Financial crises in emerging markets: a canonical model

We present a simple model that can account for the main features of recent financial crises in emerging markets. The international illiquidity of the domestic financial system is at the center of the problem. Illiquid banks are a necessary and a sufficient condition for financial crises to occur. Domestic financial liberalization and capital flows from abroad (especially if short-term) can aggravate the illiquidity of banks and increase their vulnerability to exogenous shocks and shifts in expectations. A bank collapse multiplies the harmful effects of an initial shock, as a credit squeeze and costly liquidation of investment projects cause real output drops and collapses in asset prices. Under fixed exchange rates, a run on banks becomes a run on the currency if the central bank attempts to act as a lender of last resort.Banks and banking, Central ; International finance ; Liquidity (Economics) ; Monetary policy ; Money supply

Monetary Policy and the Currency Denomination of Debt: A Tale of Two Equilibria

Exchange rate policies depend on portfolio choices, and portfolio choices depend on anticipated exchange rate policies. This opens the door to multiple equilibria in policy regimes. We construct a model in which agents optimally choose to denominate their assets and liabilities either in domestic or in foreign currency. The monetary authority optimally chooses to float or to fix the currency, after portfolios have been chosen. We identify conditions under which both fixing and floating are equilibrium policies: if agents expect fixing and arrange their portfolios accordingly, the monetary authority validates that expectation; the same happens if agents initially expect floating. We also show that a flexible exchange rate Pareto-dominates a fixed one. It follows that social welfare would rise if the monetary authority could precommit to floating.

Short-Term Capital Flows

We provide a conceptual and empirical framework for evaluating the effects of short-term capital flows. A simple model of the joint determination of the maturity and cost of external borrowing highlights the role played by self-fulfilling crises. The model also specifies the circumstances under which short-term debt accumulation is socially excessive. The empirical analysis shows that the short-term debt to reserves ratio is a robust predictor of financial crises, and that greater short-term exposure is associated with more severe crises when capital flows reverse. Higher levels of M2/GDP and per-capita income are associated with shorter-term maturities of external debt. The level of international trade does not seem to have any relationship with levels of short-term indebtedness, which suggests that trade credit plays an insignificant role in driving short-term capital flows. Our policy analysis focuses on ways in which potential illiquidity can be avoided.

Optimal Interest Rate Policy in a Small Open Economy

Using an optimizing model we derive the optimal monetary and exchange rate policy for a small stochastic open economy with imperfect competition and short run price rigidity. The optimal monetary policy has an exact closed-form solution and is obtained using the utility function of the representative home agent as welfare criterion. The optimal policy depends on the source of stochastic disturbances affecting the economy, much as in the literature pioneered by Poole (1970). Optimal monetary policy reacts to domestic and foreign disturbances. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one, as is likely to be the case empirically, the optimal exchange rate policy implies a dirty float: interest rate shocks from abroad are met partially by adjusting home interest rates, and partially by allowing the exchange rate to move. This optimal pattern may help rationalize the observed fear of floating.

Liquidity crises in emerging markets: Theory and policy

We build a model of financial sector illiquidity in an open economy. Illiquidity is defined as a situation in which a country's consolidated financial system has potential short-term obligations that exceed the amount of foreign currency available on short notice. We show that illiquidity is key in the generation of self-fulfilling bank and/or currency crises. We discuss the policy implications of the model and study issues associated with capital inflows and the maturity of external debt, the role of real exchange depreciation, options for financial regulation, fiscal policy, and exchange rate regimes.Financial crises ; Foreign exchange ; Capital movements ; Liquidity (Economics)

The Asian liquidity crisis

A country's financial system is internationally illiquid if its potential short-term obligations in foreign currency exceed the amount of foreign currency it can have access to in short notice. This condition may be necessary and sufficient for financial crises and/or exchange rate collapses (Chang and Velasco 1998a, b). In this paper we argue that the 1997-98 crises in Asia were in fact a consequence of international illiquidity. This follows from an analysis of empirical indicators of illiquidity as well as other macroeconomic statistics. We trace the emergence of illiquidity to financial liberalization, the shortening of the foreign debt structure, and the currency denomination of assets versus liabilities. We explain how financial crises became exchange rate collapses due to a government policy of both fixing exchange rates and acting as lender of last resort. Finally, we outline the policy implications of our view for preventing crises and for dealing with them.Banks and banking, Central ; International finance ; Liquidity (Economics) ; Monetary policy ; Money supply

Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rates: Which Provides More Fiscal Discipline?

In recent years the conventional wisdom has held that fixed rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates. In this paper we show that this wisdom need not hold in a standard model in which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a maximizing fiscal authority. The claim that fixed rates induce more discipline stresses that sustained adoption of lax fiscal policies must eventually lead to an exhaustion of reserves and thus to a politically costly collapse of the peg. Hence, under fixed rates bad behavior today leads to punishment tomorrow. Under flexible rates bad behavior has costs as well. The difference is in the intertemporal distribution of these costs: flexible rates allow the effects of unsound fiscal policies to manifest themselves immediately through movements in the exchange rate. Hence, bad behavior today leads to punishment today. If fiscal authorities are impatient, flexible rates - by forcing the costs to be paid up-front - provide more fiscal discipline and higher welfare for the representative private agent. The recent experience of Sub- Saharan countries supplies some preliminary evidence that matches the predictions of the model.

Can Capital Mobility be Destabilizing?

In a standard two-sector neoclassical model with distortions, capital mobility can render the steady state indeterminate, in the sense that there exist infinitely many convergent paths. In the closed economy with no international capital mobility, the utility function must be linear or close to it for indeterminacy to occur, while in the open economy the shape of the utility function makes no difference. The reason is that in the no mobility case changes in aggregate investment must be matched by changes in aggregate consumption, while in the case of full capital mobility they can simply be financed by borrowing abroad. The paper provides some theoretical underpinnings to the concerns that de-regulating the capital account may be destabilizing.

Liquidity Crises in Emerging Markets: Theory and Policy

We build a model of financial sector illiquidity in an open economy. Illiquidity defined as a situation in which a country's consolidated financial system has potential short-term obligations in foreign currency that exceed the amount of foreign currency it can have access to on short notice can be associated with self fulfilling bank and/or currency crises. We focus on the policy implications of the model, and study the role of capital inflows and the maturity of external debt, the way in which real exchange rate depreciation can transmit and magnify the effects of bank illiquidity, options for financial regulation, the role of debt and deficits, and the implications of adopting different exchange rate regimes.