Potential competitive effects on U.S. bank credit card lending from the proposed bifurcated application of Basel II

This paper analyzes the potential competitive effects of the proposed bifurcated application of Basel II capital regulations in the United States on bank credit card lending activities. For this purpose, the authors consider the Basel II regulations as stated in the June 2004 Basel Committee Framework Agreement. ; Also issued as Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 05-21 ; Superseded by Working Paper 07-09Basel capital accord ; Credit cards

Implicit recourse and credit card securitizations: What do fraud losses reveal?

In this paper, we develop and test a model of implicit recourse in asset-backed securitizations. Fraud losses on securitized assets are generally incurred by the bank and do not affect the performance of securitization trusts, while credit losses do affect the trust's performance and are potentially borne by the owner of the securitized assets. Thus, the classification of losses as either fraud or credit losses provides a potential avenue of implicit recourse to manipulate the performance of securitization trusts. Using annual data from 2001 to 2006, we find that the performance of the credit card securitization portfolio is negatively related to fraud losses reported by the bank. We examine these results in light of the proposed Basel II capital rules and argue that a bank's incentive to provide implicit recourse will increase under the anticipated regime.

Competitive effects of Basel II on US bank credit card lending

We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed Basel II capital regulations on US bank credit card lending. We find that bank issuers operating under Basel II will face higher regulatory capital minimums than Basel I banks, with differences due to the way the two regulations treat reserves and gain-on-sale of securitized assets. During periods of normal economic conditions, this is not likely to have a competitive effect; however, during periods of substantial stress in credit card portfolios, Basel II banks could face a significant competitive disadvantage relative to Basel I banks and nonbank issuers.Basel Accord Basel II Capital requirements Bank regulation Competition

The Role of the Bias in Crafting Consensus: FOMC Decision Making in the Greenspan Era

We examine the role of the "bias" associated with a monetary policy directive - wording in the directive that concerns possible policy shifts in the period between one FOMC meeting and the next - in FOMC decision making in the Greenspan years. Previous studies have suggested that the bias provided the Chairman a tool for orchestrating Committee consensus. Our evidence shows that when the bias had meaningful implications for intermeeting funds rate changes (1987-92), it influenced voting by FOMC members. Biases both provoked and discouraged dissents, depending on the direction of the bias and the preferences of individual Committee members. When the bias did not have meaningful implications for intermeeting policy adjustments (1993-99), we find no evidence that it affected members' voting choices. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that FOMC members voted on the basis of a rational assessment of the policy content of proposed directives.