Assessing the Second Born: The Role of Competitiveness and Extrinsic Motivation in Birth Order

Birth order may represent one of the most influential environmental factors that directly impacts personality development and even life outcomes. The present study sought to expand upon the existing literature by examining the motivational and dispositional differences between first born and second born individuals. Research indicates that first born children show significantly higher levels of academic achievement and lifelong attainment due to experiencing higher parental expectations as well as increased financial support. As a result, the second born child is likely to compare him/herself with the first born sibling and develop a greater level of competitiveness. Additionally, this desire to surpass the first born may lead to the development of extrinsically motivated goals. Few research endeavors to date have explored the specific motivational disposition of the second born child with no future siblings. By engaging in this research, a better understanding of the complex interaction between siblings can be ascertained as well as a deeper appreciation for how the familial environment impacts development. Such information can be applied to the educational setting to develop programs more rewarding and salient to second-born individuals, thus increasing their level of academic achievement. Seventy-two male and female participants took part in the present experiment. Research validated scales were used to assess overall competitiveness in addition to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. A paired-t test was used to evaluate the data and compare the differences between the two groups. Although the results do not support the hypotheses, there were a number of limitations that may have served to restrict the scope of the data. The theoretical implications of the results and suggestions for future research will be discussed

Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition

This paper investigates the relationship between economic reforms and constitutional transition, which has been neglected by many transition economists. It is argued that assessment of reform performance might be very misleading if it is not recognized that economic reforms are just a small part of large scale of constitutional transition. Rivalry and competition between states and between political forces within each country are the driving forces for constitutional transition. We use Russia as an example of economic reforms associated with constitutional transition and China as an example of economic reforms in the absence of constitutional transition to examine features and problems in the two patterns of transition. It is concluded that under political monopoly of the ruling party, economic transition will be hijacked by state opportunism. Dual track approach to economic transition may generate very high long-term cost of constitutional transition that might well outweigh its short-term benefit of buying out the vested interests.constitutional transition, economic reform, division of labor, debate of shock therapy vs gradualism, debate of convergence vs institutional innovation

Understanding China's Economic Performance

Broadly speaking, two schools of thought have emerged to interpret China's rapid growth since 1978: the experimentalist school and the convergence school. The experimentalist school attributes China's successes to the evolutionary, experimental, and incremental nature of China's reforms. Specifically, the resulting non-capitalist institutions are claimed to be successful in (a) agriculture where land is not owned by the farmers; (b) township and village enterprises (TVEs) which are owned collectively by rural communities; and (c) state owned enterprises (SOEs) where increased competition and increased wage incentive, but not privatization, have been emphasized. The convergence school holds that China's successes are the consequences of its institutions being allowed to converge with those of non-socialist market economies, and that China's economic structure at the start of reforms is a major explanation for the rapid growth. China had a high population density heavily concentrated in low-wage agriculture, a condition that was favorable for labor-intensive export-led growth in other parts of East Asia. The convergence school also holds that China's gradualism results primarily from a lack of consensus over the proper course, with power still divided between market reformers and old-style socialists; and that the "innovative" non-capitalist institutions are responses to China's political circumstances and not to its economic circumstances. Perhaps the best test of the two approaches is whether China's policy choices are in fact leading to institutions harmonized with normal market economies or to more distinctive innovations. In this regard, the recent policy trend has been towards institutional harmonization rather than institutional innovation, suggesting that the government accepts that the ingredients for a dynamic market economy are already well-known

China's Economic Growth After WTO Membership

We assess the prospects of China's future growth performance in two steps. The first step is to project the potential growth path by determining whether past successes were generated by economic experimentation that produced non-capitalist institutional innovations (e.g. incentive contracts to state enterprises, profit-oriented supervision by state industrial bureaux, collectively-owned rural enterprises), or by institutional convergence toward the advanced WTO economies like France, Japan and the United States - two interpretations known respectively as the experimentalist school and the convergence school. Because WTO membership would harmonise China's economic institutions with those of capitalist economies and reduce the scope for experimentation, the experimentalist school would project a lower potential growth path than the convergence school. The fact that China has sought WTO membership voluntarily and with great tenacity is recognition of the correctness of the convergence interpretation. The second step in assessing China's growth prospects is to project the extent and duration that actual growth would deviate from potential growth. We assess the possibility of a WTO-induced macroeconomic shock that would generate such great political turmoil that prolonged economic stagnation would result. This macroeconomic shock could take two forms: a flood of imports that would cause widespread unemployment; and the entry of foreign banks that would bankrupt the domestic banks, and hence shut down the national credit system, crippling production economy-wide. Our main conclusions are that the government has the technical means to avert such this WTO-induced macroeconomic shock, and that the real threat to macroeconomic stability is China's weak fiscal position

Geography, Economic Policy and Regional Development in China

Many studies of regional disparity in China have focused on the preferential policies received by the coastal provinces. We decomposed the location dummies in provincial growth regressions to obtain estimates of the effects of geography and policy on provincial growth rates in 1996–99. Their respective contributions in percentage points were 2. 5 and 3. 5 for the province-level metropolises, 0. 6 and 2. 3 for the northeastern provinces, 2. 8 and 2. 8 for the coastal provinces, 2. 0 and 1. 6 for the central provinces, 0 and 1. 6 for the northwestern provinces, and 0. 1 and 1. 8 for the southwestern provinces. Because the so-called preferential policies are largely deregulation policies that have allowed coastal Chinese provinces to integrate into the international economy, it is far superior to reduce regional disparity by extending these deregulation policies to the interior provinces than by re-regulating the coastal provinces. Two additional inhibitions to income convergence are the household registration system, which makes the movement of the rural poor to prosperous areas illegal, and the monopoly state bank system that, because of its bureaucratic nature, disburses most of its funds to its large traditional customers, few of whom are located in the western provinces. Improving infrastructure to overcome geographic barriers is fundamental to increasing western growth, but increasing human capital formation (education and medical care) is also crucial because only it can come up with new better ideas to solve centuries-old problems like unbalanced growth.

Geography, Economic Policy, and Regional Development in China

Many studies of regional disparity in China have focused on the preferential policies received by the coastal provinces. We decomposed the location dummies in provincial growth regressions to obtain estimates of the effects of geography and policy on provincial growth rates in 1996-99. Their respective contributions in percentage points were 2.5 and 3.5 for the province-level metropolises, 0.6 and 2.3 for the northeastern provinces, 2.8 and 2.8 for the coastal provinces, 2.0 and 1.6 for the central provinces, 0 and 1.6 for the northwestern provinces, and 0.1 and 1.8 for the southwestern provinces. Because the so-called preferential policies are largely deregulation policies that have allowed coastal Chinese provinces to integrate into the international economy, it is far superior to reduce regional disparity by extending these deregulation policies to the interior provinces than by re-regulating the coastal provinces. Two additional inhibitions to income convergence are the household registration system, which makes the movement of the rural poor to prosperous areas illegal, and the monopoly state bank system that, because of its bureaucratic nature, disburses most of its funds to its large traditional customers, few of whom are located in the western provinces. Improving infrastructure to overcome geographic barriers is fundamental to increasing western growth, but increasing human capital formation (education and medical care) is also crucial because only it can come up with new better ideas to solve centuries-old problems like unbalanced growth.

Geography, Economic Policy, and Regional Development in China

Many studies of regional disparity in China have focused on the preferential policies received by the coastal provinces. We decomposed the location dummies in provincial growth regressions to obtain estimates of the effects of geography and policy on provincial growth rates in 1996-99. Their respective contributions in percentage points were 2.5 and 3.5 for the province-level metropolises, 0.6 and 2.3 for the northeastern provinces, 2.8 and 2.8 for the coastal provinces, 2.0 and 1.6 for the central provinces, 0 and 1.6 for the northwestern provinces, and 0.1 and 1.8 for the southwestern provinces. Because the so-called preferential policies are largely deregulation policies that have allowed coastal Chinese provinces to integrate into the international economy, it is far superior to reduce regional disparity by extending these deregulation policies to the interior provinces than by re-regulating the coastal provinces. Two additional inhibitions to income convergence are the household registration system, which makes the movement of the rural poor to prosperous areas illegal, and the monopoly state bank system that, because of its bureaucratic nature, disburses most of its funds to its large traditional customers, few of whom are located in the western provinces. Improving infrastructure to overcome geographic barriers is fundamental to increasing western growth, but increasing human capital formation (education and medical care) is also crucial because only it can come up with new better ideas to solve centuries-old problems like unbalanced growth

Geography, Economic Policy and Regional Development in China

Many studies of regional disparity in China have focused on the preferential policies received by the coastal provinces. We decomposed the location dummies in provincial growth regressions to obtain estimates of the effects of geography and policy on provincial growth rates in 1996-99. Their respective contributions in percentage points were 2.5 and 3.5 for the province-level metropolises, 0.6 and 2.3 for the northeastern provinces, 2.8 and 2.8 for the coastal provinces, 2.0 and 1.6 for the central provinces, 0 and 1.6 for the northwestern provinces, and 0.1 and 1.8 for the southwestern provinces. Because the so-called preferential policies are largely deregulation policies that allowed coastal Chinese provinces to integrate into the international economy, it is far superior to reduce regional disparity by extending these deregulation policies to the interior provinces than by re-regulating the coastal provinces. Two additional inhibitions to income convergence are the household registration system, which makes the movement of the rural poor to prosperous areas illegal, and the monopoly state bank system that, because of their bureaucratic nature, disburses most of its funds to its large traditional customers, few of whom are located in the western provinces. Improving infrastructure to overcome geographic barriers is fundamental to increasing western growth, but increasing human capital formation (education and medical care) is also crucial because only it can come up with new better ideas to solve centuries-old problems like unbalanced growth

The Asian Financial Crisis: What Happened, and What is to be done

We identify the Asian financial crisis to be the result of the instabilities of short-term capital flows, inadequate prudential supervision in the financial markets of the developing countries, mistaken commitments to the fixed exchange rate regime, lack of international coordination in the regulation of international financial markets, absence of an international mechanism for the orderly working out of international debt, and inappropriate "rescue" packages imposed by the IMF. We recommend 30 policy reforms to make the international economy more resilient to financial turmoil, and to reduce the costs of such turmoil. We conclude that there is little particularly 'Asian' about the Asian financial crisis. Even though official Washington, led by the IMF, proclaimed the crisis to be one of Asian capitalism, the more generic character of the crisis became all too clear during 1998, as the crisis spread to Russia, South Africa, and Brazil. Rather than an Asian crisis, the world is experiencing a type of global crisis that reflects the rapid arrival of global capitalism, in a world economy not yet used to the integration of the advanced and developing countries. Because we see no justification for the monopoly position of the IMF as the sole international institution on monetary affairs, we advocate the formation of regional monetary bodies to provide mutual support in the event of a financial crisis hitting one or another member country. We also advocate that an international bankruptcy system be established in order to accelerate an orderly workout of international debts when a developing country falls into an extreme indebtedness crisis. Existing key international organisations like the IMF have performed poorly, and they must be reformed to render them more transparent in their operations, and more democratic in their governance. Developing countries must have a greater role in designing future rescue packages extended to financially distressed countries so that rescue packages will no longer be biased toward the interests of the creditor countries. The new global financial architecture should have generalised floating of currencies as its mainstay. The bad debts of the financial and corporate sectors in Pacific Asia to be quickly resolved by the infusion of public money, and the takeover of some large domestic banks by foreign banks. Furthermore, the revival of the corporate sectors in Asia requires international creditors to write-down the value of their loans, and to convert part of their loans into equity participation. There is a serious mismatch in Pacific Asia, particularly in most of southeast Asia, between investment in physical hardware - factories and machinery - and investment in the social software - scientific research centers, administrative and judiciary systems, and growth of civil society. In a world of growing international competitiveness, when foreign direct investors are courted not just by Asia but Central Europe and Latin America, the concerns over governance are bound to grow, and to weigh increasingly heavily on the unreformed countries of Asia. The long-term competitiveness of Asia rests as much on "getting its institutions right" as on "getting the prices right."http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39638/3/wp253.pd

Function-feature analysis of emergency sanitation technologies: towards systematic innovation

There has been increased recognition of the need for innovation in emergency sanitation products and technologies. To support effective design, this paper explores an approach systematically innovate by framing the problem from the perspective of the functions (the desired outcomes of a design) that features (characteristics of a design) achieve. The paper illustrates examples of how such functions can be identified: by analysing existing designs, studying the literature and drawing lessons learned from case studies. Functions may be interrelated and vary in nature and importance in different circumstances. Functions can be achieved by implementing one or more design features. At the same time, features can contribute to achieving one or more functions. By understanding and consolidating all possible functions and features, this approach can support innovation in several ways, most fundamentally by ensuring that important design considerations are not overlooked during the product development process