Word-Entity Duet Representations for Document Ranking

This paper presents a word-entity duet framework for utilizing knowledge bases in ad-hoc retrieval. In this work, the query and documents are modeled by word-based representations and entity-based representations. Ranking features are generated by the interactions between the two representations, incorporating information from the word space, the entity space, and the cross-space connections through the knowledge graph. To handle the uncertainties from the automatically constructed entity representations, an attention-based ranking model AttR-Duet is developed. With back-propagation from ranking labels, the model learns simultaneously how to demote noisy entities and how to rank documents with the word-entity duet. Evaluation results on TREC Web Track ad-hoc task demonstrate that all of the four-way interactions in the duet are useful, the attention mechanism successfully steers the model away from noisy entities, and together they significantly outperform both word-based and entity-based learning to rank systems

KK-anonymous Signaling Scheme

We incorporate signaling scheme into Ad Auction setting, to achieve better welfare and revenue while protect users' privacy. We propose a new \emph{$K$-anonymous signaling scheme setting}, prove the hardness of the corresponding welfare/revenue maximization problem, and finally propose the algorithms to approximate the optimal revenue or welfare

A Game-theoretic Machine Learning Approach for Revenue Maximization in Sponsored Search

Sponsored search is an important monetization channel for search engines, in which an auction mechanism is used to select the ads shown to users and determine the prices charged from advertisers. There have been several pieces of work in the literature that investigate how to design an auction mechanism in order to optimize the revenue of the search engine. However, due to some unrealistic assumptions used, the practical values of these studies are not very clear. In this paper, we propose a novel \emph{game-theoretic machine learning} approach, which naturally combines machine learning and game theory, and learns the auction mechanism using a bilevel optimization framework. In particular, we first learn a Markov model from historical data to describe how advertisers change their bids in response to an auction mechanism, and then for any given auction mechanism, we use the learnt model to predict its corresponding future bid sequences. Next we learn the auction mechanism through empirical revenue maximization on the predicted bid sequences. We show that the empirical revenue will converge when the prediction period approaches infinity, and a Genetic Programming algorithm can effectively optimize this empirical revenue. Our experiments indicate that the proposed approach is able to produce a much more effective auction mechanism than several baselines.Comment: Twenty-third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013