Cross-Border Interbank Networks, Banking Risk and Contagion

Recent events emphasize the role of cross-border linkages between banking systems in transmitting local developments across national borders. This paper analyzes whether international linkages in interbank markets affect the stability of interconnected banking systems and channel financial distress within a network consisting of banking systems of main advanced countries for the period 1993-2009. Methodologically, I use a spatial modelling approach to test for spillovers in cross-border interbank markets. The results suggest that foreign exposures in banking play a significant role in channelling banking risk: I find that countries which are linked through foreign borrowing or lending positions to more stable banking systems abroad are significantly affected by positive spillover effects. From a policy point of view, this implies that especially in stable times linkages in the banking system can be beneficial, while they have to be taken with caution in times of financial turmoil covering the whole system

Uncertainty, financial crises, and subjective well-being

This paper focuses on the effect of uncertainty as reflected by financial market variables on subjective well-being. The analysis is based on Eurobarometer surveys, covering 20 countries over the period from 2000 to 2013. Individuals report lower levels of life satisfaction in times of higher uncertainty approximated by stock market volatility. This effect is heterogeneous across respondents: The probability of being unsatisfied is higher for respondents who are older, less educated, and live in one of the GIIPS countries of the euro area. Furthermore, higher uncertainty in combination with a financial crisis increases the probability of reporting low values of life satisfaction

Aktuelle Trends: Ungewöhnliche Zeiten in der Geldpolitik: Niedriges Zinsniveau begleitet von hohen Zentralbankreserven

Mit dem Ausbruch der Finanzkrise 20072008 und der sich anschließenden Staatsschuldenkrise kam es zu zahlreichen Veränderungen in der Implementierung der Geldpolitik im Euroraum. Oberstes Ziel der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) ist dabei die Wahrung der Preisstabilität und ein funktionierender Geldtransmissionsmechanismus

Bank Risk Proxies and the Crisis of 2007/09: A Comparison

Motivated by the variety of bank risk proxies, our analysis reveals that nonperforming assets are a well-suited complement to the Z-score in studies of bank risk

Risikobewertung von Staatsanleihen im Euroraum während der Staatsschuldenkrise von Ansteckungseffekten getrieben

Die europäische Staatsschuldenkrise hat in vielen Ländern zu Zinsaufschlägen auf Staatsanleihen geführt. Dies war vor allem in den Jahren 2010 und 2011 in Ländern wie Griechenland, Italien oder Spanien zu beobachten. Zur gleichen Zeit blieben die Kreditrisiken deutscher oder französischer Staatsanleihen auf einem moderaten Niveau. Trotz der unterschiedlichen Entwicklung in den Niveaus findet man ein hohes Maß an Gleichbewegung von Kreditrisiken in den Ländern des Euroraums. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit dies durch strukturelle Ähnlichkeiten, internationale Verflechtungen und globale Marktentwicklungen erklärt werden kann

1st IWH-FIN-FIRE Workshop on Challenges to Financial Stability

Im Rahmen des Workshops tauschten sich internationale Teilnehmerinnen und Teilnehmer über aktuelle Forschungspapiere rund um das Thema „Challenges to Financial Stability“ aus. Im Wesentlichen diente der Workshop als Plattform, um Änderungen in den regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen des Finanzsektors und die daraus resultierenden Einflüsse auf die Finanzstabilität bzw. die Konsequenzen für die Realwirtschaft zu diskutieren

Sovereign Credit Risk Co-movements in the Eurozone: Simple Interdependence or Contagion?

Since the onset of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis, credit risk spreads in Europe have diverged. Despite this divergence, credit risk comoves strongly within certain country groups such as the eurozone periphery. We seek to answer what the determinants of the observed pattern of credit risk co-movements are and whether and during which periods sovereign debt markets have been subject to contagion. We proceed in three steps. First, we apply dynamic conditional correlations from a multivariate GARCH model to sovereign CDS spreads of 17 countries over the period 2008 to 2012. Second, we separate periods of simple interdependence from contagion. Third, we analyze the determinants behind credit risk co-movements and the role of contagion using regression analysis. Our results reveal a high degree of co-movements in sovereign credit risk, especially for eurozone countries during the sovereign debt crisis. We find strong evidence for both fundamentals and nonfundamentals based contagion. Similarities in economic fundamentals, cross-country linkages in banking and common market sentiment play a significant role

Central Bank Transparency and Cross-border Banking

We analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross-border bank activities. Based on a panel gravity model for cross-border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that a rise in central bank transparency in the destination country, on average, increases cross-border claims. Using interaction models, we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross-border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent. Central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered complements by banks investing abroad

Taxing Banks: An Evaluation of the German Bank Levy

Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system, the real economy, and public finances. Regimes for restructuring and restoring banks financed by bank levies and fiscal backstops seek to reduce these costs. Bank levies attempt to internalize systemic risk and increase the costs of leverage. This paper evaluates the effects of the German bank levy implemented in 2011 as part of the German bank restructuring law. Our analysis offers three main insights. First, revenues raised through the bank levy are minimal, because of low tax rates and high thresholds for tax exemptions. Second, the bulk of the payments were contributed by large commercial banks and the head institutes of savings banks and credit unions. Third, the levy had no effect on the volume of loans or interest rates for the average German bank. For the banks affected most by the levy, we find evidence of fewer loans, higher lending rates, and lower deposit rates