Classification of Hazardous Areas Produced by Maintenance Interventions on N.G. Distribution Networks and in Presence of Open Surface of Flammable Liquid

The safety and protection of workers is a duty of their employer. In case of the presence of hazardous areas due to the risk of explosion, an area classification has to be performed to identify the shape and size of the locations where an explosion may happen. Two typical cases that can produce hazardous areas are gas emissions from a containment system, because of normal operation or because of a failure, and vapor emissions from an open surface pool of flammable liquid. In this paper, two studies are presented: the first deals with the problem of natural gas releases during maintenance work on the gas distribution network, and the second with vapor emissions from a pool of flammable liquid. In the first case, experimental measures have been performed to easily calculate the size of the hazardous area; in the second case, computer simulations are used to derive a simplified model to determine it. The results of the two studies presented are examined and commented in the light of the International and national Standard

Lightning protection of PV systems

Lightning strikes can affect photovoltaic (PV) generators and their installations, involving also the inverter's electronics. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the risk connected to lightning strikes in order to adopt the correct protective measures for the system. The Standard IEC (EN) 62305-2 reports the procedures for the risk calculation and for the choice of proper lightning protection systems. Usually the technical guidelines suggest protecting with SPDs (surge protective devices) both DC and AC sides of the PV installation. The paper estimates overvoltages due to lightning discharges and evaluates the actual need of lightning protection measures on the basis of the results of the risk analysis and of the protection costs. The paper in the first part presents the procedure for the evaluation of the risk connected to lightning strikes according to the Standard IEC EN 62305-2; then it applies the procedure to typical PV installations, analyzing risks and risk components which have to be kept into account. In the second part the paper studies the surge overcurrents to be expected on LV systems, induced voltages caused by direct flashes and by flashes near the PV installation. Approximated equations for the calculation of induced voltages and currents are given for different types of LPS (lightning protection systems) and lightning flashes. In the last part of the paper the methodology is applied as an example to a practical case and some conclusions are give

Area classification for explosive atmospheres: comparison between European and North American approaches

The object of this paper is to review various methods of determining the extent of hazardous areas in industrial facilities where explosive gas or vapor atmospheres may be present. Three different approaches are analyzed and compared. The first one is recommended in North American Standards, such as API500, API505 and NFPA 497. The second is one of the proposals for the second edition of the International Standard IEC 60079-10-1 (adopted as European standard EN 60079-10-1). The third approach had been previously worked out with the authors‘ contribution and had been adopted by the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 since 2001. The last two approaches are analytical, meanwhile the first one is prescriptive. In the second part of the paper both analytical approaches are applied to the releases which are analyzed in NFPA 497 as practical examples. Resulting hazardous area extents are compared and the differences among the three methods are discusse

Large N.G. explosion and fire involving several buried utility networks

This paper describes an accident (explosion and natural gas fire) that occurred in Turin (Italy), in which power distribution cables, tramway network feeding cables and a gas pipe were involved. The described accident is particularly interesting because it occurred in the town centre and lasted several hours, producing a very high risk for the population. Fortunately, nobody was injured, but 120 people were evacuated for 24 h. The sequence of events is described, the involved facilities are examined and the physical processes which led to the different top events are discussed. Actually, starting from a modest event (600 V electric cable loss of insulation), which most likely lasted for months, the aforementioned accident was reached in a crescendo of domino effects. This sequence has been represented by an ISD in which the failure of the different protection systems is highlighted. These protection systems were mostly based upon the strict respect of procedures both in the installation and in the following maintenance of the different utilities. These aspects have been also briefly devised in the light of Italian and foreign regulations concerning the problem of the coexistence of buried utilities

Dangerous touch voltages in buildings: The impact of extraneous conductive parts in risk mitigation

International (IEC) European (CENELEC) and American (NEC) Standards require, in each building, the connection of extraneous conductive parts (i.e. metal water or gas pipes) to the main grounding terminal. There are two good reasons for this: the voltage between extraneous conductive parts and exposed conductive parts is zeroed and extraneous conductive parts can contribute to the leakage of fault current into the ground. There is however a third advantage in the bonding connection: the entire structure (floors and walls of the building), together with the exposed and the extraneous metallic parts, forms a quasi-equipotential system, with the consequent strong reduction of touch voltages. Metallic pipes and reinforcement of reinforced concrete have a particular relevance thanks to their large widespread through buildings. However, in some practical cases, it is not possible to connect all extraneous conductive parts to the protective equipotential bonding because they are not accessible. In the paper, the reduction of touch voltages in buildings, when these extraneous conductive parts are present but not connected to the protective equipotential bonding is quantified. Different building models are created and solved by the finite element method in order to calculate touch voltages in different scenarios. The results show that the mere presence of widespread metallic parts in buildings helps to reduce touch voltages, but not enough to ensure safety against indirect contacts. The electrical installation safety performance is greatly improved in reinforced concrete buildings if at least some easily accessible parts, like water or central heating pipes, are connected to the main grounding terminal. Also in brick buildings, they provide a certain reduction of GPR, maximum and mean touch voltages

Hazardous areas extension in explosive atmospheres caused by free gas jets

This paper regards the validation procedure of the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 formula, used to calculate the hazardous areas extensions in places where explosive gas atmospheres may be present. In industrial activity, a typical event which cause explosive atmosphere consists of damaging and leakage from unions, gaskets, valves of pipes and vessels. At this purpose, in this work it has been taken into account the accidental discharge of flammable gas into a quiescent atmosphere through an orifice. Validation has been performed by comparing calculated values with experimental data. Two gases have been taken into account: methane and hydrogen. Different scenarios have been analyzed, each one differing from the others in the gas release cross section and in the vessel pressure. Results show that the formula fits well not catastrophic industrial accident situation

MV ground fault current distribution: An analytical formulation of the reduction factor

Global Earthing Systems (GESs) are defined by international standards IEC 61936-1 and EN 50522 as an equivalent Earthing System (ES) created by the interconnection of local ESs. Thanks to this interconnection, just a percentage of the total fault current is injected to ground in a single ES, reducing the risk of electrocution. However, even if several experiments and models proved this effect, the identification and official certification is already a difficult task. If dangerous scenarios caused by a single line to ground fault can be easily evaluated for a specific MV feeder by measurement or analytic models (quite cumbersome to use), operative procedures valid for all the scenarios are not still available. In this work, a simplified formula to compute the reduction factor is presented, as well as its rationale. The proposed formula is easy to use and the results provided are sufficiently accurate, taking into account a desired safety margin. For this reason, it could be a valid tool for Distributor System Operators (DSO) and Certification Bodies and a step forward for the GES identification

Fault Current Detection and Dangerous Voltages in DC Urban Rail Traction Systems

In this paper, the electrical safety of dc urban traction systems is analyzed, with particular focus on fault current detection and on dangerous voltages which could arise in case of fault. For the discussion, the tram network of Turin, Italy, is used as a case study. First, the structure of the dc traction power supply is described, analyzing in detail the different components; then, the safety of the system is analyzed, examining possible types of fault. In particular, ground faults inside the substation and ground faults along the line are analyzed in detail. Fault currents and dangerous voltages are calculated, thanks to a simplified steady-state circuital model of the traction system. Finally, the consequent risks for the people are examined and some conclusions and possible solutions are presented

A Comparative Review of the Methodologies to Identify a Global Earthing System

International Standards IEC 61936-1 and EN 50522 define a global earthing system (GES) as the earthing network, created by the interconnection of local earthing systems that should guarantee the absence of dangerous touch voltages. Despite that, standards do not provide any official practical guidelines for its identification. The official classification of GES areas would lead to a simplification of the design and verification procedures of medium voltage/low voltage (MV/LV) substations grounding systems with associated economical savings for both distribution system operators and MV users. To overcome this regulatory vacuum, several teams of researchers proposed methods to identify the presence of a GES. In this paper, the main methods developed to identify a GES are presented. The different methodologies are applied to a real urban scenario and compared