The intelligence reform agenda: what next?

Intelligence is now at the forefront of our national security effort. Recent reforms have delivered more money and more people to the intelligence community but limited structural changes. This Policy Analysis, by Carl Ungerer, offers an assessment of the intelligence reform agenda and proposes some further steps towards restructuring the intelligence community and its activities to meet the national security challenges of the next decade. It argues that reforms to the coordination mechanisms, community engagement, education, training and accountability regimes are necessary to ensure that intelligence continues to play a central role in Australia’s national security

Atmospheric trace element abundances associated with slash burning

The atmospheric trace element abundances associated with slash burning have been measured by instrumental neutron activation analysis (INAA). On site ground level samples were collected during the slash burning season using high volume samplers and a cascade impactor. In addition to the air samples, soil, wood and ashed wood samples were collected for analysis. The abundances of up to 29 elements were determined in each of the samples. The results show the air particulate to be a mixture of upswept soil and wood ash. From the particle size analysis and the calculated enrichment factors, wood ash was shown to be the major source of the elements Br, Cl, Hg, Sb, Se, Zn, K and As. Of greatest interest is the high concentration of K associated with small particles. Laboratory ashing of wood samples at 500°C and 1100°C showed the elements Zn, Na, K, Se, Hg, Br, and Cl to be depleted from 70-95% at 1100°C relative to unburned wood

The Canberra Commission: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead

Despite its inauspicious start and virtual abandonment by the new Coalition government in Australia, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons continued to attract international attention in arms control and disarmament circles

The "Middle power" concept in Australian foreign policy

During the early 1990s, the Hawke and Keating Labor governments promoted Australia's diplomatic credentials as an activist and independent middle power. Labor claimed that by acting as a middle power Australia was constructing a novel diplomatic response to the challenges of the post-Cold War world. But a closer reading of the official foreign policy record since 1945 reveals that previous conservative governments have also taken a similar view of Australia's place and position on the international stage. This essay traces the historical evolution of the middle power concept in Australian foreign policy and concludes with an assessment of the Howard government's more recent reluctance to use this label and its implications for Australia's future middle power credentials. Although its use has waxed and waned in official policy discourse and it is more commonly associated with Labor governments, the middle power concept itself and the general diplomatic style it conveys have been one of the most durable and consistent elements of Australia's diplomatic practice

Influence without power: Middle powers and arms control diplomacy during the Cold War

This article examines the evolution of middle power diplomacy on arms control during the Cold War. It argues that despite several attempts to influence major arms control negotiations, the structural constraints imposed by strict bipolarity—particularly during the early stages of the Cold War—limited the room for diplomatic manoeuvre by the small and medium-sized states. Factors such as the geographical voting groups within the United Nations system and the self-imposed discipline within traditional alliance structures typically restricted middle power initiatives on the important questions of international security such as arms control. Nonetheless, a number of efforts were made by leading middle powers such as Australia and Canada to progress the cause of arms control and significant policy ideas were at least canvassed during this time. The historical evidence shows that the middle powers were not innocent bystanders in the Cold War arms control debates, but whatever influence they had was ultimately subordinate to the overwhelming structural power of Washington and Mosco