Psychology and evolutionary biology:Causal analysis, evidence, and nomothetic laws

Published as a chapter in Van Hezewijk, R. (2003). Psychology and evolutionary biology; Causal analysis, evidence, and nomothetic laws. In N. Stephenson, L. Radtke, R. Jorna & H. J. Stam (Eds.), Theoretical psychology; Critical contributions (pp. 405-415). Concord, Ontario: Captus Press.SUMMARY Since James, some psychologists have referred to evolutionary psychology as one of the sources of explaining behaviour (James, 1890). However, the status of such references is not always clear. In the recent work of many authors, it is not always clear (1) what kind of causal analyses are appropriate in psychology beyond those psychologists already use; (2) how psychological explanations fit in the general scheme of explanations in the life sciences, especially in biological explanatory schemes; and (3) what this implies for the evaluation of available evidence. This chapter is about these questions. I discuss five types of explanations involved in psychological explanations using an evolutionary perspective, and I discuss how these types of analysis relate to types of propositions and types of evidence

Psychology as an autonomous discipline: Johannes Linschoten's dissertation

In 1956 Johannes Linschoten – one of the members of the alleged phenomenological Utrecht School – presented his dissertation on binocular space perception. He surprised many a colleague with a work of 573 pages plus a booklet of 226 figures, written in German, containing an introductory part, an experimental part and a theoretical part (Linschoten, 1956). The introduction offered an overview of the theory that was focussed most on binocular space perception at that time (Hering’s Theory of Identity), and its follow up versions. The experimental part reported of 130 experiments. In the experimental part Linschoten not only criticized this theory, but also other candidates from other, more general, theories of perception (Wheatstone, Helmholtz, Gestalt theory). He discussed the Panum-effect in his analysis and experiments, and attraction of image points of the two retinal images involved as an explanation, as well as the role of eye movements. The theoretical part is an analysis of the role binocular depth perception plays for the organism in the localisation of significant objects in the depth of the “structured spaceness (Räumlichkeit)”. He presented a dynamic theory of binocular space perception and concluded with his answer to the question why human beings have two eyes. Although at first hand this dissertation can be viewed as an excellent combination of experimental and theoretical approach to solve a complex problem, and as the opposite of a phenomenological approach that could have been expected from this author, we argue for a different point of view. We will point out that the phenomenological approach in the Utrecht School of the fifties did not exclude experimental work at all, and will demonstrate that, more importantly, Linschoten’s aim with his dissertation was to argue that in any account of binocular depth perception a psychological explanation is inevitable. In other words: psychology is an autonomous discipline. It demonstrably involves explanatory problems that can only be solved by presupposing a psychologically active organism. Continuing our research Linschoten in psychology (Stam & Van Hezewijk, 2004; Van Hezewijk & Stam, 2006; Van Hezewijk, Stam, & Panhuysen, 2001, , 2002) we tend to believe that initially Linschoten believed that only a phenomenological approach could guarantee the autonomy of psychology as a discipline. However, Linschoten changed his views during his short life, to end with the apparent opposite view (Linschoten, 1964), that psychology should be reductive and experimental. Our argument will include references to Linschoten’s recovered master thesis (Linschoten, 1949), earlier work on space and movement perception (Linschoten, 1950, , 1952), and copies of handwritten notes for his dissertation. Linschoten, J. (1949). Ontwerp van een fenomenologische theorie der bewegingswaarneming; Deel 1: De beweging in de objectieve ruimte [Design of a phenomenological theory of movement perception; Part 1: Movement in objective space]. Unpublished Theretische scriptie voor het doctoraal examen [ Theoretical thesis for the doctoral (Master)], Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht [now Utrecht University], Utrecht. Linschoten, J. (1950). Logische en phenomenologische analyse der bewegingsverschijnselen [Logical and phenomenological analysis of the movement phenomena]. Tijdschrift voor philosophie, 12(4), 668-728. Linschoten, J. (1952). Experimentelle Untersuchung der sog. induzierten Bewegung [Experimental study of the so-called induced movement]. Psychologische Forschung, 24, 34-92. Linschoten, J. (1956). Strukturanalyse der binokulären Tiefenwahrnehmung; eine experimentelle Untersuchung [Stuctural analysis of binocular depth perception; an experimental study] (Herausgabe of Ph.D. thesis, printed with support by ZWO, The Netherlands, and with a foreword by Wolfgang Metzger). Groningen: Wolters. Linschoten, J. (1964). Idolen van de psycholoog (Idols of the psychologist) (2nd ed.). Utrecht: Bijleveld. Stam, H. J., & Van Hezewijk, R. (2004, 5-7 August 2004,). Phenomenological Psychology in Europe and North America: The case of Johannes Linschoten and the demise of the ‘Utrecht School.’ Paper presented at the CIRCULATING KNOWLEDGE; Fifth British-North American Joint Meeting of the BSHS, CSHPS, and HSS, Halifax, Nova Scotia. Van Hezewijk, R., & Stam, H. J. (2006). Idols of the Psychologist: Johannes Linschoten and The demise Of Phenomenological Psychology In The Netherlands. Journal for the History of the Behavioral Sciences, resubmitted after revision. Van Hezewijk, R., Stam, H. J., & Panhuysen, G. (2001). Existential questions: no, one, or two Utrecht Schools? Paper presented at the 20th Conference of the European Society for the History of the Human Sciences, Amsterdam, 14-18 August 2001. Van Hezewijk, R., Stam, H. J., & Panhuysen, G. (2002, 27th - 31st August 2002). The double dissociation of phenomenological and experimental methods in psychology; A case study. Paper presented at the 21st Conference of the European Society for the History of the Human Sciences, Barcelona

Close the gap please

Mate choice, courting, parental investment, attractiveness, and love are a few examples of phenomena in the sphere of human interactions in which evolutionary psychology has a keen interest. Evolutionary theory has been quite successful in explaining and predicting these preferences. Nevertheless, it is not so difficult to point out local differences in what is considered attractive (or beautiful) here as well, depending on the social group one is part of. The sensorium is sophisticated in the group, whether it is about wine or women, men or heavy metal music. We elaborate on this in the present paper

The psychologist's dilemma ESHHS Paper Utrecht 2010

The Psychologists Dilemma Game René van Hezewijk and Henderikus Stam Among the recurrent cleavages that define 20th century psychology is the deep division between psychologies that distance the psychologist from the phenomenon under investigation from those that engage the question under investigation from the perspective of the reflexive capacities of the psychologist as one among other human beings and/or members of a specific culture. Most obvious was the emergence – in the late nineteenth century – of phenomenology, an explicit philosophical position in the debate on the foundations of science. Although the label “phenomenological psychology” is now widely and loosely applied to a range of methods that bear little resemblance to the debates of the early 20th century, the mid-20th century attempt to create a unique phenomenological psychology was successful in establishing an alternative position, albeit ever so briefly, within the discipline. The later incarnations of humanistic psychologies and social constructionisms owe their initial form to this debate. As early as 1890 William James articulated the Psychologists’ Fallacy (the “great snare of the psychologist”) as the “confusion of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report” (p. 196). Although this could be read as a critique of introspection, and James meant it as such in part, it is also a critique of the failure to recognize the reflexive nature of psychologists’ claims. For James, “we must avoid substituting what we know the consciousness is, for what it is a consciousness of, and counting its outward, and so to speak physical, relations with other facts of the world, in among the objects of which we set it down as aware” (James, 1890, p. 197) . North American psychology after World War II however took its purpose clearly to be the psychology that was capable at every turn of demonstrating the limits of human subjectivity. Both behaviorism and cognitive psychology premised on the thesis that behavioral continuities could provide the mechanism by which one might articulate the features of the system. Social psychology, in the meantime, adopted a version of experimentation whose functions were to demonstrate that human beings were fallible and incapable of cognizing the determinants of their own actions. On the one hand the psychologist takes the standpoint that seems capable of recapitulating recreating from scratch the determinants governing the behavior of persons without ever involving the background or tacit knowledge of the recreating psychologist him or herself. On the other hand the psychologist is supposed to be incapable of understanding and explaining the behavior of a person without using knowledge of the meanings those persons employ. The first type of psychologist is not – or does not want to be – aware of the implicit knowledge they need for understanding behavior, the second type of psychologist is vulnerable to the fads and fallacies to which every human being in every culture is vulnerable. Interestingly, we now find psychologists of the first type that meet the boundaries of their rationalism when they find that some of the alleged fads and fallacies are very clever after all. Survival seems more successful if we ignore the explicit knowledge that one’s behavior is fallacy-bound. For instance Gerd Gigerenzer claims that fallacies are not fallacious after all; they are fallacies only in the light of theories claiming truth or justice or rightness in situations that are ecologically irrational. (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Gigerenzer, 2007; Wegner, 2002) In trying to find a counter instance of the latter, we have an interesting example in the work of Johannes Linschoten (1925-1964), a one time member of the Utrecht School. Referring and adding to earlier presentations in the ESHHS conferences we think we have found a way to understand the allegedly significant “paradigm switch” from phenomenology to positivism, or the “conversion to positivism” of Johannes Linschoten in his “Idols” (Linschoten, 1964). We even have a better understanding of why Linschoten used the word “Idols”, which he borrowed from Francis Bacon. Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., & Trötschel, R. (2001). The Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation and Pursuit of Behavioral Goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(6), 1014-1027. Gigerenzer, G. (2007). Gut feelings : the intelligence of the unconscious. New York: Viking. James, W. (1890). Principles of Psychology, vol. 1&2. New York: Dover. Linschoten, J. (1964). Idolen van de psycholoog (Idols of the psychologist) (2nd ed.). Utrecht: Bijleveld. Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Close the gap

Paper presented at the ISTP Conference, Toronto 2007. Mate choice, courting, parental investment, attractiveness, and love are a few examples of human interactions in which evolutionary psychology has a keen interest. Theories like this shed light on human partner preferences and there is quite strong empirical support for that as well. Roughly the general version says that For any member of the sexes, if the individual is interested in long-term mating, it will select a mate that is showing to be 1. able to invest in the relationship and in their offspring 2. willing to invest in the relationship and in their offspring 3. able to physically protect self, partner and offspring 4. having good parenting skills 5. compatible with the self (has similar values, age, personality etc.) These studies show how the preferences in partner selection resemble each other. Over many countries and cultures, within and between the sexes, within and between age groups, social economic classes etc. people all are, to certain extend alike in what they like and dislike. The interpretation of what is alike, however, is a matter of debate. That is, “resemblance” always is resemblance in the eye of the persons or organisms that compare. So a preference for a certain body shape, for symmetry, for sharp male facial contours and soft contours in the female face, for a particular waist-hip ratio etc. is in the eye of the beholder. That is, in the eye of the organism involved, or at least in the eye of the sex of the organism involved, or at least in the eye of the members of a certain age, culture, historical period of the sex of the organism involved, or at least…etc. From another angle there are studies of how personal knowledge of the human body partially accounts for the experience of romantic love in humans. Helen Fisher’s work is an example. Focusing on the experiences of human beings concerning romantic love, she reports remarkable regularities in and resemblances of feelings between human beings from different countries, cultures, ages, the sexes and even, apparently, between non-human animals – primates, and some other mammals in particular. What is remarkable here is that they mostly report of either internal feelings or the bilateral meaningful behavior and expected or hoped for behavior of the one in love and the one loved.From yet one other angle, Antonio Damasio’s theory on emotions and feelings also seems to enhance evolutionary psychology’s claims. Damasio suggests that vision, hearing, touch, taste and smell result from nerve activation patterns that reflect states of the external world. Emotions, on the other hand, are nerve activation patterns that correspond to the state of the internal world. The experience of sexual attraction is activated but also recorded in nerve cell activation patterns obtained by the brain from neural and hormonal feedback, and is experienced as a body state.Briefly, we argue, the way we interpret or represent our feelings, depends on how feelings are stylized, articulated, and expressed in communities. From (socially) skilled members of the group we learn how to appropriately deal with affects

On the claims of evolutionary psychology to explain romantic love

Paper presented at the bi-annual conference of the International Society for Theoretical Psychology, Totonto CANADA, 17-22 June 2007Mate choice, courting, parental investment, attractiveness, and love are a few examples of phenomena in the sphere of human interactions in which evolutionary psychology has a keen interest. Evolutionary theory has been quite successful in explaining and predicting these preferences. Nevertheless, it is not so difficult to point out local differences in what is considered attractive (or beautiful) here as well, depending on the social group one is part of. The sensorium is sophisticated in the group, whether it is about wine or women, men or heavy metal music. We elaborate on this in the present paper

Adaptive and Genomic Explanations of Human

In: Biology and Philosophy (2005), vol. 20, pp. 57-78. Also published in Barendregt, M. (2004). The gene doctrine; a pragmatic perspective of reduction and explanation in biological psychology. Unpublished PH.D., Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.Abstract. Evolutionary psychology and behavioural genomics are both approaches to explain human behaviour from a genetic point of view. Nonetheless, thus far the development of these disciplines is anything but interdependent. This paper examines the question whether evolutionary psychology can contribute to behavioural genomics. Firstly, a possible inconsistency between the two approaches is reviewed, viz. that evolutionary psychology focuses on the universal human nature and disregards the genetic variation studied by behavioural genomics. Secondly, we will discuss the structure of biological explanations. Some philosophers rightly acknowledge that explanations do not involve laws which are exceptionless and universal. Instead, generalisations that are invariant suffice for successful explanation as long as two other stipulations are recognised: the domain within which the generalisation has no exceptions as well as the distribution of the mechanism described by the generalisation should both be specified. It is argued that evolutionary psychology can contribute to behavioural genomic explanations by accounting for these two specifications

Reflection: A Socratic approach

Open accessReflection is a fuzzy concept. In this article we reveal the paradoxes involved in studying the nature of reflection. Whereas some scholars emphasize its discursive nature, we go further and underline its resemblance to the self-biased dialogue Socrates had with the slave in Plato’s Meno. The individual and internal nature of the reflection process creates difficulty for studying it validly and reliably. We focus on methodological issues and use Hans Linschoten’s view of coupled systems to identify, analyze, and interpret empirical research on reflection. We argue that researchers and research participants can take on roles in several possible system couplings. Depending on who controls the manipulation of the stimulus, who controls the measuring instrument, who interprets the measurement and the response, different types of research questions can be answered. We conclude that reflection may be validly studied by combining different couplings of experimenter, manipulation, stimulus, participant, measurement, and response