514 research outputs found
On the Messy âUtopophobia vs Factophobiaâ Controversy
In recent years, political philosophers have been fiercely arguing over the virtues and vices of utopian vs realistic theorizing. Partly due to the lack of a common and consistently used vocabulary, these debates have become rather confusing. In this chapter, I attempt to bring some clarity to them and, in doing so, I offer a conciliatory perspective on the âutopian vs realistic theorizingâ controversy. I argue that, once the notion of a normative or evaluative theory is clearly defined and distinguished from the desiderata that any good theory should satisfy, many of the disagreements between supporters and opponents of âutopianâ or âidealâ theorizing can be easily dissolved. I conclude that, in general, political philosophers should be cautious when theorizing at the extreme ends of the âutopian-realisticâ spectrum, but that, setting extremes aside, the correct level of realism or idealism depends on the particular question a theory aims to address
In what Sense Are Human Rights Political
Philosophical discussion of human rights has long been monopolised by what might be called the ânatural-law viewâ. On this view, human rights are fundamental moral rights which people enjoy solely by virtue of their humanity. In recent years, a number of theorists have started to question the validity of this outlook, advocating instead what they call a âpoliticalâ view. My aim in this article is to explore the latter view in order to establish whether it constitutes a valuable alternative to the ânatural-law viewâ. In particular, I distinguish between three ways in which human rights can be political: in relation to their (1) iudicandum, (2) justification and (3) feasibility constraints. I argue that it makes sense to think of human rights as political in relation to both their iudicandum and their justification but in a way that is not always adequately captured by proponents of the political view. Moreover, I also claim that, if we take the political view seriously, we still need to engage in the sort of abstract moral reasoning that characterises the natural-law approach and which proponents of the political view significantly downplay
Ideal vs. Nonâideal Theory: A Conceptual Map
This article provides a conceptual map of the debate on ideal and nonâideal theory. It argues that this debate encompasses a number of different questions, which have not been kept sufficiently separate in the literature. In particular, the article distinguishes between the following three interpretations of the âideal vs. nonâideal theoryâ contrast: full compliance vs. partial compliance theory; utopian vs. realistic theory; endâstate vs. transitional theory. The article advances critical reflections on each of these subâdebates, and highlights areas for future research in the field
No Global Demos, No Global Democracy? A Systematization and Critique
A globalized world, some argue, needs a global democracy. But there is considerable disagreement about whether global democracy is an ideal worth pursuing. One of the main grounds for scepticism is captured by the slogan: âNo global demos, no global democracy.â The fact that a key precondition of democracyâa demosâis absent at the global level, some argue, speaks against the pursuit of global democracy. The paper discusses four interpretations of the skeptical sloganâeach based on a specific account of the notion of âthe demosââand concludes that none of them establishes that the global democratic ideal must be abandoned. In so doing, the paper (i) systematizes different types of objections against global democracy, thus bringing some clarity to an otherwise intricate debate and (ii) offers a robust but qualified defense of the global democratic ideal
Justice, Charity, and Disaster Relief: What, if Anything, Is Owed to Haiti, Japan and New Zealand?
Whenever fellow humans suffer due to natural catastrophes, we have a duty to help them. This duty is not only acknowledged in moral theory, but also expressed in ordinary peopleâs reactions to phenomena such as tsunamis, hurricanes, and earthquakes. Despite being widely acknowledged, this duty is also widely disputed: some believe it is a matter of justice, others a matter of charity. Although central to debates in international political theory, the distinction between justice and charity is hardly ever systematically drawn. To fill this gap in the literature, I consider three accounts of this distinction, the âAgent-basedâ, the âRecipient-basedâ, and the âMixedâ View, and argue that they are all unsatisfactory. I then offer a fourth alternative, the âAutonomyâ View, which successfully overcomes the difficulties affecting its rivals. I conclude by considering the implications of this view for the moral grounds of disaster relief in earthquake-stricken Haiti, New Zealand, and Japan
Cosmopolitan Justice and Rightful Enforceability
The liberal debate on global justice has long been polarized between cosmopolitans, who champion global equality, and statists, who defend global sufficiency. Interestingly, little attention has been given to what these outlooks have in common: a focus on justice. Justice differs from other types of values in that it sets out rightfully enforceable entitlements. Once this is appreciated, however, cosmopolitanism and statism can be shown to offer inadequate accounts of global justice. Since the principles they advocate are reasonably contested, directly enforcing them on dissenting others would violate the liberal commitment to equal respect for persons. When the demands of justice are reasonably disagreed upon, as they are at the global level, conflicts over them need to be procedurally adjudicated. The chapter concludes that taking the enforceability of justice seriously leads us to advocate global outcome sufficiency, and global procedural equality, thereby steering a middle course between statism and cosmopolitanism
Social Samaritan Justice: When and Why Needy Fellow Citizens Have a Right to Assistance
In late 2012, Hurricane Sandy hit the East Coast of the U.S., causing much suffering and devastation. Those who could have easily helped Sandyâs victims had a duty to do so. But was this a rightfully enforceable duty of justice, or a non-enforceable duty of beneficence? The answer to this question is often thought to depend on the kind of help offered: the provision of immediate bodily services is not enforceable; the transfer of material resources is. I argue that this double standard is unjustified, and defend a version of what I call âSocial Samaritanism.â On this view, within political communities, the duty to help the needyâwhether via bodily services or resource transfersâis always an enforceable demand of justice, except when the needy are reckless; across independent political communities, it is always a matter of beneficence. I defend this alternative double standard, and consider its implications for the case of Sandy
Canine Justice: An Associative Account
A prominent view in contemporary political theory, the âassociative viewâ, says that duties of justice are triggered by particular cooperative relations between morally significant agents, and that âthereforeâ principles of justice apply only among fellow citizens. This view has been challenged by advocates of global justice, who point to the existence of a world-wide cooperative network to which principles of justice apply. Call this the challenge from geographical extension. In this paper, I pose a structurally similar challenge to the associative view: the challenge from species extension. This says that the existing network of cooperation extends beyond the human species, to encompass some non-human animals, particularly domesticated dogs. In light of this, if one believes that (i) certain non-human animals are morally significant (i.e. objects of moral concern), and that (ii) justice applies to fellow cooperators, one should also hold that domesticated dogs are owed justice in much the same way our human fellow citizens are. I conclude by considering the implications of this argument for the associative view, and animal-rights theory
Global Justice and the Role of the State: A Critical Survey
Reference to the state is ubiquitous in debates about global justice. Some authors see the state as central to the justification of principles of justice, and thereby reject their extension to the international realm. Others emphasize its role in the implementation of those principles. This chapter scrutinizes the variety of ways in which the state figures in the global-justice debate. Our discussion suggests that, although the state should have a prominent role in theorizing about global justice, contrary to what is commonly thought, acknowledging this role does not lead to anti-cosmopolitan conclusions, but to the defense of an âintermediateâ position about global justice. From a justificatory perspective, we argue, the state remains a key locus for the application of egalitarian principles of justice, but is not the only one. From the perspective of implementation, we suggest that state institutions are increasingly fragile in a heavily interdependent world, and need to be supplementedâthough not supplantedâwith supranational authorities
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