The Effects of Individual Vessel Quotas in the British Columbia Halibut Fishery

Implementation of Individual vessel quotas (IVQs) in the British Columbia halibut fishery has provided a unique opportunity to examine the effects of this management technique on a previously intense "derby" fishery. This paper describes the changes that have occurred in the fishery since the introduction of individual vessel quotas in 1991. The results presented here are largely based on the findings of two surveys. In September 1993, we conducted in-depth interviews with most of the major halibut processors in British Columbia. These processors reported significant changes in the processors and marketing of halibut. In Spring 1994, we conducted a mail survey of all 435 licensed halibut fishermen. The survey consisted of several series of questions designed to measure changes in fishing operations (crew size, fishing practices, etc.). quota leasing activities, changes in fishing income, and opinions about the effects of IVQs. The results presented here provide important information about the effects of the British Columbia halibut IVQ program to date and will be useful for comparison to similar management programs implemented elsewhere.fishery management, ITQs, Pacific Halibut, Environmental Economics and Policy, International Relations/Trade, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries — inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers, and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total harvest limits and input-controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen ‘natural experiments’ in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community, individual harvest, or territorial rights and also price ecosystem services — coupled with public research, monitoring and effective oversight — promote sustainable fisheries.incentives, sustainability, rights, fisheries management

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries (now replaced by EEN0508)

Using examples from more than a dozen fisheries, we highlight the failures of ‘command control’ management and show that approaches that empower fishers with the incentives and the mandate to be co-custodians of the marine environment can promote sustainability. Evidence is provided that where harvesters share well-defined management responsibilities over fish, and experience both the pain of overexploitation and the gains from conservation, they are much more likely to protect fish stocks and habitat. The key insight is that to maintain marine ecosystems for present and future generations, fishing incentives must be compatible with long-term goals of sustainability.incentives, sustainability, rights, fisheries management

A rejoinder to E. Pinkerton et al., the elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas

The purpose of this rejoinder is to respond to and question the many assertions made by Pinkerton et al. in the recently published Marine Policy article entitled: "The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas". Particular attention is paid to the assertion that 79% of the British Columbia Pacific halibut TAC is being leased out by "armchair fishermen". The rejoinder also discusses how ITQs, when used with other fishery management tools, such as catch monitoring, creates incentives that align more closely the fishermen harvesting behaviour and practices with the objectives of the resource manager.Individual transferable quotas Fisheries management Fisheries policy Fisheries catch monitoring

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries: inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries.This article is from Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 2006, 63(3): 699-710, doi:10.1139/f05-247.</p

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery ecosystem interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries: inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, developed fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and effective oversight promote sustainable fisheries