Effect of dose rate on ion beam mixing in Nb-Si

The influence of dose rate, i.e., ion flux, on ion beam mixing in Nb‐Si bilayer samples was measured at room temperature and 325 °C. At the higher temperature, an increase in dose rate of a factor of 20 caused a decrease in the thickness of the mixed layer by a factor of 1.6 for equal total doses. At room temperature, the same change in flux had no effect on mixing. These results are consistent with radiation‐enhanced diffusion theory in the recombination‐limited regime

The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions

Now, however, a new form of shareholder litigation has emerged that is distinct from derivative or securities fraud claims: class action lawsuits filed under state law challenging director conduct in mergers and acquisitions. The empirical data reported in this article show that these acquisition-oriented suits are now the dominant form of corporate litigation and outnumber derivative suits by a wide margin. Are these acquisition-oriented class actions just another deadbeat in the corporate governance debate? Should policymakers take action to cut back on the development of this new form of shareholder litigation? In this paper, we argue that, just as with derivative suits and securities fraud class actions, good policy must balance the positive managerial agency cost reducing effects of these acquisition-oriented shareholder suits against their litigation agency costs. To frame our analysis of acquisition-oriented class actions, we begin with a look back at the history of this debate over representative litigation in corporate and securities law. For six decades, there have been efforts to limit shareholder derivative suits. These suits, in which one shareholder sues in the name of and on behalf of the corporation, are. usually brought to enforce various fiduciary duties that officers and directors owe corporations and their shareholders. They thus can be contrasted to normal corporate litigation in which directors determine what actions to take for the corporation. Derivative suits were once said to have promise as a means to limit managerial agency costs

The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits

Derivative suits, long the principal vehicle for discussions about representative litigation in corporate and securities law, now share the stage with younger cousins - securities fraud class actions and state law fiduciary duty class actions. At the same time alternative governance vehicles - independent directors, auditors and other reforms that have followed in the wake of Enron - potentially diminish the relative place of litigation such as derivative suits. This article presents data from all derivative suits filed in Delaware over a two-year period. We find a relatively small number, certainly as compared to fiduciary class action and securities fraud class actions. Unlike these other representative suits, derivative suits are used for both public and close corporations. They arise usually in a duty of loyalty context. Contrary to earlier studies, we do not find evidence that these cases are strike suits yielding little benefit. Instead, roughly 30% of the derivative suits provide relief to the corporation or the shareholders, while the others are usually dismissed quickly with little apparent litigation activity. In cases producing a recovery to shareholders, those amounts typically exceed the amount of attorneys\u27 fees awarded by a significant margin. They do demonstrate some indicia of litigation agency costs (for example suits being filed quickly, multiple suits per controversy, and repeat plaintiffs\u27 law firms), but each of these is much less pronounced for derivative suits than for other forms of representative litigations. Overall, the claim that derivative suits are strike suits is much weaker than in earlier periods. The Delaware judiciary, which hears most public company corporate litigation in America, has effectively monitored these cases. There is room to open the door for larger shareholders to utilize these suits to police corporate misconduct. Institutional shareholders, while not willing to take on as large a role in governance as many have suggested in terms of naming directors and the like, may be willing to take a larger role in derivative litigation. Thus we see potential for derivative litigation to play a more important role in the future. We therefore suggest that suits brought by a one percent or larger shareholder should be excused from the demand requirement currently applied in derivative suits

Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism

Shareholder voting is a key part of contemporary American corporate governance. As numerous contemporary battles between corporate management and shareholders illustrate, voting has never been more important. Yet, traditional theory about shareholder voting, rooted in concepts of residual ownership and a principal/agent relationship, does not reflect recent fundamental changes as to who shareholders are and their incentives to vote (or not vote). In the first section of the article, we address this deficiency directly by developing a new theory of corporate voting that offers three strong and complementary reasons for shareholder voting. In the middle section, we apply our theory to a world where most shares are held by institutional investment intermediaries (and mostly within retirement plans). We show that intermediaries’ business plans give them little reason to vote those shares and even create conflicts of interest that may distort their votes. Yet several key developments have countered that reality and opened the way for voting’s new prominence. First, government regulations now require many institutions to vote their stock in the best interests of their beneficiaries. Second, subsequent market innovations led to the birth of third party voting advisors, including Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which help address the costs of voting and the collective action problems inherent in coordinated institutional shareholder action. Third, building on these developments, hedge funds have aggressively intervened in corporate governance at firms seen as undervalued, regularly using the ballot box to pressure targeted firms to create shareholder value, thereby giving institutional shareholders a good reason to care about voting. But there is more to the corporate franchise than hedge fund inspired voting. Say on Pay proposals, Rule 14a-8 corporate governance proposals, and majority vote requirements for the election of directors, are all important, recurrent topics involving shareholder votes. We must also explain why these lower value votes should be held. In our concluding section, we apply our theory to examine when shareholder voting is justified. We examine hedge fund activism as an example of high value voting situation and Say on Pay votes as an illustration of lower value cases where there are still good reasons to have shareholder votes

Investigating whether adverse prenatal and perinatal events are associated with non-clinical psychotic symptoms at age 12 years in the ALSPAC birth cohort

Background. Non-clinical psychosis-like symptoms (PLIKS) occur in about 15% of the population. It is not clear whether adverse events during early development alter the risk of developing PLIKS. We aimed to examine whether maternal infection, diabetes or pre-eclampsia during pregnancy, gestational age, perinatal cardiopulmonary resuscitation or 5-min Apgar score were associated with development of psychotic symptoms during early adolescence. Method. A longitudinal study of 6356 12-year-old adolescents who completed a semi-structured interview for psychotic symptoms in the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC) birth cohort. Prenatal and perinatal data were obtained from obstetric records and maternal questionnaires completed during pregnancy. Results. The presence of definite psychotic symptoms was associated with maternal infection during pregnancy [adjusted odds ratio (OR) 1.44, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.11–1.86, p=0.006], maternal diabetes (adjusted OR 3.43, 95% CI 1.14–10.36, p=0.029), need for resuscitation (adjusted OR 1.50, 95% CI 0.97–2.31, p=0.065) and 5-min Apgar score (adjusted OR per unit decrease 1.30, 95% CI 1.12–1.50, p<0.001). None of these associations were mediated by childhood IQ score. Most associations persisted, but were less strong, when including suspected symptoms as part of the outcome. There was no association between PLIKS and gestational age or pre-eclampsia. Conclusions. Adverse events during early development may lead to an increased risk of developing PLIKS. Although the status of PLIKS in relation to clinical disorders such as schizophrenia is not clear, the similarity between these results and findings reported for schizophrenia indicates that future studies of PLIKS may help us to understand how psychotic experiences and clinical disorders develop throughout the life-course