A Public Dilemma: Cooperation with Large Stakes and a Large Audience

We analyze a large-stakes prisoner's dilemma game played on a TV show. Players cooperate 40% of the time, demonstrating that social preferences are important; however, cooperation is significantly below the 50% threshold that is required for inequity aversion to sustain cooperation. Women cooperate significantly more than men, while players who have "earned" more of the stake cooperate less. A player's promise to cooperate is also a good predictor of his decision. Surprisingly, a player's probability of cooperation is unrelated to the opponent's characteristics or promise. We argue that inequity aversion alone cannot adequately explain these results; reputational concerns in a public setting might be more important.

Calculations of the thermodynamic and kinetic properties of LiV3O8

The phase behavior and kinetic pathways of Li1+xV3O8 are investigated by means of density functional theory (DFT) and a cluster expansion (CE) methodology that approximates the system Hamiltonian in order to identify the lowest energy configurations. Although DFT calculations predict the correct ground state for a given composition, both GGA and LDA fail to obtain phase stability consistent with experiment due to strongly localized vanadium 3d electrons. A DFT+U methodology recovers the correct phase stability for an optimized U value of 3.0eV. GGA+U calculations with this value of U predict electronic structures that qualitatively agree with experiment. The resulting calculations indicate solid solution behavior from LiV3O8 to Li2.5V3O8 and two-phase coexistence between Li2.5V3O8 and Li4V3O8. Analysis of the lithiation sequence from LiV3O8 to Li2.5V3O8 reveals the mechanism by which lithium intercalation proceeds in this material. Calculations of lithium migration energies for different lithium concentrations and configurations provides insight into the relevant diffusion pathways and their relationship to structural properties

Beauty and the Sources of Discrimination

We analyze discrimination against less attractive people on a TV game show with high stakes. The game has a rich structure that allows us to disentangle the relationship between attractiveness and the determinants of a player’s earnings. Unattractive players perform no worse than attractive ones, and are equally cooperative in the prisoner’s dilemma stage of the game. Nevertheless, they are substantially more likely to be eliminated by their peers, even though this is costly. We investigate third party perceptions of discrimination by asking subjects to predict elimination decisions. Subjects implicitly assign a role for attractiveness but underestimate its magnitude

Is Beauty only Skin-deep? Disentangling the Beauty Premium on a Game Show

This paper analyzes behavior on a TV game show where players’ monetary payoffs depend upon an array of factors, including ability in answering questions, perceived cooperativeness and the willingness of other players to choose them. We find a substantial beauty premium and are able to disentangle contributing factors. Attractive players perform no differently than less attractive ones, on every dimension. They also exhibit and engender the same degree of cooperativeness. Nevertheless, attractive players are substantially less likely to be eliminated by their peers. Our results suggest a consumption value basis for the beauty premium

A Public Dilemma: Cooperation with Large Stakes and a Large Audience

We analyze a large-stakes prisoner's dilemma game played on a TV show. Players cooperate 40% of the time, demonstrating that social preferences are important; however, cooperation is significantly below the 50% threshold that is required for inequity aversion to sustain cooperation. Women cooperate significantly more than men, while players who have "earned" more of the stake cooperate less. A player's promise to cooperate is also a good predictor of his decision. Surprisingly, a player's probability of cooperation is unrelated to the opponent's characteristics or promise. We argue that inequity aversion alone cannot adequately explain these results; reputational concerns in a public setting might be more important

CALIFA reveals Prolate Rotation in Massive Early-type Galaxies: A Polar Galaxy Merger Origin?

We present new evidence for eight early-type galaxies (ETGs) from the CALIFA Survey that show clear rotation around their major photometric axis ("prolate rotation"). These are LSBCF560-04, NGC 0647, NGC 0810, NGC 2484, NGC 4874, NGC 5216, NGC 6173 and NGC 6338. Including NGC 5485, a known case of an ETG with stellar prolate rotation, as well as UGC 10695, a further possible candidate for prolate rotation, we report ten CALIFA galaxies in total that show evidence for such a feature in their stellar kinematics. Prolate rotators correspond to ~9% of the volume-corrected sample of CALIFA ETGs, a fraction much higher than previously reported. We find that prolate rotation is more common among the most massive ETGs. We investigate the implications of these findings by studying N-body merger simulations, and show that a prolate ETG with rotation around its major axis could be the result of a major polar merger, with the amplitude of prolate rotation depending on the initial bulge-to-total stellar mass ratio of its progenitor galaxies. Additionally, we find that prolate ETGs resulting from this formation scenario show a correlation between their stellar line-of-sight velocity and higher order moment h_3, opposite to typical oblate ETGs, as well as a double peak of their stellar velocity dispersion along their minor axis. Finally, we investigate the origin of prolate rotation in polar galaxy merger remnants. Our findings suggest that prolate rotation in massive ETGs might be more common than previously expected, and can help towards a better understanding of their dynamical structure and formation origin.Comment: accepted for publication in A&

Per-site occupancy in the discrete parking problem

We consider the classical discrete parking problem, in which cars arrive uniformly at random on any two adjacent sites out of n sites on a line. An arriving car parks if there is no overlap with previously parked cars, and leaves otherwise. This process continues until there is no more space available for cars to park, at which point we may compute the jamming density En/n, which represents the expected fraction of occupied sites. We extend the classical results by not just considering the total expected number of cars parked, but also the probability of each site being occupied by a car. This we then use to provide an alternative derivation of the jamming density