85 research outputs found
German and international crisis management in the Sahel: why discussions about Sahel policy are going around in circles
n May, Germanyâs parliament approved the country's continued military particiÂpation in two missions in Mali and the Sahel. As part of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) and the EU Training Mission EUTM Mali, up to 1,550 German soldiers can be deployed. Given the scale of these engagements, which are currently Germany's largest, German discussions on Sahel policy, like those elsewhere, have been sluggish and unproductive. One reason for this is that buzzÂwords and false certainties determine the debate, which is largely detached from strategic considerations. (Autorenreferat
Cameroon and Boko Haram: time to think beyond terrorism and security
The terrorist organisation Boko Haram will determine Cameroonâs medium-term domestic and security agenda. Together with an underestimated structural propensity to crisis and political conflict, this presents the country with a double challenge. The ability of Cameroonian state and society to master both is far lower than talk about this "regional anchor of stability" would have it. Europe should start developing ideas on crisis prevention. (Autorenreferat
Mali, the G5 and security sector assistance: political obstacles to effective cooperation
While the security situation in Mali and its border areas continues to deteriorate, the new "Force Conjointe" (FC) of the G5 Sahel states completed its first military operation in mid-November. Its aim is to make a regional contribution to the fight against terrorism and organized crime. A summit was held in Paris on 13 December to mobilise further financial and equipment support for FC. Germany and the EU are strongly committed to this project alongside France. However, efforts to enhance regional armed forces are fraught with problems. International partners prefer a capacity-building approach geared to short-term success over security sector reform and lack a coordinated strategy. The Malian government, on the other hand, preserves the status quo and is not prepared to accept its political responsibility. (Autorenreferat
United Nations peacekeeping and the use of force: the Intervention Brigade in Congo is no model for success
The number of uniformed personnel serving in UN peace missions reached a new record in 2016, at almost 123,000. Following grave failings of UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, there is growing awareness within the UN of a widening disjoint between the expectations placed upon peacekeeping forces and what they can actually achieve. One aspect of the debate relates to the question of how robustly UN missions should operate in enforcing their mandate. In some quarters the resolute use of force is seen as the key to greater success. Almost three years ago the UN sent a Force Intervention Brigade to Congo with an explicit mandate to neutralise armed groups. An assessment of its record reveals that the brigade cannot be regarded as an organisational model worth replicating, and that peace-enforcing mandates do not necessarily lead to greater success in peacekeeping. (author's abstract
UN peacekeeping in Mali: time to adjust Minusma's mandate
The mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Minusma) ends on 30 June 2019. There is little doubt that the UN Security CounÂcil will extend the mission. Less clear is how Minusma contributes to Maliâs stabilisation and how the mandate could be altered to increase the missionâs effectiveness. In light of changing conditions in Mali, the Security Council should consider a stronger Minusma engagement in central Mali. But for this to happen, cuts must be made in the north. (Autorenreferat
Operation Barkhane and the future of intervention in the Sahel: the shape of things to come
France is preparing to change its posture in the Sahel. After a "mini surge" of 600 addiÂtional soldiers since February 2020, its counterterrorism Operation Barkhane is likely to revert to the pre-surge level, with more reductions possible in the medium term. Regardless of the details and timetable of the adjustments, French policy toward the Sahel is evolving as Paris seeks to balance a lighter military footprint with counterterrorÂism goals, the continued internationalization of intervention, and more local responsibility. (author's abstract
France's Africa policy under president Macron: good intentions, partial reform and the fiasco in the Sahel
Since his election in 2017, President Emmanuel Macron has tried to distance himself from established and widely criticised patterns of France's Africa policy. He diversified relations with Africa in regional and substantive terms, integrated non-state actors and cultivated a comparatively open approach to Franceâs problematic past on the conÂtinent. However, Macron's efforts to craft a narrative of change was overshadowed by path dependencies, above all the continuation of the military engagement in the Sahel and incoherent relations with autocratic governments. The involuntary military withdrawal first from Mali (2022), from Burkina Faso (2023) and finally from Niger (announced for late 2023) marks a historic turning point in Franco-African relations. The question is no longer whether relations between France and its former colonies will change; the real question is whether Paris will be able to shape this change or if it will be a mere bystander to a transformation that is largely driven by African actors. (author's abstract
Nigeria: Boko Haram and the regionalization of terrorism
The wave of violence unleashed in north-eastern Nigeria by the militant terror group Boko Haram and the regionalization of terrorism have spurred neighboring Chad, Cameroon and Niger into action. Since March 2015, they have been conducting military operations in the border regions, sometimes on Nigerian territory, in an effort to push back the terrorists. Nigeria and its neighbors have officially agreed a multilateral military operation with the aim of neutralizing Boko Haram. However, for domestic political reasons, Nigeria is blocking regional cooperation, while a UN Security Council mandate for the force is in the making. International support for the planned military operation will be futile unless Abuja changes course. It remains to be seen, if the newly elected President Muhammadu Buhari will bring change. (Autorenreferat
The hidden costs of power-sharing: reproducing insurgent violence in Africa
This article analyzes some factors underlying the spread of insurgent violence in Africa. It focuses on the impact external factors have on power struggles on the continent. The first of these is the unsteady support for democracy from Western donors, which has impeded more far-reaching domestic changes in much of Africa. Second are wider changes in the international setting that dramatically enhanced the international standing of armed movements in the post-1989 period. The article argues that the interplay of both factors has induced would-be leaders to conquer state power by violent rather than non-violent means. This becomes particularly evident in regard to Western efforts to solve violent conflict through power-sharing agreements. The hypothesis is put forward that the institutionalization of this practice for the sake of âpeaceâ, i.e. providing rebels with a share of state power, has important demonstration effects across the continent. It creates an incentive structure would-be leaders can seize upon by embarking on the insurgent path as well. As a result, and irrespective of their effectiveness in any given case, power-sharing agreements may contribute to the reproduction of insurgent violence
The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: Presidential Term Limits in Africa
In Africa, a seemingly growing number of attempts by presidents to overcome or abrogate term limits, or make them otherwise ineffective, has ignited a debate about the significance of constitutional engineering, and its implications for the rule of law, democracy, and the nature of politics in general. In light of recent instances of âthird-term bids,â we revisit the hypothesis about the institutionalisation of power in Africa and challenge the assumption that, over the past two decades, African politics have experienced a fundamental change away from âbig manâ rule towards the rule of law. Based on a comprehensive stocktaking of the state of play of term limits and third-term bids, we analyse broader trends and outcomes of legal and constitutional engineering. We argue that an analysis focusing exclusively on formal institutions and procedures misrepresents the extent of political change by ignoring power and authority in many African countries. While the growing salience of formal institutions is undeniable, we suggest that they matter more as a legitimisation of the power of political leaders than as a constraint to it.Die anscheinend zunehmenden Versuche von PrĂ€sidenten in Afrika, MandatsbeschrĂ€nkungen zu umgehen, abzuschaffen oder auf anderem Wege auszuhebeln, haben eine Debatte ĂŒber die Bedeutung von VerfassungsĂ€nderungen und deren Folgen fĂŒr Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Demokratie und die Politik generell ausgelöst. Im Lichte jĂŒngster Versuche von PrĂ€sidenten, sich eine dritte Amtszeit zu verschaffen, ĂŒberprĂŒfen die Autoren die These der Institutionalisierung von Macht in Afrika. Sie hinterfragen die Annahme, dass sich die politischen Systeme in Afrika im Verlauf der letzten beiden Jahrzehnte grundlegend gewandelt haben - von der "Big-Man"-Politik hin zur Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Auf der Grundlage einer umfassenden Bestandsaufnahme der Bedeutung von AmtszeitbeschrĂ€nkungen und der Versuche, sie zu umgehen, analysieren sie Trends und Ergebnisse juristischer und verfassungsrechtlicher Manipulationen. Die Autoren argumentieren, dass eine Analyse, die ausschlieĂlich auf formale Institutionen und Verfahren fokussiert, die Reichweite des politischen Wandels verkennt, weil sie die tatsĂ€chlichen AutoritĂ€ts- und Machtstrukturen in vielen afrikanischen LĂ€ndern auĂer Acht lĂ€sst. Zwar ist der Bedeutungszuwachs formaler Institutionen offenkundig, nach EinschĂ€tzung der Autoren liegt ihre faktische Bedeutung jedoch mehr in der Legitimierung von Macht als in deren BeschrĂ€nkung
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