Monotonicity Problems of Interval Solutions and the Dutta-Ray Solution for Convex Interval Games

This paper examines several monotonicity properties of value-type interval solutions on the class of convex interval games and focuses on the Dutta-Ray (DR) solution for such games. Well known properties for the classical DR solution are extended to the interval setting. In particular, it is proved that the interval DR solution of a convex interval game belongs to the interval core of that game and Lorenz dominates each other interval core element. Consistency properties of the interval DR solution in the sense of Davis-Maschler and of Hart-Mas-Colell are verified. An axiomatic characterization of the interval DR solution on the class of convex interval games with the help of bilateral Hart-Mas-Colell consistency and the constrained egalitarianism for two-person interval games is given.cooperative interval games;convex games;the constrained egalitarian solution;the equal division core;consistency

Weighted Average Lexicographic Values for Share Sets and Balanced Cooperative Games

Inspired by Kalai-Samet [4] and Tijs [11], weighted average lexicographic values are introduced for share sets and for cores of cooperative games using induction arguments. Continuity properties and monotonicity properties of these weighted lexicographic values are studied. For subclasses of games (convex games, simplex games, big boss games) relations are established with weighted (exact) Shapley values.Cooperative games;average lexicographic value;weighted Shapley value

Core Representations of the Standard Fixed Tree Game

This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We introduce the concept of a weighted constrained egalitarian solution. The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian solutions. The notion of home-down allocation is developed to create further insight in the local behavior of the weighted constrained egalitarian allocation. A similar and dual approach by the notion of down-home allocations gives us the class of weighted Shapley values. The constrained egalitarian solution is characterized in terms of a cost sharing mechanism.Cooperative game theory;tree games;core;weighted constrained egalitarian solution

Cooperation by Asymmetric Agents in a Joint Project

The object of study is cooperation in joint projects, where agents may have different desired sophistication levels for the project, and where some of the agents may have low budgets.In this context questions concerning the optimal realizable sophistication level and the distribution of the related costs among the participants are tackled.A related cooperative game, the enterprise game, and a non-cooperative game, the contribution game, are both helpful.It turns out that there is an interesting relation between the core of the convex enterprise game and the set of strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game.Special attention is paid to a rule inspired by the airport landing fee literature.For this rule the project is split up in a sequence of subprojects where the involved participants pay amounts which are, roughly speaking, equal, but not more than their budgets allow.The resulting payoff distribution turns out to be a core element of the related contribution game.game theory;projects

Compromising in Partition Function Form Games and Cooperation in Perfect Extensive Form

In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f.game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game.For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided.Also a generic subclass of games in extensive form of perfect information without chance moves is introduced.For this class of perfect extensive form games there is a natural credible way to define a p.f.f. game if the players consider cooperation.It turns out that the p.f.f. games obtained in this way are compromisable.game theory

An Algorithm for the Nucleolus of Airport Profit Problems

Airport profit games are a generalization of airport cost games as well as of bankruptcy games.In this paper we present a simple algorithm to compute the nucleolus of airport profit games.In addition we prove that there exists an unique consistent allocation rule in airport profit problems, and it coincides with the nucleolus of the associated TU game.algorithm;airports;profit;allocation;games

Share Opportunity Sets and Cooperative Games

In many share problems there is a priori given a natural set of possible divisions to solve the sharing problem.Cooperative games related to such share sets are introduced, which may be helpful in solving share problems.Relations between properties of share sets and properties of games are investigated.The average lexicographic value for share sets and for cooperative games is studied.cooperative games;bankruptcy games;average lexicographic value;opportunity sets

Fuzzy Clan Games and Bi-monotonic Allocation Rules

Clan game;Big boss game;Core;Decision making;Fuzzy coalition;Fuzzy game;Monotonic allocation rule

Weighted Allocation Rules for Standard Fixed Tree Games

cooperative game theory;tree games;core;weighted Shapley value;nucleolus