The Gulf Crisis and The Fragmentation of the Middle East: The Policies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan

In mid-1990, tensions were rapidly growing in that part of the Middle East now generally referred to as the Gulf. The immediate issue was Iraq\u27s claim that other oil producers in the area were exceeding agreed quotas and therefore keeping oil prices inordinately low. By July, a sharp confrontation had developed between Iraq and Kuwait. Baghdad not only accused its smaller neighbor of quota violations but also of having encroached upon Iraq\u27s own oil resources. With the encouragement of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Iraqi and Kuwaiti representatives met in Jeddah at the end of the month. By then, Iraqi demands had blossomed into clear territorial claims as well as an insistence that Kuwait forgive a multi-billion dollar debt incurred by Baghdad during the eight-year war it launched against Iran in 1981. The Jeddah talks collapsed in less than twenty-four hours with no movement toward agreement. Meanwhile, Iraq\u27s autocratic president, Saddam Hussein, amassed thousands of troops on the Kuwaiti border. Most observers remained calmly certain that the sabre-rattling would lead to no more than further talks and some eventual accommodation whereby Kuwait would pay its way out of the crisis, either in cash or possibly through some minor territorial adjustment. On August 2, Saddam surprised everyone. Iraq invaded Kuwait in massive force, initially using the transparently false claim that it was responding to a local revolution. The tiny Sheikhdom was quickly conquered. Baghdad soon announced its annexation. Shockwaves coursed aro nd the globe in the wake of these events. The Arab World lapsed into initial paralysis which soon yielded to divisions as governments assessed their options and political pundits as well as the proverbial man-on-the­street took positions. Global opinion generally condemned Iraq, though at this level too there was obvious initial uncertainty over what action might be taken. The United States emerged as the leading force behind negative international reaction. The outline of a wide International Coalition calling for Baghdad\u27s withdrawal from Kuwait soon crystallized. The U.N. Security Council imposed a trade embargo against Iraq and the measure was enforced by American and European navies. Thousands of U.S. troops were rushed to Saudi Arabia. where they were joined by Egyptian, Moroccan, Syrian, British and French forces. Over the following months these were augmented to various degrees by military units contributed by a number of additional countries while yet other states extended various other types of support. Saddam vowed that Kuwait\u27s annexation was irreversible but called for an international conference to resolve all major outstanding Middle East problems, which in his view not only meant the issue of Kuwait but also Israel\u27s occupation of Palestine and presence in south Lebanon as well as Syria\u27s involvement in Lebanon. As though to emphasize its inflexibility, Bagdad in effect took several thousand foreigners hostage by forbidding their exit from Iraq or occupied Kuwait . Suspecting that this might be the case, Cairo Papers altered its publication schedule in the early fall of 1990 to make room for the present issue.https://fount.aucegypt.edu/faculty_book_chapters/1903/thumbnail.jp

‘NOT A RELIGIOUS STATE’ A study of three Indonesian religious leaders on the relation of state and religion

This article explores the concept of a ‘secular state’ offered by three Indonesian religious leaders: a Catholic priest, Nicolaus Driyarkara (1913–1967), and two Muslim intellectuals who were also state officials, Mukti Ali (1923–2004) and Munawir Sjadzali (1925–2004). All three, who represented the immediate generation after the revolution for Indonesian independence from the Dutch (1945), defended the legitimacy of a secular state for Indonesia based on the state ideology Pancasila (Five Principles of Indonesia). In doing so, they argued that a religious state, for example an Islamic state, is incompatible with a plural nation that has diverse cultures, faiths, and ethnicities. The three also argued that the state should remain neutral about its citizens’ faith and should not be dominated by a single religion, i.e. Islam. Instead, the state is obliged to protect all religions embraced by Indonesians. This argument becomes a vital foundation in the establishment of Indonesia’s trajectory of unique ‘secularisation’. Whilst these three intellectuals opposed the idea of establishing a religious or Islamic state in Indonesia, it was not because they envisioned the decline of the role of religion in politics and the public domain but rather that they regarded religiosity in Indonesia as vital in nation building within a multi-religious society. In particular, the two Muslim leaders used religious legitimacy to sustain the New Order’s political stability, and harnessed state authority to modernise the Indonesian Islamic community

The challenge of fundamentalism: political Islam and the new world disorder

Long before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Islamic fundamentalism was exerting a significant influence in nearly every corner of the world. Bassam Tibi, a widely recognized expert on Islam and Arab culture, offers an important and disquieting analysis of this particular synthesis of religion and politics. A Muslim and descendant of a famous Damascene Islamic scholar family, Tibi sees Islamic fundamentalism as the result of Islam's confrontation with modernity and not only--as it is widely believed--economic adversity. The movement is unprecedented in Islamic history and parallels the inability of Islamic nation-states to integrate into the new world secular order. For this updated edition, Tibi has written a new preface and lengthy introduction addressing Islamic fundamentalism in light of and since September 11

Friede im Nahen Osten im Lichte einer Vergegenwärtigung des Westfälischen Friedens

Beitrag zur Friedensforschung im Jahrbuch der Osnabrücker Friedensgespräche 199

Islam’s Exposure to Modernity

In March 2016, The Department of Arab and Islamic Civilizations was honored to host Bassam Tibi, professor emeritus of International Relations in the University of Göttingen, as the 23rd Bayard Dodge Distinguished Visiting Professor. Tibi gave two public lectures in Oriental Hall at the Tahrir campus in addition to giving a talk at the AUC Middle East Studies Center. Additionally he visited a graduate seminar taught by Mohamed Serag, professor in the Department of Arab and Islamic Civilizations