Government expenditures on education, health, and infrastructure : a naive look at levels, outcomes, and efficiency

All interested parties seem to agree that it is important to be able to monitor public sector performance at the sectoral level, but most current work based on multi-country databases does not lend itself to country-specific conclusions. This is due to a large extent to major data limitations both on sectoral expenditures and on sectoral outcomes. This paper discusses the related issues and shows what we can do with the current data inspite of the drastic limitations. The main conclusions of the paper are that any efforts to assess country-specific performances in relative terms are likely to be difficult in view of the data problems. A rough sense of performance across sectors can be estimated for groups of countries, allowing some modest benchmarking exercises. These estimates show that low-income countries generally lag significantly behind higher-income countries. Efficiency has improved during the 1990s in energy and education but has not improved significantly in transport.Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Public Sector Expenditure Analysis&Management,Inequality,Economic Theory&Research,Poverty Monitoring&Analysis

Technical efficiency gains from port reform : the potential for yardstick competition in Mexico

The authors show how relatively standard methodologies can help to measure the efficiency gains from reforming the organization of port infrastructure, how those measures can be used to promote competition between ports, and how competition can be built into an incentive-driven regulatory regime. As illustration, they use a case study of port reform in mexico in 1993, the first efficiency analysis of port restructuring in a developing country. Their analysis, which covers 1996-99 and relies on a stochastic production frontier, shows that overall, Mexico has achieved annual efficiency gains of 6-8 percent in the use of port infrastructure since assigning its management to independent, decentralized operators. Changes in relative performance ratings are revealing. They identify consistent sets of leaders and laggards, including some that would not have been identified by partial productivity indicators commonly used in the sector. The authors'main conclusions: 1) Reforms have significantly improved average port performance. 2) The analytically sound performance rankings allowed by the port-specific efficiency measures can help to promote yardstick competition in the sector. These rankings are superior to those that would emerge from use of partial productivity indicators. They account for the joint effects of all inputs on outputs--which is crucial, because it avoids the risk of inconsistent rankings based on different partial indicators, arbitrarily chosen. Developing the database method to measure efficiency in countries with no strong tradition of database development is an enormous task--especially in transport sectors, where the tradition of generating databases useful to policymakers is in its infancy. The most immediate effect of this exercise was to reveal the poverty of the database in the Mexican port sector and the need for regulators to invest in its development.Transport and Trade Logistics,Environmental Economics&Policies,Labor Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Common Carriers Industry,Environmental Economics&Policies,Ports&Waterways,Transport Security,Economic Theory&Research,Transport and Trade Logistics

Forecasting the demand for privatized transport - What economic regulators should know, and why

Forecasting has long been a challenge, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. But the analytical instruments and data processing capabilities available through the latest technology, and software, should allow much better forecasting than transport ministries, or regulatory agencies typically observe. Privatization brings new needs for demand forecasting. More attention is paid to risk under privatization, than when investments are publicly financed. And regulators must be able to judge traffic studies done by operators, and to learn what strategic behavior influenced these studies. Many governments, and regulators avoid good demand, modeling out of lack of conviction that theory, and models can do better than the"old hands"of the sector. This is dangerous when privatization changes the nature of business. For projects amounting to investments of $100-200 million, a cost of$ 100,000-200,000 is not a reason to reject a reasonable modeling effort. And some private forecasting firms are willing to sell guarantees, or insurance with their forecasts, to cover significant gaps between forecasts, and reality.Markets and Market Access,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Decentralization,Banks&Banking Reform,Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Access to Markets,Environmental Economics&Policies

Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries

This paper shows empirically that"privatization"in the energy, telecommunications, and water sectors, and the introduction of independent regulators in those sectors, have not always had the expected effects on access, affordability, or quality of services. It also shows that corruption leads to adjustments in the quantity, quality, and price of services consistent with the profit-maximizing behavior that one would expect from monopolies in the sector. The results suggest that privatization and the introduction of independent regulators have, at best, only partial effects on the consequences of corruption for access, affordability, and quality of utility services.Infrastructure Regulation,Energy Production and Transportation,Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Social Accountability,ICT Policy and Strategies

Public-private partnerships in transport

This paper summarizes the evidence on the evolution of transport PPPs over the last 15 years or so. In the process, it provides a primer on the associated policy issues, including of the central role of project finance in the implementation of PPP policies and the debates on risk allocation in the design of PPPs. The paper also offers a discussion of the increasingly well recognized residual roles for the public sector in transport, with an emphasis on the regulatory debates surrounding the adoption of PPPs.Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Debt Markets,Banks&Banking Reform,Access to Finance,

Infrastructure performance and reform in developing and transition economies: evidence from a survey of productivity measures

The authors review about 80 studies on electricity and gas, water and sanitation, and rail and ports (with a footnote on telecommunications) in developing countries. The main policy lesson is that there is a difference in the relevance of ownership for efficiency between utilities and transport in developing countries. In transport, private operators have tended to perform better than public operators. For utilities, ownership often does not matter as much as sometimes argued. Most cross-country studies find no statistically significant difference in efficiency scores between public and private providers. As for the country-specific studies, some do find differences in performance over time but these differences tend to matter much less than a large number of other variables. Across sectors, private operators functioning in a competitive environment or regulated under price caps or hybrid regulatory regimes tend to catch up best practice faster than public operators. There is a very strong case to push regulators in developing and transition economies toward a more systematic reliance on yardstick competition in a sector in which residual monopoly powers tend to be common.Enterprise Development&Reform,Labor Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Health Economics&Finance

Processes, information, and accounting gaps in the regulation of Argentina's private railways

Almost a decade after Argentina began privatizing its railways, resolution of conflicts between regulators, users, and operators continues to take longer, and to be more difficult, than expected. The authors contend that many of these conflicts arose because there are no rules for interactions between the key stakeholders: government, regulators, users, unions, and the media. One result of inexperience in setting up concession agreement has been that the agreements did not clearly define the information needed for oversight and regulation. Argentine rail concession contracts were supposed to be specific about the way tariffs, quality, investment, exclusivity, and so on, would change over time. And the newly created regulatory bodies were given some discretion about adjusting the contracts in the face of unforeseen developments. However, initial privatization were carried out in such a way that there was no time to refine terms, so many loopholes remained. Those unforeseen events have happened, and the regulatory agency, the National Commission for Transport Regulation (CNRT), has had to adapt its procedures and decisions to available information. In some cases, alleged modifications of the operating environment have led to renegotiations. Changes have been introduced in the approach to furnishing information to the government for oversight and regulatory accounting. The changes center on clearer definitions in connection with four major issues: a) The measurement of efficiency; b) access prices; and c) the financial model. Circumstances in the Argentine rail industry early in 2001 did not favor dramatic changes, but current renegotiations could be used to adjust information requirements to reflect what has been learned through six yearsof experience.Environmental Economics&Policies,Knowledge Economy,Labor Policies,Decentralization,Financial Intermediation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation,Banks&Banking Reform,Education for the Knowledge Economy,Knowledge Economy

What do Basel Capital Accords mean for SMEs?

This paper analyses the impact of the new Basel Capital Accords (Basel II and Basel III) on the bank’s capital requirements in a portfolio of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) when the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach is used. To do this, the study uses a large database of Spanish firms and covers the period from 2005 to 2009. We also examine the effect on the credit risk premium charged by banks of the guarantee offered by a Loan Guarantee Association (LGA) to a SME; and whether this foreseeable decrease in the interest rates applicable to the SME is compensated by the cost of this guaranteeBank capital requirements, Credit risk mitigation, Bank financing of SMEs, Basel II, Basel III Loan Guarantee Association

Price caps, efficiency payoffs, and infrastructure contract renegotiation in Latin America

Twenty years ago, as the United Kingdom was getting ready to launch the privatization of its public services, Professor Littlechild developed and operationalized the concept of price caps as a regulatory regime to control for residual monopoly conditions in those services. Ten years later, Latin American countries, as they embarked into their own infrastructure reforms, also adopted the price cap regulatory model. Relying on a large data base on the factors driving contract renegotiation in the region and a survey of the literature on efficiency gains, the authors assess the impact of this regulatory regime in Latin America. They show that while the expected efficiency gains were amply achieved, these gains were seldom passed on to the users. Instead they were shared by the government and the firms. Moreover, the adoption of price caps implied higher costs of capital and hence, tariffs, and brought down levels of investment.International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Decentralization,Labor Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Water Supply and Sanitation Participation,Community Participation in Water Supply and Sanitation

Credit risk mitigation and SMEs bank financing in Basel II : the case of the Loan Guarantee Associations

The objective of this paper is to analyse the impact of the techniques foreseen in the Basel Agreement II (BII) for mitigating the risk of default on bank loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In particular, we will conduct an analysis of the effect of the guarantees that the Loan Guarantee Association (LGA) offer to the SMEs on the assignment of capital requirements of the financial entities under BII. At the same time, the study will examine the effect of this guarantee on the credit risk premium that the financial entities should charge their clients, and whether this foreseeable decrease in the interest rates applicable to the SMEs is compensated by the cost of the guarantee. The results show that, considering that the cost of the LGA guarantee in Spain is around 0.68%, it will be advantageous for an SME with the annual sales of less than or equal to €5 million to request this guarantee whenever the probability of default (PD) of the LGA is <1.1%, if the approach utilised by the financial entity is the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) and the SME is considered as corporate; however, if the SME is included in a regulatory retail portfolio, then the limit for the PD of the LGA decreases to 0.71%. On the other hand, when the approach utilised is the Standardised one, then will be profitable for an SME treated as retail to request this guarantee whenever the PD of the LGA is <3.35% (3.95% for corporate exposures)