Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Auction Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India

This paper undertakes structural estimation of asymmetric auction models in a market for basmati, and detects the presence of a cartel consisting of a large (in market share) local miller and commission agents purchasing for large distant millers. The contracts between the distant millers and their commission agents help to explain the specific form that collusion takes. Simulations indicate that (i) the cartel gains considerably by colluding, over the competitive outcome; (ii) however, sellers (farmers) do not lose significantly under collusion when the commission agents bid; (iii) a knowledgeable auctioneer would choose much higher starting prices for auctions when commission agents bid, compared with the observed starting prices. The paper also shows that efficient collusion, the form of collusion commonly assumed in the literature, does not explain the data well.Auctions, Cartels, Agricultural Markets.

SOCIAL CONTRACTS, MARKETS AND EFFICIENCY -- GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION IN NORTH INDIA

This paper uses primary data to analyze the institutions and informal markets that govern groundwater allocation in the principal sugarcane belt of North India. In contrast to earlier literature, we find that the observed water trades result in efficient water allocation across farms. We interpret this and other stylized facts in terms of a simple bargaining model with limited inter-player transfers. Poor functioning of the power sector leads to reduced pumping and a water supply constraint. Simulations show that power supply reform can significantly increase farm yields, be financed out of the increased farm profits, and provide an instrument to use for attaining intertemporal efficiency in water allocation.water markets, market structure, water production function.

Are consumers willing to pay more for biofortified foods?: Evidence from a field experiment in Uganda

Vitamin A deficiency is a major health problem in Africa and in many other developing countries. Biofortified staple crops that are high in beta-carotene and adapted to local growing environments have the potential to significantly reduce the prevalence of vitamin A deficiency. One such example is the orange sweet potato (OSP). Because of its distinctive orange color, which is in contrast to the white varieties that are typically consumed in Africa, it is important to assess whether consumers will accept it. This paper attempts to address this question by using a choice experiment with the real product to quantify the magnitude of the premium or discount in consumers' willingness to pay that may be associated with it. It also considers the extent to which the provision of nutrition information affects valuations. Finally, the paper addresses whether the use of hypothetical scenarios is justified in a developing country context, and quantifies the magnitude of hypothetical bias that results as a consequence. We examine whether a “cheap talk” script, which as elaborated in the paper, reminds respondents that hypothetical scenarios are to be treated as if they are real, is effective in mitigating hypothetical bias. The experiment was conducted in Uganda, a key target country for the dissemination of orange sweet potato. Our results suggest that in the absence of nutrition information, there is no difference between white and orange varieties in consumers' willingness to pay, but there is a discount for yellow sweet potato (which does not have any beta-carotene). The provision of nutrition information does translate into substantial premia for the orange varieties, indicating that an information campaign may be key to driving market acceptance of the new product. Finally, there is a substantial hypothetical bias in both the willingness to pay (WTP), and the marginal WTP, for the new varieties; while “cheap talk” may mitigate this bias, it does not eliminate it.Cheap talk, Field experiments, Hypothetical bias, conjoint analysis, Universal logit,