Financial market integration under EMU

The single most important policy-induced innovation in the international financial system since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods regime is the institution of the European Monetary Union. This paper provides an account of how the process of financial integration has promoted financial development in the euro area. It starts by defining financial integration and how to measure it, analyzes the barriers that can prevent it and the effects of their removal on financial markets, and assesses whether the euro area has actually become more integrated. It then explores to which extent these changes in financial markets have influenced the performance of the euro-area economy, that is, its growth and investment, as well as its ability to adjust to shocks and to allow risk-sharing. The paper concludes analyzing further steps that are required to consolidate financial integration and enhance the future stability of financial markets

Financial Market Integration under EMU

The European Monetary Union (EMU) has been the single most important policy-induced innovation in the international financial system since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system. By eliminating exchange rate risk, EMU has eliminated a key obstacle to financial integration. But while a single currency is a necessary condition for the emergence of pan-European capital markets, it is not a sufficient one. Other frictions may still stand in the way of full integration: persistent differences in regulations applying to financial intermediaries, tax treatment, standard contractual clauses and business conventions, issuance policy, security trading systems, settlement systems, availability of information, and judicial enforcement may still segment financial markets along national borders. In the process that preceded and accompanied the introduction of the euro, however, monetary unification triggered a sequence of policy actions and private sector responses that swept aside many other regulatory barriers to financial integration. To what extent has this process of regulatory reform led to actual financial integration? And if European financial markets have actually become more integrated, to what extent have these changes spurred growth and investment in Europe? Will financial integration affect also the ability of households to shoulder risks, or the ability of European economies to adjust to macroeconomic shocks? Which policy lessons can we draw for the future of European financial markets?978-92-79-08237-5, Jappelli, Pagano, euro area, financial markets, financial integration, EMU

The Determinants of Savings: Lessons from Italy

In most of the postwar period Italy featured an abnormally high saving rate, compared to most other industrialized countries. But this is no longer true. Under any definition, in the last decade the Italian saving rate has fallen below the average of the developed economies. Why was the Italian saving ratio comparatively high and why has its decline been so dramatic? In this paper we consider various potential answers to these questions. We particularly focus on the recent slowdown in productivity growth, the development of credit and insurance markets, and the changes in the social security system. In the second part of the paper we use a series of repeated cross-sections from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth in order to check if the macroeconomic explanation for the decline in saving are consistent with microeconomic data.saving

Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A Survey

Information sharing about borrowers' characteristics and their indebtedness can have important effects on credit markets activity. First, it improves the banks' knowledge of applicants' characteristics and permits a more accurate prediction of their repayment probabilities. Second, it reduces the informational rents that banks could otherwise extract from their customers. Third, it can operate as a borrower discipline device. Finally, it eliminates borrowers' incentive to become over-indebted by drawing credit simultaneously from many banks without any of them realizing. Understanding the effects of information sharing also helps to shed light on some key issues in the design of a credit information system, such as the relationship between public and private mechanisms, the dosage between black and white information sharing, and the "memory" of the system. Merging the insights from theoretical models with the lessons of experience, one can avoid serious pitfalls in the design of credit information systems.information sharing, credit markets

Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence

Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard, and can therefore increase lending and reduce default rates. To test these predictions, we construct a new international data set on private credit bureaus and public credit registers. We find that bank lending is higher and proxies for default rates are lower in countries where lenders share information, regardless of the private or public nature of the information sharing mechanism. We also find that public intervention is more likely where private arrangements have not arisen spontaneously and creditor rights are poorly protected.information sharing, credit market, default rate

The Welfare Effects of Liquidity Constraints

We analyze the welfare implications of liquidity constraints for households in an overlapping generations model with growth. In a closed economy with exogenous technical progress, liquidity constraints reduce welfare if the economy is dynamically inefficient. But if it is dynamically efficient, some degree of financial repression is required to maximize steady-state utility, even though some generations are hurt in the transition. With endogenous technical progress, financial repression may increase welfare even along the transition path, thus leading to a Pareto improvement. In this case the optimal degree of financial repression increases as the economy grows.saving, liquidity constraints,

Information Sharing in Credit Markets: International Evidence

Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard, and can therefore increase lending and reduce default rates. We construct a new international data set on credit bureaus and public credit registers. The theoretical predictions are broadly consistent with our data. We also study why central banks often supplement private arrangements by creating public credit registers and distribution of information about borrowers` credit histories. Public intervention is more likely where creditor rights are poorly protected and private arrangements have not arisen spontaneously.

Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience

We describe the operation of credit bureaus and public credit registers in Europe and extract potential lessons for upgrading credit registers in other countries. The evidence that we report is based on questionnaires directed to private credit bureaus and central banks, on direct interviews and on official sources. The European experience highlights a set of important issues. First, European privacy protection laws affect greatly the amount and type of information shared between lenders. Second, credit bureaus tend to originate from local lenders. Third, in Europe as elsewhere there are powerful forces pushing towards consolidation of the credit bureaus industry. While this process reflects the "natural monopoly" feature of the industry, its pace has been accelerated by technological factors and, especially within Europe, by the increasing international integration of capital markets. Three annexes complete the paper, reporting detailed descriptions of private credit bureaus activity in European countries, the main features of European public credit registers, and privacy protection restrictions to the activity of credit bureaus and public credit registers in Europe.information sharing, credit markets

The Determinants of Savings: Lessons from Italy

In most of the postwar period Italy featured an abnormally high saving rate in comparison to that of most other industrialized countries. But this is no longer true. Under any definition, in the last decade the Italian saving rate has fallen below the average of the developed economies. Why was the Italian saving ratio comparatively high and why has its decline been so dramatic? In this paper we consider various potential answers to these questions. We particularly focus on the recent slowdown in productivity growth, the development of credit and insurance markets, and changes in the social security system. In the second part of the paper we use a series of repeated cross-sections from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth in order to determine whether the macroeconomic explanations for the decline in saving are consistent with microeconomic data.