"Distributional Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act-- A Microsimulation Approach"

Over the last two decades, those at the bottom of the income scale have seen their incomes stagnate, while those at the top have seen theirs skyrocket; without intervention, the recession that began in December 2007 was likely to exacerbate this trend. Will the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) be able to keep the situation from getting worse for those at the bottom of the income scale? Will ARRA reverse the upward trend in inequality that we've seen in the recent past? The authors of this new working paper employ a microsimulation of ARRA to address these questions. They find that, despite a large amount of job creation, ARRA is likely to have little impact on overall income inequality, or on the income gaps between relatively advantaged and disadvantaged groups.

"Who Gains from President Obama's Stimulus Package ... And How Much?"

In this Special Report, Levy scholars Ajit Zacharias, Thomas Masterson, and Kijong Kim provide a preliminary assessment of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), a package of transfers and tax cuts that is expected to provide relief to low-income and vulnerable households especially hurt by the economic crisis, while at the same time supporting aggregate demand. By the administration's estimate, ARRA will create or save approximately three and a half million jobs by the end of 2010; while the ameliorating impact of the stimulus plan on the employment situation is surely welcome, say the authors, the government could have achieved far more at the same cost by skewing the stimulus package toward outlays rather than tax cuts. Their analysis points toward the necessity for a comprehensive employment strategy that goes well beyond ARRA. The need for public provisioning of various sorts--ranging from early childhood education centers to public health facilities to the “greening” of public transportation--coupled with the severe underutilization of labor, naturally suggests an expanded role for public employment as a desirable ingredient in any alternative strategy.

"Long-Term Trends in the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being (LIMEW), United States, 1959-2004"

We use here a new measure of household economic well-being called LIMEW. LIMEW is different in scope from the official United States Census Bureau measure of gross money income (MI) in that it includes taxes, noncash transfers, public consumption, income from wealth, and household production. We analyze trends in LIMEW from 1959 to 2004, and find that median LIMEW grew by 0.7 percent per year while median MI increased by 0.6 percent per year. LIMEW grew much slower than MI from 1959 to 1982, and much faster than MI from 1982 to 2004. In 2004, measured inequality was lower in LIMEW than MI (a difference of 5.5 Gini points); similarly, the increase in inequality between 1959 and 2004 was higher in MI than LIMEW (6.2 versus 5.1 Gini points). Much of the difference in these measures can be traced to the role of net government expenditures. According to both measures, the racial gap narrowed from 1959 to 1989; it then widened somewhat from 1989 to 2004 according to LIMEW but continued to narrow according to MI. The difference in time trends can be traced mainly to the rising income from wealth of white households relative to nonwhite households. The gap in well-being between single females and married couples widened from 1959 to 1989 and then narrowed slightly between 1989 and 2004 according to LIMEW but increased rather steadily from 1959 to 2004 according to MI. The fortunes of the elderly relative to the nonelderly showed considerable improvement from 1959 to 2004 according to LIMEW, almost reaching parity in 2004. In contrast, according to MI, the relative position of the elderly was about the same in 2004 as in 1959. In this instance, the difference in time trends can be traced mainly to rising income from wealth and government transfers accruing to the elderly relative to the nonelderly.

"The Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being, France, 1989 and 2000"

We construct estimates of the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being for France for the years 1989 and 2000. We also estimate the standard measure of disposable cash income (DI) from the same data sources. We analyze overall trends in the level and distribution of household well-being using both measures for France as a whole and for subgroups of the French population. The average French household experienced a slower rate of growth in LIMEW than DI over the period. A substantial portion of the growth in well-being for the middle quintile was a result of increases in net government expenditures and income from wealth. We also found that the well-being of families headed by single females relative to married couples deteriorated much more, while the well-being of households headed by the elderly relative to households headed by the nonelderly improved much more than indicated by the standard measure of disposable income. The conventional measure indicates that a steep decline in economic inequality took place between 1989 and 2000, while our measure indicates no such change. We argue that these outcomes can be traced to the difference in the treatment of the role of wealth in shaping economic inequality. Our measure also indicates that, on balance, government expenditures and taxes did not have an inequality-reducing effect in France for both years. This is, again, contrary to conventional wisdom.Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-being (LIMEW); France; Economic Well-Being; Economic Inequality; Household Income Measures

Optimal Coverage Level Choice with Individual and Area Plans of Insurance

We theoretically examine a farmer’s coverage demand with area and individual insurance plans as either separate or integrated options. The individual and area losses are assumed to be imperfectly and positively correlated. With actuarially fair rates, the farmer will fully insure with the individual plan and demand no area insurance regardless of the plans being separate or integrated. Under separate plans, free area insurance and the fair rate for individual insurance, area insurance replaces a portion of individual insurance demand. Under integrated plans, free area insurance, and the fair rate for individual insurance, the farmer over-insures using both area and individual plans.Agricultural risk, area plans of insurance, crop insurance, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Agricultural Finance, Crop Production/Industries, Demand and Price Analysis, Farm Management, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Risk and Uncertainty, D81, G22, Q12, Q18,

"Why President Obama Should Care About 'Care': An Effective and Equitable Investment Strategy for Job Creation"

In his State of the Union address President Obama acknowledged that "our most urgent task is job creation" - that a move toward full employment will lay the foundation for long-term economic growth and ensure that the federal government creates the necessary conditions for businesses to expand and hire more workers. According to a new study by Levy scholars Rania Antonopoulos, Kijong Kim, Thomas Masterson, and Ajit Zacharias, the government needs to identify and invest in projects that have the potential for massive, and immediate, public job creation. They conclude that social sector investment, such as early childhood education and home-based care, would generate twice as many jobs as infrastructure spending and nearly 1.5 times the number created by investment in green energy, while catering to the most vulnerable segments of the workforce.

Optimal Coverage Level Choice with Individual and Area Plans of Insurance

We theoretically examine a farmer’s coverage demand with area and individual insurance plans as either separate or integrated options. The individual and area losses are assumed to be imperfectly and positively correlated. With actuarially fair rates, the farmer will fully insure with the individual plan and demand no area insurance regardless of the plans being separate or integrated. Under separate plans, free area insurance and the fair rate for individual insurance, area insurance replaces a portion of individual insurance demand. Under integrated plans, free area insurance, and the fair rate for individual insurance, the farmer will over-insure with individual plan and demand additional area insurance.Agricultural risk, area plans of insurance, crop insurance, Agricultural and Food Policy, Agricultural Finance, Crop Production/Industries, Demand and Price Analysis, Farm Management, Financial Economics, Industrial Organization, Marketing, Production Economics, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Risk and Uncertainty, D81, G22, Q12, Q18,

"The Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being, Great Britain, 1995 and 2005"

We construct estimates of the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being for Great Britain for the years 1995 and 2005. We also produce estimates of the official British measures HBAI (from the Department for Work and Pensions annual report titled "Households below Average Income") and ROI (from the Office of National Statistics Redistribution of Income analysis). We analyze overall trends in the level and distribution of household well-being using all three measures for Great Britain as a whole and for subgroups of the British population. Gains in household economic well-being between 1995 and 2005 vary by the measure used, from 23 percent (HBAI) to 32 percent (LIMEW) and 35 percent (ROI). LIMEW shows that much of the middle class’s gain in well-being was as a result of increases in government expenditures. LIMEW also marks a greater increase in economic well-being among elderly households due to the increase in their net worth. The redistributive effect of net government expenditures decreased notably between 1995 and 2005 according to the official measures, primarily due to the change in the distributive impact of government expenditures.Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-being (LIMEW); Great Britain; Economic Well-Being; Economic Inequality; Household Income Measures

On the (De)centralization of FruitChains

One of the most important features of blockchain protocols is decentralization, as their main contribution is that they formulate a distributed ledger that will be maintained and extended without the need of a trusted party. Bitcoin has been criticized for its tendency to centralization, as very few pools control the majority of the hashing power. Pass et al. proposed FruitChain [PODC 17] and claimed that this blockchain protocol mitigates the formation of pools by reducing the variance of the rewards in the same way as mining pools, but in a fully decentralized fashion. Many follow up papers consider that the problem of centralization in Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchain systems can be solved via lower rewards' variance, and that in FruitChain the formation of pools is unnecessary. Contrary to the common perception, in this work, we prove that lower variance of the rewards does not eliminate the tendency of the PoW blockchain protocols to centralization; miners have also other incentives to create large pools, and specifically to share the cost of creating the instance they need to solve the PoW puzzle. We abstract the procedures of FruitChain as oracles and assign to each of them a cost. Then, we provide a formal definition of a pool in a blockchain system, and by utilizing the notion of equilibrium with virtual payoffs (EVP) [AFT 21], we prove that there is a completely centralized EVP, where all the parties form a single pool controlled by one party called the pool leader. The pool leader is responsible for creating the instance used for the PoW procedure. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that examines the construction of mining pools in the FruitChain system.Comment: Full version of the IEEE CSF 2023 camera-ready versio