduction of a new product or the sale of licenses to use a patent. We characterize the monopolist´s optimal pricing strategy and its implications for the temporal pattern of prices and for herding.The analysis is performed under alternative assumptions about observability of prices. We find that when previous prices are observable, herding may but need not arise. In contrast, herding arises immediately when previous prices are unobservable and the seller´s equilibrium strategy is a pure Markov strategy. While the possibility of social learning is present in the first case, it is absent in the second. Finally, we examine the seller´s to manipulate the buyers´evaluation of the object when buyers are naive. Using secret discounts the seller succsessfully interferes with social learning, and herding occurs in finite time.

Optimal Pricing and Endogenous Herding

We consider a monopolist who sells identical objects of common but unknown value in a herding-prone environment. Buyers make their purchasing decisions sequentially, and rely on a private signal as well as We consider a monopolist who sells identical objects of common but previous buyers’ actions to infer the common value of the object. The model applies to a variety of cases, such as the introduction of a new product or the sale of licenses to use a patent. We characterize the monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy and its implications for the temporal pattern of prices and for herding. The analysis is performed under alternative assumptions about observability of prices. We find that when previous prices are observable, herding may but need not arise. In contrast, herding arises immediately when previous prices are unobservable and the seller’s equilibrium strategy is a pure Markov strategy. While the possibility of social learning is present in the first case, it is absent in the second. Finally, we examine the seller’s incentive to manipulate the buyers’ evaluation of the object when buyers are naive. Using secret discounts the seller successfully interferes with social learning, and herding occurs in finite time.herding, informational cascades, optimal pricing