Price formation under small numbers competition: Evidence from land auctions in Singapore

10.1111/j.1540-6229.2006.00159.xReal Estate Economics34151-7

Sequential sales of similar assets: The law of one price and real estate

10.1111/j.1467-9787.2010.00691.xJournal of Regional Science512355-37

Local government internal structure, external constraints and the median voter

This paper examines how internal structure and external constraints affect local government ability to meet voters' demands. It applies the revealed preference method to US counties to identify those that fail to satisfy the pure democracy outcome of the median voter hypothesis (MVH). Probit analysis identifies the factors associated with counties that satisfy the MVH. Internal government structure does not matter but restricting home rule increases the likelihood of satisfying the MVH equilibrium, the latter result consistent with the leviathan model. The systematic differences found for urban and rural county governments reinforce this conclusion. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006Home rule, Leviathan, Median voter hypothesis,