Informality: Causes and Consequences for Development

This article reviews the economic literature on informality, its causes, and its consequences for development. It covers a comprehensive body of research that ranges from well-identified experimental studies to equilibrium macro models, and which more recently includes structural models that integrate both micro and macro effects. The results available in the literature indicate that lowering the costs of formality is not an effective policy to reduce informality but may generate positive aggregate effects, such as higher output and total factor productivity (TFP). The most effective formalization policy is to increase enforcement on the extensive margin but not on the intensive margin of informality. The former generates substantial gains in aggregate TFP and output, without necessarily increasing unemployment. However, the overall welfare impacts are likely to depend on the transitional dynamics between steady states, which remains an open area for future research

Enforcement of Labour Regulation and the Labour Market Effects of Trade: Evidence from Brazil

How does enforcement of labour regulations shape the labour market effects of trade? We combine local economic shocks generated by the unilateral trade liberalisation in Brazil and enforcement variation across regions to show that regions with stricter enforcement observed: (i) lower informality; (ii) larger losses in overall employment; (iii) greater reductions in the number of formal plants. Regions with weaker enforcement experienced opposite effects. All these effects are concentrated on low-skill workers. Our results indicate that greater flexibility introduced by informality allows both formal firms and low-skill workers to cope better with adverse labour market shocks

Firms, informality, and development: theory and evidence from Brazil

This paper develops and estimates an equilibrium model where heterogeneous firms can exploit two margins of informality: (i) not register their business, the extensive margin; and (ii) hire workers "off the books," the intensive margin. The model encompasses the main competing frameworks for understanding informality and provides a natural setting to infer their empirical relevance. The counterfactual analysis shows that once the intensive margin is accounted for, firm and labor informality need not move in the same direction as a result of policy changes. Lower informality can be, but is not necessarily associated with higher output, TFP, or welfare

Firms, informality, and development: theory and evidence from Brazil

This paper develops and estimates an equilibrium model where heterogeneous firms can exploit two margins of informality: (i) not register their business, the extensive margin; and (ii) hire workers "off the books," the intensive margin. The model encompasses the main competing frameworks for understanding informality and provides a natural setting to infer their empirical relevance. The counterfactual analysis shows that once the intensive margin is accounted for, firm and labor informality need not move in the same direction as a result of policy changes. Lower informality can be, but is not necessarily associated with higher output, TFP, or welfare

Do lower taxes reduce informality? Evidence from Brazil

We exploit a unique, large-scale formalization program in Brazil to estimate the effects of reducing the costs of formality on firm formalization. We rely on both firm-level administrative data and individual panel data to show that reducing taxes once registration costs have already been eliminated reduces firm informality. This effect comes from the formalization of existing informal firms, and not from the creation of new formal businesses nor greater formal firm survival. The implied formalization elasticity is otherwise low, and our cost-benefit analysis indicates that the program led to net losses in tax revenues

Information frictions and access to the Paycheck Protection Program

The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) extended 669 billion dollars of forgivable loans in an unprecedented effort to support small businesses affected by the COVID-19 crisis. This paper provides evidence that information frictions and the “first-come, first-served” design of the PPP program skewed its resources towards larger firms and may have permanently reduced its effectiveness. Using new daily survey data on small businesses in the U.S., we show that the smallest businesses were less aware of the PPP and less likely to apply. If they did apply, the smallest businesses applied later, faced longer processing times, and were less likely to have their application approved. These frictions may have mattered, as businesses that received aid report fewer layoffs, higher employment, and improved expectations about the future

Do lower taxes reduce informality? Evidence from Brazil

We exploit a unique, large-scale formalization program in Brazil to estimate the effects of reducing the costs of formality on firm formalization. We rely on both firm-level administrative data and individual panel data to show that reducing taxes once registration costs have already been eliminated reduces firm informality. This effect comes from the formalization of existing informal firms, and not from the creation of new formal businesses nor greater formal firm survival. The implied formalization elasticity is otherwise low, and our cost-benefit analysis indicates that the program led to net losses in tax revenues

Economic shocks and crime: evidence from the Brazilian trade liberalization

This paper studies the effect of changes in economic conditions on crime. We exploit the 1990s trade liberalization in Brazil as a natural experiment generating exogenous shocks to local economies. We document that regions exposed to larger tariff reductions experienced a temporary increase in crime following liberalization. Next, we investigate through what channels the trade-induced economic shocks may have affected crime. We show that the shocks had significant effects on potential determinants of crime, such as labor market conditions, public goods provision, and income inequality. We propose a novel framework exploiting the distinct dynamic responses of these variables to obtain bounds on the effect of labor market conditions on crime. Our results indicate that this channel accounts for 75 to 93 percent of the effect of the trade-induced shocks on crime