Just a small delay? Bidding Behavior and Efficiency in overlapping multiple auctions

Online auction platforms like eBay provide a wide range of auctions containing substitutable goods. Some of these auctions exhibit parallel elements which means that two or more auctions run side by side for a certain time. Experiments have shown that multiple auctions ending at the same time, result in significantly lower efficiency due to the coordination failure of the buyers. I introduce an experimental setup with three sellers and four buyers in an overlapping multiple second price auction environment, where every seller runs one auction with a homogeneous good and the buyers are confronted with single unit demand. Furthermore, I vary the degree of the overlap between the successive auctions. One main result is that sellers revenue is significantly higher in overlapping multiple auctions than in parallel multiple auctions. Moreover, I observe a lower coordination failure of the buyers in overlapping auctions than in parallel multiple auctions. Due to these results, efficiency in overlapping multiple auctions is higher compared to the efficiency in parallel multiple auctions.internet auctions, cross bidding, market design, electronic business

An Experimental Analysis of Parallel Multiple Auctions

At online auction platforms we often observed that substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently with auctions ending at the same time. I introduce an experimental setup of three sellers and four buyers in an ascending second price auction environment where every seller runs one auction with a homogeneous good and the buyers are confronted with single unit demand. I find that sellers revenue is significantly lower than theory predicts due to the fact that some auctions did not receive bids whereas other auctions concentrated the bids of all bidders. Moreover, I observe a statistically higher revenue of sellers setting the minimum starting price. Furthermore, my study shows that the buyers submit bids which are significantly lower than the private valuation every buyer receives. Comparing the efficiency of the parallel multiple auction setup to a double auction control experiment, I find a significant lower efficiency in parallel multiple auctions due to the coordination failure of the buyers.simultaneous auctions, internet auctions, market design, electronic business

An Experimental Assessment of Confederate Reserve Price Bids in Online Auction

internet auctions, bid shilling, reserve price, internet fraud, market design

Stochastic Deadlines: A Comparison of Parallel Multiple Auction Designs

In online auction platforms, offers are listed side by side and may end at the same point in time. While theoretical studies predict efficient coordination across auctions, experimental and empirical studies observe efficiency losses, i.e. goods remain unsold. In order to mitigate this coordination failure, we contribute to the literature of auction design by introducing a stochastic deadline in parallel multiple auctions. In these parallel Candle Auctions, several auctions start at the same time but end (separately) due to a stochastic process. We think that the stochastic ending rule decreases the coordination failure because the threat of a sudden termination forces the bidders to coordinate across auctions early in the auction process. Indeed, we find that coordination is less pronounced in parallel Candle Auctions resulting in higher efficiencySimultaneous Auctions, Internet, Auction Design, Experimental Economics

An Experimental Analysis of Parallel Multiple Auctions

At online auction platforms we often observed that substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently with auctions ending at the same time. I introduce an experimental setup of three sellers and four buyers in an ascending second price auction environment where every seller runs one auction with a homogeneous good and the buyers are confronted with single unit demand. I find that sellers revenue is significantly lower than theory predicts due to the fact that some auctions did not receive bids whereas other auctions concentrated the bids of all bidders. Moreover, I observe a statistically higher revenue of sellers setting the minimum starting price. Furthermore, my study shows that the buyers submit bids which are significantly lower than the private valuation every buyer receives. Comparing the efficiency of the parallel multiple auction setup to a double auction control experiment, I find a significant lower efficiency in parallel multiple auctions due to the coordination failure of the buyers

Just a small delay? Bidding Behavior and Efficiency in overlapping multiple auctions

Online auction platforms like eBay provide a wide range of auctions containing substitutable goods. Some of these auctions exhibit parallel elements which means that two or more auctions run side by side for a certain time. Experiments have shown that multiple auctions ending at the same time, result in significantly lower efficiency due to the coordination failure of the buyers. I introduce an experimental setup with three sellers and four buyers in an overlapping multiple second price auction environment, where every seller runs one auction with a homogeneous good and the buyers are confronted with single unit demand. Furthermore, I vary the degree of the overlap between the successive auctions. One main result is that sellers revenue is significantly higher in overlapping multiple auctions than in parallel multiple auctions. Moreover, I observe a lower coordination failure of the buyers in overlapping auctions than in parallel multiple auctions. Due to these results, efficiency in overlapping multiple auctions is higher compared to the efficiency in parallel multiple auctions

An Experimental Assessment of Confederate Reserve Price Bids in Online Auction

Confederate bids (i.e. bids placed by sellers´ confederates) are sometimes assumed to enhance sellers´ revenues, if not detected by bidders. As compared to public reserve prices, confederate bids may be used to increase bidding activity (perhaps causing "auction fever") or to evade placement costs without increasing the risk of unacceptably low prices. We present two field experiments with parallel auctions of identical units of a popular DVD and a memorial coin using three different reserve price and confederate bid settings. We find statistically indistinguishable prices and price dispersion in all three auction types. Sellers´ payoffs, however, are significantly lower with public reserve prices, due to placement costs

Stochastic Deadlines: A Comparison of Parallel Multiple Auction Designs

In online auction platforms, offers are listed side by side and may end at the same point in time. While theoretical studies predict efficient coordination across auctions, experimental and empirical studies observe efficiency losses, i.e. goods remain unsold. In order to mitigate this coordination failure, we contribute to the literature of auction design by introducing a stochastic deadline in parallel multiple auctions. In these parallel Candle Auctions, several auctions start at the same time but end (separately) due to a stochastic process. We think that the stochastic ending rule decreases the coordination failure because the threat of a sudden termination forces the bidders to coordinate across auctions early in the auction process. Indeed, we find that coordination is less pronounced in parallel Candle Auctions resulting in higher efficienc

Everything counts! - Warum kleine Gemeinden die Gewinner der Zensuserhebung 2011 sind

The population and housing census 2011 was an EU-wide census in all EU member states. In Germany, the basis was a largely register-based method. In this paper, it is shown that communities with less than 10.000 inhabitants have significantly less relative losses in the number of inhabitants compared to communities with more than 10.000 inhabitants.Comment: in Germa

Verhalten und Effizienz in multiplen Auktionen

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2010Tim Hopp