Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession

This article investigates the most important determinants of domestic institutional change in combating corruption and reforming the judiciary in Bulgaria and Romania since EU accession in 2007. It explores how EU and domestic incentives trigger domestic institutional change, and how the two interact with one another. It argues that political leaders and parties will only continue and deepen reforms in response to the twin forces of EU and domestic influence. The EU incentives that shape elite choices stem primarily from public monitoring by the European Commission of government performance and the possibility of sanctions by the EU. The domestic incentives centre on winning elections and holding power, with substantial variation explained in part by diverging sources of domestic support

EU democracy promotion in the European neighbourhood: political conditionality, economic development and transnational exchange

How effective and relevant is European Union political conditionality for the promotion of democracy in third countries? This article reports the results of a panel study of 36 countries of the East European and Mediterranean neighbourhood of the EU for the years 1988—2004. The analysis shows robust and strong effects of EU political conditionality on democracy in the neighbouring countries if the EU offers a membership perspective in return for political reform. Absent the offer of membership, however, EU incentives such as partnership and cooperation do not reliably promote democratic change. The analysis controls for economic development and transnational exchanges as two alternative potential causes of democratization. Although economic and geographical factors have an impact on democratization in the European neighbourhood as well, EU political conditionality remains a significant influence

Is europeanisation through conditionality sustainable?: lock-in of institutional change after EU accession

Is the impact of EU accession conditionality sustainable after target states achieve EU membership? Although accession changes the incentive structure for compliance, this article suggests that a lock-in of pre-accession institutional changes can contribute to their persistence even after the EU's sanctioning power weakens. A case study of gender equality institutions in five new member states suggests that a combination of government partisan preferences and veto players explains whether such lock-in occurs. If institutional change no longer fits government preferences, the key condition is the presence of veto players who can lock in institutional change. Rather than impairing Europeanisation, as the literature often assumes, domestic veto players can thus foster it. However, the case study also finds that veto players can lock in non-compliance too if conditionality was unsuccessful, and it appears easier to reverse earlier institutional change than to redress the lack of it