50 research outputs found

    Monetary policy, capital inflows, and the housing boom

    Get PDF
    We estimate an open economy VAR model to quantify the effect of monetary policy and capital inflows shocks on the US housing market. The shocks are identified with sign restrictions derived from a standard DSGE model. We find that monetary policy shocks have a limited effect on house prices and residential investment. In contrast, capital inflows shocks driven by an increase in foreign savings have a positive and persistent effect on both housing variables. Other sources of capital inflows shocks, such as foreign monetary expansion or an increase in aggregate demand in the US, have a more limited role.Monetary policy ; Money supply ; International finance

    Low interest rates and housing booms: the role of capital inflows, monetary policy and financial innovation

    Get PDF
    A number of OECD countries experienced an environment of low interest rates and a rapid Increase in real house prices and residential investment during the past decade. Different explanations have been suggested for the housing boom: expansionary monetary policy, capital inflows due to a global savings glut and excessive financial innovation combined with inappropriately lax financial regulation. In this study we examine the effects of these three factors on the housing market. We estimate a panel VAR for a sample of OECD countries and identify monetary policy and capital inflows shocks using sign restrictions. To explore how the effects of these shocks change with the structure of the mortgage market and the degree of securitization, we allow the VAR coefficients to vary with mortgage market characteristics. Our results suggest that both types of shocks have a significant and positive effect on real house prices, real credit to the private sector and residential investment. The response of housing variables to both types of shocks is stronger in countries with more developed mortgage markets. The amplification effect of mortgage-backed securitization is particularly strong for capital inflows shocks.Money supply ; Capital movements

    Does Macro-Pru Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment

    Get PDF
    The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro-prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence—lacking to date—on both questions, using a unique dataset. In the UK, regulators have imposed time-varying, bank-specific minimum capital requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK-owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This “leakage” is substantial, amounting to about one-third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change.

    Financial Protectionism: the First Tests

    Get PDF
    We provide the first empirical tests for financial protectionism, defined as a nationalistic change in banks’ lending behaviour, as the result of public intervention, which leads domestic banks either to lend less or at higher interest rates to foreigners. We use a bank-level panel data set spanning all British and foreign banks providing loans within the United Kingdom between 1997Q3 and 2010Q1. During this time, a number of banks were nationalised, privatised, given unusual access to loan or credit guarantees, or received capital injections. We use standard empirical panel-data techniques to study the “loan mix,” domestic (British) loans of a bank expressed as a fraction of its total loan activity. We also study effective short-term interest rates, though our data set here is much smaller. We examine the loan mix for both British and foreign banks, both before and after unusual public interventions such as nationalisations and public capital injections. We find strong evidence of financial protectionism. After nationalisations, foreign banks reduced the fraction of loans going to the UK by about eleven percentage points and increased their effective interest rates by about 70 basis points. By way of contrast, nationalised British banks did not significantly change either their loan mix or effective interest rates. Succinctly, foreign nationalised banks seem to have engaged in financial protectionism, while British nationalised banks have not.

    The European Central Bank's QE: A New Hope

    Full text link
    We examine the impact of the ECB’s QE on Euro Area real GDP and core CPI with a Bayesian VAR, estimated on monthly data from 2012M6 to 2016M4. We assess the total impact via a counter-factual exercise, country-by-country and through alternative transmission channels. QE anouncement shocks are identified with four different identification schemes as in Weale and Wieladek (2016). We find that in absence of the first round of ECB QE, real GDP and core CPI would have been 1.3% and 0.9% lower, respectively. The effect is roughly 2/3 times smaller than in the UK/US. Impulse response analysis suggests that the policy is transmitted via the portfolio rebalancing, the signalling, credit easing and exchange rate channels. Spanish real GDP benefited the most and Italian the least

    The spillovers, interactions, and (un)intended consequences of monetary and regulatory policies

    Get PDF
    Have bank regulatory policies and unconventional monetary policies—and any possible interactions—been a factor behind the recent “deglobalisation” in cross-border bank lending? To test this hypothesis, we use bank-level data from the UK—a country at the heart of the global financial system. Our results suggest that increases in microprudential capital requirements tend to reduce international bank lending and some forms of unconventional monetary policy can amplify this effect. Specifically, the UKŚłs Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) significantly amplified the effects of increased capital requirements on cross-border lending. Quantitative easing did not appear to have a similar effect and countries with stronger prudential capital regulations were partially insulated against the effects of these changes in UK policy. We find that this interaction between microprudential regulations and the FLS can explain roughly 30% of the contraction in aggregate UK cross-border bank lending between mid-2012 and end-2013, corresponding to around 10% of the global contraction in cross-border lending. This suggests that unconventional monetary policy designed to support domestic lending can have the unintended consequence of reducing foreign lending. Keywords: Capital requirements; Funding for Lending Scheme; Financial deglobalisatio

    Firms' price, cost and activity expectations: evidence from micro data

    Get PDF
    Firms’ expectations play a central role in modern macroeconomic models, but little is known empirically about how these are formed or whether they matter for economic outcomes. Using a novel panel data set of manufacturing firms’ expectations about prices and wage rates, new orders, employment and unit costs for the United Kingdom, we document a range of stylized facts about the properties of firms’ expectations and their relationship with recent experience. There is wide dispersion of expectations across firms. Expected future price and wage growth are influenced by firm-specific factors but macroeconomic factors also matter. Expectations of employment and new orders are influenced by firm-specific measures of past orders while expected unit costs seem to be influenced more by firm-specific cost pressures and aggregate import prices. After controlling for a wide range of variables we find a significant connection between past expected price and wage increases and their out-turns. But there is also strong evidence that firms’ expectations are clearly not rational
    corecore