What Acquaintance Teaches

In her black and white room, Mary doesn’t know what it is like to see red. Only after undergoing an experience as of something red and hence acquainting herself with red can Mary learn what it is like. But learning what it is like to see red requires more than simply becoming acquainted with it. To be acquainted with something is to know it, but such knowledge, as we argue, is object-knowledge rather than propositional-knowledge. To know what it is like one must know an appropriate propositional answer to the question ‘what is it like?’. Despite this mismatch between object-knowledge and knowing an answer, we believe that acquaintance is crucial to Mary’s epistemic progress. When Mary leaves her black and white room, her new knowledge tempts one to think that she must come to know a candidate answer (a coarse-grained fact) that she didn’t know in her room. Since Mary already knows all the physical facts in her room, any additional facts she might learn appear to threaten physicalism. In reply, many physicalists have been attracted to the phenomenal concept strategy according to which Mary can come to have new knowledge and hence know a new answer to the question ‘what is it like to see red?’ by entertaining a coarse-grained fact under a concept she didn’t possess in her room – Mary learns a new fine-grained fact. We believe both of these accounts of Mary’s epistemic progress are mistaken. As we argue, Mary could know every fact (coarse-grained and fine-grained) that might serve as an answer to the question ‘what is it like to see red?’ and still not know what it is like. The physical world leaves no leftover coarse-grained facts for Mary to learn and because concepts are sharable, easy to possess, and easy to introduce, there are possible situations in which Mary, while in her black and white room, has every concept that might make a fine-grained difference. In short, even when Mary is granted a great deal of factual knowledge and vast conceptual resources, she may still not know an appropriate answer to the question ‘what is it like to see red?’. But in any such situation, Mary lacks acquaintance with red and on this basis we argue that in order to know what it is like, in order for Mary to know an appropriate answer, Mary’s propositional knowledge must be appropriately related to her acquaintance with red

Anomaly Cancelations in Orientifolds with Quantized B Flux

We consider anomaly cancelations in Type IIB orientifolds on T^4/Z_N with quantized NS-NS sector background B-flux. For a rank b B-flux on T^4 (b is always even) and when N is even, the cancelation requires a 2^{b/2} multiplicity of states in the 59-open string sector. We identify the twisted sector R-R scalars and tensor multiplets which are involved in the Green-Schwarz mechanism. We give more details of the construction of these models and argue that consistency with the 2^{b/2} multiplicity of 59-sector states requires a modification of the relation between the open string 1-loop channel modulus and the closed string tree channel modulus in the 59-cylinder amplitudes.Comment: Revtex 3.0, 34 pages, 2 figures, references adde

Relict basin closure and crustal shortening budgets during continental collision: An example from Caucasus sediment provenance

Comparison of plate convergence with the timing and magnitude of upper crustal shortening in collisional orogens indicates both shortening deficits (200–1700 km) and significant (10–40%) plate deceleration during collision, the cause(s) for which remains debated. The Greater Caucasus Mountains, which result from postcollisional Cenozoic closure of a relict Mesozoic back‐arc basin on the northern margin of the Arabia‐Eurasia collision zone, help reconcile these debates. Here we use U‐Pb detrital zircon provenance data and the regional geology of the Caucasus to investigate the width of the now‐consumed Mesozoic back‐arc basin and its closure history. The provenance data record distinct southern and northern provenance domains that persisted until at least the Miocene. Maximum basin width was likely ~350–400 km. We propose that closure of the back‐arc basin initiated at ~35 Ma, coincident with initial (soft) Arabia‐Eurasia collision along the Bitlis‐Zagros suture, eventually leading to ~5 Ma (hard) collision between the Lesser Caucasus arc and the Scythian platform to form the Greater Caucasus Mountains. Final basin closure triggered deceleration of plate convergence and tectonic reorganization throughout the collision. Postcollisional subduction of such small (102–103 km wide) relict ocean basins can account for both shortening deficits and delays in plate deceleration by accommodating convergence via subduction/underthrusting, although such shortening is easily missed if it occurs along structures hidden within flysch/slate belts. Relict basin closure is likely typical in continental collisions in which the colliding margins are either irregularly shaped or rimmed by extensive back‐arc basins and fringing arcs, such as those in the modern South Pacific.Key PointsU‐Pb provenance indicates Greater Caucasus formed by postcollisional Cenozoic closure of a Mesozoic back arc basin likely ~350–400 km widePostcollisional subduction/underthrusting of such relict basins helps account for shortening deficits and delayed plate decelerationPlate convergence should not be expected to balance upper crustal shortening or the length of subducted slab following collisionPeer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/135981/1/tect20504.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/135981/2/tect20504_am.pd

News from Academy Bay

CDRS Research Highlights, 2004. Plants. Social Sciences. Vertebrates. Invasive Species Total Control Plan. Terrestrial Invertebrates. Project Isabela. Marine Sciences

Effect of Hookworm Infection on Wheat Challenge in Celiac Disease – A Randomised Double-Blinded Placebo Controlled Trial

Background and Aims: The association between hygiene and prevalence of autoimmune disease has been attributed in part to enteric helminth infection. A pilot study of experimental infection with the hookworm Necator americanus was undertaken among a group of otherwise healthy people with celiac disease to test the potential of the helminth to suppress the immunopathology induced by gluten

Pictures have propositional content

Although philosophers of art and aesthetics regularly appeal to a notion of ‘pictorial content’, there is little agreement over its nature. The present paper argues that pictures have propositional contents. This conclusion is reached by considering a style of argument having to do with the phenomenon of negation intended to show that pictures must have some kind of non-propositional content. I first offer reasons for thinking that arguments of that type fail. Second, I show that when properly understood, such arguments can in fact be turned on their heads and shown to support the propositionalist position

Recollection, perception, imagination

Remembering a cat sleeping (specifically, recollecting the way the cat looked), perceiving (specifically, seeing) a cat sleeping, and imagining (specifically, visualizing) a cat sleeping are of course importantly different. Nonetheless, from the first-person perspective they are palpably alike. Our first question is: Q1 What are these similarities (and differences)? The question can equally well be asked about other modalities—a purring cat could be substituted for a sleeping one, for example. But the chief examples will be visual. Despite the similarities between remembering, seeing, and imagining, one can readily distinguish them in one’s own case. When one sees a cat sleeping, one is often in a position to know that one sees a cat sleeping. (Or, at least, to know that one sees something, which perhaps unbeknownst to one is a cat sleeping.) In ordinary cases, there is no danger of confusing vision with recollection or imagination. Although confusion between recollection and imagination is more likely, it is not pervasive: usually there is little difficulty in knowing that one is recalling a cat sleeping, not (merely) visualizing a cat sleeping. 1 Our second question concerns this latter fact: Q2 How does one tell that one is recalling (and so not perceiving or imagining)? “By introspection ” is no doubt a correct answer, if ‘introspection ’ is taken as a label for that special first-person method—whatever it is—that delivers knowledge of one’s mental life. Correct, but hardly illuminating. Of course, there are versions of Q2 for perceiving and imagining, with equally unobvious substantive answers. The version of Q2 for perception will be addressed en route to answering the version for recollection. 1 Seeming to recall is an important category, but space precludes the discussion it deserves.