Reflections

The American Society of International Law Committee recommended that the Manley 0. Hudson Medal be awarded to Professor Eric Stein for his lifetime of significant contributions to international and comparative law. Stein, the Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, Emeritus, at the University of Michigan Law School, had been an active supporter of ASIL as Honorary Vice President, Counsellor, and Honorary Editor of, and frequent contributor to, the American Journal of International Law. His many books and articles established him as a leading thinker and writer on European Community law and on what he described in a famous article as the Uses, Misuses, and Nonuses of Comparative Law

Beyond voting rights suspension : tailored sanctions as democracy catalyst under Article 7 TEU

Article 7 TEU empowers the Council to suspend certain rights derived from the application of the Treaties. The suspension of voting rights in the Council is one such example. This contribution examines which other rights can be suspended. It uses sanction theories and a textual and contextual analysis of the sanction provision contained in Article 7 TEU to assess the options the Council has, and develops guidelines and suggests improvements of the institutional framework for devising sanctions. The contribution argues for targeted sanctions against individuals and entities that form the political and economic basis of regimes deviating from the fundamental liberal-democratic values. The sanction must be tailored to the causes of the deviation in such a way that they can enhance democratic pluralism

Passing-on-standing matrix in private antitrust enforcement : a reconciliation of economic and justice approaches

Any scheme for private antitrust enforcement is framed by two main questions: who will have standing – direct or indirect purchasers – and will the passing-on defense be allowed. Imagine that a cartel of oil producers forces gas stations – direct purchasers – to buy petrol at a higher than competitive price. The gas stations then raise the price for the final customers – indirect purchasers. When the gas stations sue the cartel, the cartelist will claim that no damage has occurred to the gas stations, because the gas stations have passed on the overcharge to its final customers – the passing-on defense. In the United States, the ruling of the California Supreme Court in Clayworth v. Pfizer, alongside a report of the Antitrust Modernization Commission of 2007, spurred new debate on whether the 1970s Federal case law should be overruled. The situation in the European Union has been even more challenging. The Court of Justice of the EU surprised everybody with two landmark cases in the early 2000s, in which the court set up a basic scheme for private antitrust enforcement. However, neither the EU nor the Member States had the appropriate legislation in place. The article analyzes these latest developments, offering new solutions to both jurisdictions. I argue that the practice of passing on increases the total social welfare loss resulting from the existence of a cartel. To remedy the problem, I suggest a system that allows the passing-on defense, grants indirect purchasers standing, and multiplies the damages award. Such a system will lead to direct-purchaser suits being the rule, with indirect purchasers remaining subsidiary enforcers. It will also prompt the direct purchasers to commence the antitrust litigation in the proper time, thus limiting the additional social inefficiencies created by the cartel

Judicial appointments : the article 255 TFEU advisory panel and selection procedures in the Member States

This article assesses recent reforms of the appointment procedure for members of the Court of Justice and the General Court. We evaluate the effects of the establishment of the Article 255 TFEU Panel. Next to a discussion on the transparency of the Panel's opinions, the criteria set and the role it plays in reappointments, we present case studies of the selection procedure in fourteen Member States, representing new and old, and small and large Member States. Our analysis shows that far from being a paper tiger, the Article 255 TFEU Panel has proven to have a significant impact: it has had a chilling effect on a number of national nominations but also indirectly influenced the selection processes in some Member States, thus limiting arbitrariness. However, opening up judicial appointments to scrutiny at both the EU and the national level has resulted in a subtle move into the direction of judicial self-government

Judicial Appointments: The Article 255 TFEU Advisory Panel and Selection Procedures in the Member States

This article assesses recent reforms of the appointment procedure for members of the Court of Justice and the General Court. We evaluate the effects of the establishment of the Article 255 TFEU Panel. Next to a discussion on the transparency of the Panel’s opinions, the criteria set and the role it plays in reappointments, we present case studies of the selection procedure in fourteen Member States, representing new and old, and small and large Member States. Our analysis shows that far from being a paper tiger, the Article 255 TFEU Panel has proven to have a significant impact: it has had a chilling effect on a number of national nominations but also indirectly influenced the selection processes in some Member States, thus limiting arbitrariness. However, opening up judicial appointments to scrutiny at both the EU and the national level has resulted in a subtle move into the direction of judicial self-government

Judicial Appointments: The Article 255 TFEU Advisory Panel and Selection Procedures in the Member States

This article assesses recent reforms of the appointment procedure for members of the Court of Justice and the General Court. We evaluate the effects of the establishment of the Article 255 TFEU Panel. Next to a discussion on the transparency of the Panel's opinions, the criteria set and the role it plays in reappointments, we present case studies of the selection procedure in fourteen Member States, representing new and old, and small and large Member States. Our analysis shows that far from being a paper tiger, the Article 255 TFEU Panel has proven to have a significant impact: it has had a chilling effect on a number of national nominations but also indirectly influenced the selection processes in some Member States, thus limiting arbitrariness. However, opening up judicial appointments to scrutiny at both the EU and the national level has resulted in a subtle move into the direction of judicial self-government