Duration of loan arrangement and syndicate organization

What is the influence of syndicate organization on the duration of loan arrangement? I answer this question using the survival analysis methodology on a sample of loans from 59 countries over the 1992-2006 period. I find that syndicate size, concentration, reputation, and national diversity clearly matters for the duration of loan arrangement and therefore for borrower satisfaction regarding the speed of obtaining the necessary funding. A syndicate organization adapted to specific agency problems of syndication, with numerous, reputable, and experienced arrangers retaining a larger portion of the loan reduces the duration. The latter is also shorter when the lenders diversity in terms of nationality is weaker.Syndicated loan, syndication process, duration of loan arrangement, agency costs, reputation, experience, nationality, survival analysis

Bank lending networks, experience, reputation, and borrowing costs.

We investigate the network structure of syndicated lending markets and evaluate the impact of lenders’ network centrality, considered as measures of their experience and reputation, on borrowing costs. We show that the market for syndicated loans is a “small world” characterized by large local density and short social distances between lenders. Such a network structure allows for better information and resources flows between banks thus enhancing their social capital. We then show that lenders’ experience and reputation play a significant role in reducing loan spreads and thus increasing borrower’s wealth.agency costs, bank syndicate, experience, loan syndication, reputation, small world, social network analysis.

The crisis as a wake-up call: do banks tighten screening and monitoring during a financial crisis?

Recent developments and theoretical work on the transition economies has emphasised the importance of internal bargaining and incentives. This paper constitutes the first attempt to systematise the large and growing body of case studies of enterprise restructuring in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Russia and the Czech Republic. We begin from a framework in which the incentives and constraints on managers are crucial for the success of transforming enterprises into value maximising firms. The forms of, and the constraints on, active behaviour are examined for each enterprise across the dimensions of internal organisation, product and labour markets and investment. There is a huge variety in the quality of the evidence and in the experiences documented. Although we find widespread evidence of enterprise managers reacting to the post-reform environment, examples of deep restructuring are rare. Managers are hamstrung by weak incentives and increasing employee opposition, as well as by the uneven development of social and market infrastructure external to the enterprise. Low incentives arise from the absence of a managerial labour market, monopoly power and the large component of idiosyncratic knowledge possessed by incumbents. Opposition is based on the high costs of job loss. A characteristic feature of the transition economies is the ability of employees to veto restructuring and the opposition of labour appears likely to increase as unemployment rates and durations grow. Cases are described where the passage of restructuring measures has been facilitated by the willingness of the state to provide compensation to the ‘losers’. The examination of pre-privatisation behaviour suggests that the pace and depth of restructuring would increase after privatisation only when privatisation clearly transforms the incentives and constraints facing managers. The limited evidence on post- privatisation restructuring surveyed here suggests that foreign ownership of a former state-owned enterprise is the exception in which privatisation produces a marked change in behaviour. The role of product market power runs through the survey. Some enterprises use profits as a shield to avoid painful change, others have actively sought to build dominant positions. Aggregate data is presented which raises the possibility that the pattern of restructuring is being distorted by the uneven distribution of monopoly power across sectors. In our conclusions, we suggest ways in which future enterprise-level research could be improved to shed more light on the pattern of restructuring and to facilitate safer policy advice. From a policy perspective, we stress the complementarity between different reforms. The focus on the incentives and constraints facing enterprise managers highlights the limitations to a strategy which relies on privatisation to raise efficiency. The state must play a role in facilitating labour shedding and internal reorganisation of enterprises through providing finance for compensation, promoting the provision of social services outside the structure of enterprises and fostering the creation of new jobs. The hardening ahs promoted adjustment but over-tight budgetary policies may offset this, slowing the arte of new job creation ad heightening uncertainty about the prospects of enterprises under restructuring.

Determinants of syndicated lending in European banks and the impact of the financial crisis

Syndicated lending is a widely practiced alternative to traditional bilateral lending and within Europe the syndicated loan market increased significantly during the 2000s. Using a dataset consisting of 4,166 European banks, the authors examine the factors that determine the bank’s willingness to use syndicated lending rather than traditional lending during the period 2000 to 2010. The paper finds that syndicated lending was an alternative to bilateral loans when banks were targeting growth or looking to utilise potential capital surpluses. Syndicated lending was also used to improve the returns and credit quality of the bank’s loan portfolios. However, in the post crisis period, European banks are less interested in syndicated loan markets and larger banks, especially, those with strong capital bases, are refraining from syndicated lending

Financial Developments in Canada: Past Trends and Future Challenges

Freedman and Engert focus on the changing pattern of lending and borrowing in Canada in the past thirty to forty years, including the types of financial instruments used and the relative roles of financial institutions and financial markets. They examine how borrowing mechanisms have changed over time and consider the challenges facing the Canadian financial sector, including whether our financial markets are in danger of disappearing because of the size and pre-eminence of U.S. financial markets. Some of the trends examined here include syndicated lending, securitization, and credit derivatives, a form of financial engineering that has become increasingly important in the last few years. They also study bond and equity markets to determine whether Canadian capital markets have been hollowed out or abandoned by Canadian firms and conclude that the data do not provide much support for that view.

Regulation of Real Estate Syndications: An Overview

This comment will attempt to make some sense out of the controversy raging around real estate syndications and will attempt to determine what, if anything, should be done to regulate them. First, the mechanism of the real estate syndication and the specific problems it poses for the investor will be briefly examined. Second, the existing legal framework including restrictions imposed on real estate syndications by common law partnership and state and federal securities laws will be examined to determine whether the investor is adequately protected. Third, various proposed regulatory schemes will be examined, including the SEC\u27s proposals for new disclosure rules, the Washington Rules and Midwest Commissioner\u27s Guidelines on real estate limited partnerships. A final section examines the need for federal substantive regulations of real estate syndication. This comment concludes that the regulators at federal and state levels have failed to recognize the basic differences between the two major types of real estate syndications— specific property versus blind pool or unspecified, multiple property syndicates. It is suggested that specific property syndicates can be satisfactorily regulated by disclosure only, as the SEC proposes; blind pool syndicates, on the other hand, appear to require substantive regulation. Failure to structure regulation to fit these two different types of real estate syndicates will potentially distort the syndication process by further limiting the attractiveness and utility of the specific property syndication