Capital forbearance and thrifts: an ex post examination of regulatory gambling

This paper estimates the losses embedded in the capital positions of the 996 FSLIC-insured savings and loan institutions that did not meet capital standards at the end of the 1970s. We compare the estimated cost of resolving the insolvencies of these institutions at the end of the 1970s with the actual failure-resolution costs for those that were closed by July 3 1, 1992, and the projected resolution costs for the remaining thrifts that are likely to be closed. Our results show that even when one considers only the direct costs associated with delayed closure of economically failed thrifts, these costs significantly exceed reasonable estimates of the cost of prompt failure resolution.Savings and loan associations

Deposit insurance and the cost of capital

The impacts of deposit insurance and forbearance on the costs and value of uninsured deposits and equity capital are shown under three regimes.Deposit insurance ; Bank capital

The Exchange Stabilization Fund: how it works

The increasingly controversial Exchange Stabilization Fund is used to influence the international value of the U.S. dollar and to provide aid to foreign countries. The debate surrounding the Fund will become more informed, the authors suggest, when observers understand how to calculate the total amount of resources available to the Fund. This Economic Commentary explains how the Fund's balance sheet figures must be adjusted to produce an accurate account of those resources.Foreign exchange

The truth about hedge funds

Do hedge funds help or hurt the financial markets in which they operate? The highly publicized troubles of Long Term Capital Management have once again focused the attention of policymakers and the press on the hedge fund industry and the cry for its regulation. This Economic Commentary refutes some of the commonly held myths about hedge funds and examines the rationale for regulating them.Hedge funds ; Investments

Underlying determinants of closed-bank resolution costs

An analysis of the issues surrounding bank resolution costs, looking at failures from 1986 to 1992 and including proxies for fraud, off-balance-sheet risk, brokered deposits, and both regional and size effects. Evidence suggests there was a significant lag between the realization and recognition of losses on bank assets, and that regulators may have practiced forbearance.Bank failures

Depositor preference legislation and failed banks' resolution costs

An examination of the empirical impact of depositor preference legislation (DPL) on resolution type and resolution costs for commercial banks. It focuses on the impact of state DPL statutes, using FDIC and call-report data on resolution costs and types for all operating FDIC-BIF insured commercial banks that closed or required FDIC financial assistance from January 1986 through December 1992.Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ; Bank failures

Banking consolidation and correspondent banking

Banking consolidation, spurred by interstate branching deregulation, is changing markets' competitive structure. Policymakers and regulators have focused on the implications for customers in retail and wholesale markets rather than consolidation's impact on correspondent banking markets (where banks buy and sell inputs used to produce banking services). By studying the era of intrastate branching deregulation, the authors provide some insights on the implications of interstate branching for correspondent banking.Bank competition ; Bank mergers ; Interstate banking

SAIF policy options

An outline of three possible options for capitalizing the Savings Association Insurance Fund, which is in danger of suffering a huge premium disadvantage compared to banks insured by the Bank Insurance Fund, and a recommendation that any solution should first consider the policy objectives for maintaining separately chartered housing finance lenders.Deposit insurance ; Savings and loan associations

Depositor-preference laws and the cost of debt capital

Under depositor-preference laws, depositors' claims on the assets of failed depository institutions are senior to unsecured general-creditor claims. As a result, depositor preference changes the capital structure of banks and thrifts, thereby affecting the cost of capital for depositories. Depositor preference has no impact on the total value of banks and thrifts, however, unless deposit insurance is mispriced.Bank failures ; Bank capital ; Deposit insurance