The CIS Common Electric Power Market

Trade in electric power and mutual investments are at a low level and do not correspond with the sector’s potential. The CIS is a net exporter of electric power, but the actual volumes of import and export are small. CIS countries are capable of more, having large coal and gas reserves with huge potential for energy production, vast hydropower potential, and competitive advantage in power engineering. In spite of the considerable revival during recent years, mutual investments remain at a low level and are characterised by a one-sided structure. Power markets (power industry, hydrocarbons, coal, uranium) are specific: it is necessary to combine a complex approach to fuel and energy balance with functional integration in these unique markets. In the 2000s, the EurAsEC began work on creating a common power market (CPM). It goes without saying that, at the level of conception, power markets must be regarded as interrelated, which allows the implementation of the principle of comparative advantages in the process of integrating different countries. Alongside this, power industries may form separate markets with their own specific regulations. The idea of a common power market, which is the basis of the systematic work of the EurAsEC, inadequately reflects the peculiarities of the power industry. In our opinion, the subject that should be considered is the creation of a number of common markets, such as: an electric power market, an oil and gas market, and a coal market. The creation of a uranium market may then follow. In spite of their evident dependence on each other, each of these markets is very specific and consequently should be regulated independently Creating a common power market entails a number of solvable problems. The completion of the liberalisation of the Russian market, which is the biggest, networked market of the CIS, is one of the most important preconditions for the development of a common power market. In general, the integration of the power market is dependant on the institutional peculiarities of the national electric-power industry in the key countries. Despite this, if an optimal regulative environment is established, a common power market can still be created even with the preservation of a considerable presence of public companies in the generation and distribution of energy. Advancement towards a continental Eurasian common power market is economically rational. Russia and its neighbours are interested in Eurasian integration, which would not be constrained by the boundaries of the post-Soviet space. The very logic of a CPM urges us to go beyond the boundaries of the post-Soviet area. Russia and Kazakhstan are keen promoters of the CPM, as are a number of other CIS countries including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Belarus. Practically all of the CIS countries could gain real advantages as exporters and transmitters of electric power if real electric energy market mechanisms are introduced, thereby dealing with countries of Eurasia such as China, Iran, India, Turkey and EU countries. A CPM for Eurasia would develop gradually, founded on a number of bi- and multilateral agreements.post-Soviet space; electric power market; economic integration

Nuclear Energy Complexes: Prospects for Development and Cooperation

1. 2005–2006 was a critical period in the development of the nuclear complexes of Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. These years have ushered in a “nuclear renaissance”. Russia’s nuclear sector was subject to a total systemic review; the Federal Target Program (FTP) allocated to it funds totaling more than USD 55 billion. A decision was taken to consolidate all nuclear assets within one state corporation. Kazakhstan implemented the “15000 tons uranium by 2010” state development program. Its development programs for reactors and nuclear power plants are worked out jointly with Russia. Closer cooperation is also being pursued with other leaders in the field, primarily Japanese companies. Cooperation agreements between the two countries were adopted. The foundation of three joint ventures (JV) was the first tangible outcome of above agreements. 2. Meanwhile Kazakh uranium has become a focus of attention and fierce competition between the world’s largest consumers, including France, Canada, USA, Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia. Early this decade, Russia’s substantial production capacity and highly competitive uranium ore conversion technologies added to calls for the country to renew its economic links with Kazakhstan in the uranium mining and nuclear industries. Given Russia’s ambitious plans to develop nuclear energy, and the fact that its uranium stocks are practically depleted, the benefits of closer cooperation with Kazakhstan are clear. However, Russia will have to compete with well-established players on Kazakhstan’s uranium market. 3. Kazakhstan has aspirations to become a world leader in uranium mining and to focus production at the highly processed end of the nuclear fuel cycle. This was the backdrop for a recent transaction which will have a significant impact on the country’s nuclear industry. In the autumn of 2007, KazAtomProm purchased Toshiba’s 10% share in Westinghouse Electrics, a leading producer of nuclear reactors, for USD 540 million. This transaction has secured a permanent nuclear alliance between KazAtomProm, Toshiba and Westinghouse Electrics. For Kazakhstan, this creates new opportunities to develop a hi-tech nuclear industry and to market its output in the West. Supplying high-end nuclear products to Western markets is one of KazAtomProm’s development priorities, along with continued cooperation with Russia in supplying Soviettype reactors. 4. The need to integrate the nuclear power complexes of Kazakhstan and Russia along the entire production chain is a logical response to their urgent need to reduce their energy deficit, and to the synergies which exist between their production capacities and technologies at each stage of the nuclear fuel production chain: (1) uranium mining, (2) uranium enrichment, (3) production of fuel pellets and fuel elements, (4) reactor design and production, primarily 300 MW VBER-300 power reactors, (5) construction and operation of nuclear power plants, and (6) nuclear waste processing and disposal. 5. Kazakhstan has plans to develop its own nuclear power industry and is likely to base this on 300 MW Russian-Kazakh reactors and, in the longer-term, 1000 MW Westinghouse reactors. 6. The development of this capital-intensive sector will require extensive financing based on credit from a number of sources. International and national development banks are one promising potential source of such funding. The ability to secure this capital from international and national development banks rests entirely upon the nuclear energy industry’s potential for development, innovation, diversification and integration. The Eurasian Development Bank, VEB (Russian Development Bank) and the Development Bank of Kazakhstan have indicated their recognition of this. E.g., the EDB has extended credit to the Russian-Kazakh Zarechnoye JV.nuclear industry, economic cooperation, economic development, Russia, Kazakhstan, Eurasian Economic Community, CIS

Recoil proton distribution in high energy photoproduction processes

For high energy linearly polarized photon--proton scattering we have calculated the azimuthal and polar angle distributions in inclusive on recoil proton experimental setup. We have taken into account the production of lepton and pseudoscalar meson charged pairs. The typical values of cross sections are of order of hundreds of picobarn. The size of polarization effects are of order of several percents. The results are generalized for the case of electroproduction processes on the proton at rest and for high energy proton production process on resting proton.Comment: LaTeX2e, 4 pages, 3 figure

Holding together regionalism and the interaction of functional bureaucracies

The paper focuses on regional integration projects established by countries originally comprising a single political entity after its collapse. It shows that in this framework the existing economic ties between countries are likely to adversely affect the interests of functional bureaucracy to support regional integration given the cutting off the existing connections is often more promising from the point of view of the budget expansion. Hence, interaction of national and supranational bureaucracies is unlikely to generate impetus for increasing regional cooperation. On the other hand, external economic shocks are likely to boost “holding-together” regionalism. The empirical case for the analysis is that of the regional cooperation of the post-Soviet countries in the area of transportation and power utilities.holding-together regionalism; regional integration; bureaucracy; post-Soviet countries

Is it really different? Patterns of regionalisation in the post-Soviet Central Asia

While the regional economic integration encompassing the former Soviet Union (FSU) transpires to be inefficient, there appears to be a stronger interest in regionalism in smaller groups of more homogenous and geographically connected countries of the region, specifically, Central Asia. Using a new dataset, we find that although the economic links between the Central Asian countries are more pronounced than between that of the CIS in several key areas, this advantage has been disappearing fast over the last decade. In addition, the trend of economic integration of Central Asia strongly correlates to that of the CIS in general. Currently Central Asia should be treated as a sub-region of the post-Soviet world rather than a definite integration region.On the other hand, however, we find that Kazakhstan emerges as a new centre for regional integration, which can bear some potential for regionalism in Central Asia, and that there is an increasing trend towards greater economic interconnections with China in Central Asia. --regionalisation,economic integration,post-Soviet space,Central Asia

The EurAsEC Transport Corridors

The geographic and geo-economic location of EurAsEC countries gives them significant strategic potential for freight transit. EurAsEC has motorway and railway corridors running east-west and north-south, and a number of new corridors are being constructed. However, to handle such huge volumes of cargo, the region’s existing transport infrastructure must be modernised. Sea vs land: 2:1. Transportation of transit cargo by sea (transoceanic service) has some strong advantages, such as low delivery cost, established relationships with customers and high standards of service. This leads us to conclude that sea transit will prevail in the near future. Land transit routes offer only one competitive advantage – speed of delivery, which is two to three times faster compared with the sea routes linking East Asia with Eastern Europe. This advantage must be exploited. A considerable proportion of “time-sensitive” transit (some 16 million tonnes annually, according to the most conservative estimate) can be redirected to ITCs operated by EurAsEC. There are a number of physical and non-physical barriers to the realisation of the EurAsEC’s transit potential. Physical barriers include the poor state of motorways and railways and their related infrastructure, i.e. obsolete rolling-stock, which prevents any increase in transportation speeds and volumes; existing roads do not meet international standards; border crossing points and logistics centres have a low throughput capacity. Non-physical barriers include cumbersome permit systems, unreasonable delays in crossing borders, various charges and additional taxes imposed by regulatory and local authorities, scheduled and spot-check inspections of cargo weight, etc. The non-physical barriers are the most significant obstacles to the development of cargo transit in the region and cause serious delays in cargo delivery. Time lost does not only result in loss of money and customer trust, but also the loss of the main (in fact the only) competitive advantage land transit has over sea transit. Given their geographic position and national economic interests, Russia, Kazakhstan and their neighbours have a direct interest in the Eurasian integration process that extends beyond the boundaries of the post-Soviet space and involves the region’s most important countries. Projects implemented in certain economic sectors provide a reliable basis for regional economic integration. What begins in those key sectors eventually spreads to the institutional level. In this context, therefore, transportation must be among these priority sectors.Eurasian Economic Community, transport infrastructure, transport corridors, economic integration, post-Soviet space