Competition and Technological Complexity in Procurement: An Empirical Study of Dual Sourcing

The role of competition in defense procurement has long been controversial due to the extraordinary demand for technological advance, the relatively small production quantities involved and the importance of learning by doing. Since the early 1980s, Defense Department policy has encouraged the use of competition in the production phase of procurement where possible, particularly for relatively simple technologies. Recent theory, however, suggests that splitting production between two bidders ("dual sourcing") produces strong incentives for collusion unless the bidders are unsure of each other's costs, e.g. for sophisticated technologies in the early phases of production. Furthermore, dual sourcing may help discipline contractors in settings where contractual incompleteness is a particular problem. For both these reasons, dual sourcing may be more valuable for complex, rather than simple, technologies. To date, however, there have been no attempts to investigate empirically how technological complexity affects the viability of competition in procurement. I explore the effects of dual sourcing using a panel dataset comprising 14 missile systems with an average of 12.5 years of production history per system. Each missile's complexity is categorized based on the nature of its guidance and control system. Simple missiles enjoy greater scale economies than complex missiles, but the learning curves for the two missile types are not significantly different. The effects of dual sourcing, though, depend importantly on the nature of the technology involved: it significantly speeds learning and interferes with scale economies for complex missiles, but has no significant effects for simple ones. Dual sourcing thus produces no apparent savings for simple missiles, but for the average complex missile dual sourcing lowers unit costs by the seventh year of dual sourcing. Whether these potential savings justify the costs of transferring technology to the second source and the possible weakening of R&D incentives remains an open question.

Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem

“Buyer option” contracts, in which the buyer selects the product variant to be traded and chooses whether to accept delivery, are often used to solve hold-up problems. We present a simple game that focusses sharply on subgames in which the buyer proposes inefficient actions in order to improve his bargaining position. We argue for one of several alternative ways to model this situation. We then apply that modeling choice to recent models of the foundations of incomplete contracts and show that a buyer option contract is sufficient to induce first-best outcomes.

Spatial Proximity and Complementarities in the Trading of Tacit Knowledge

We model knowledge-trading coalitions in which the transfer of tacit knowledge is unverifiable and requires face-to-face contact, making spatial proximity important. When there are sufficient “complementarities” in knowledge exchange, successful exchange is facilitated if firms can meet in a central location,thereby economizing on travel costs. When complementarities are small,however, a central location may be undesirable because it is more vulnerable to cheating than a structure involving bilateral travel between firms. We believe that our framework may help explain the structure and stability of multimember technology trading coalitions such as Sematech and Silicon Valley.Tacit Knowledge, Clusters, Knowledge Trading, Complementarities. Spatial Proximity

Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective

We survey the growing theoretical literature on the motives for and welfare effects of corporate greening. We show how both market and political forces are making environmental CSR profitable, and we also discuss morally-motivated or altruistic CSR. Welfare effects of CSR are subtle and situation-contingent, and there is no guarantee that CSR enhances social welfare. We identify numerous areas in which additional theoretical work is needed.corporate social responsibility, environment, self-regulation, preemption, private politics

Astroturf: Interest Group Lobbying and Corporate Strategy

We study three corporate nonmarket strategies designed to influence the lobbying behavior of other special interest groups: (1) astroturf, in which the firm covertly subsidizes a group with similiar views to lobby when it normally would not; (2) the bear hug, in which the firm overtly pays a group to alter its lobbying activitives; and (3) self-regulation, in which the firm voluntarily limits the potential social harm from its activities. All three strategies reduce the informativeness of lobbying, and all reduce the payoff of the public decision-maker. We show that the decision-maker would benefit by requiring the public disclosure of funds but that the availability of alternative strategies limits the impact of such a policy.

High-order, Dispersionless "Fast-Hybrid" Wave Equation Solver. Part I: O(1)\mathcal{O}(1) Sampling Cost via Incident-Field Windowing and Recentering

This paper proposes a frequency/time hybrid integral-equation method for the time dependent wave equation in two and three-dimensional spatial domains. Relying on Fourier Transformation in time, the method utilizes a fixed (time-independent) number of frequency-domain integral-equation solutions to evaluate, with superalgebraically-small errors, time domain solutions for arbitrarily long times. The approach relies on two main elements, namely, 1) A smooth time-windowing methodology that enables accurate band-limited representations for arbitrarily-long time signals, and 2) A novel Fourier transform approach which, in a time-parallel manner and without causing spurious periodicity effects, delivers numerically dispersionless spectrally-accurate solutions. A similar hybrid technique can be obtained on the basis of Laplace transforms instead of Fourier transforms, but we do not consider the Laplace-based method in the present contribution. The algorithm can handle dispersive media, it can tackle complex physical structures, it enables parallelization in time in a straightforward manner, and it allows for time leaping---that is, solution sampling at any given time $T$ at $\mathcal{O}(1)$-bounded sampling cost, for arbitrarily large values of $T$, and without requirement of evaluation of the solution at intermediate times. The proposed frequency-time hybridization strategy, which generalizes to any linear partial differential equation in the time domain for which frequency-domain solutions can be obtained (including e.g. the time-domain Maxwell equations), and which is applicable in a wide range of scientific and engineering contexts, provides significant advantages over other available alternatives such as volumetric discretization, time-domain integral equations, and convolution-quadrature approaches.Comment: 33 pages, 8 figures, revised and extended manuscript (and now including direct comparisons to existing CQ and TDIE solver implementations) (Part I of II

Greenwash vs. Brownwash: Exaggeration and Undue Modesty in Corporate Sustainability Disclosure

Corporate greenwash has accelerated in recent years, bringing in its wake growing skepticism about corporate green claims. Although a theory of the drivers and deterrents of greenwash has begun to emerge, it is static in nature and does not incorporate the full range of ways in which firms can misrepresent their environmental performance. Our contribution is three-fold. First, we extend the theory of organizational information disclosure to incorporate the possibility of undue modesty about a firm’s environmental, social and governance practices. Second, we hypothesize about the drivers of exaggeration and undue modesty based on which of a firm’s stakeholders are salient at a given point in time; to do so we place the firm within a dynamic context that has largely been missing in the prior literature. Third, we test our hypotheses using a dataset that allows us to directly compare corporate green claims against actual performance. Results reveal that corporate output growth, deregulation, and low profits under deregulation significantly affect the choice between greenwash and brownwash. The effects of growth and profits are mitigated by external scrutiny.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/110678/1/1266_Lyon.pd

Introduction to the Special Issue on Management Strategy and the Environment

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/71429/1/j.1530-9134.2009.00205.x.pd

Voluntary Environmental Agreements when Regulatory Capacity Is Weak

Voluntary agreements (VAs) negotiated between environmental regulators and industry are increasingly popular. However, little is known about whether they are likely to be effective in developing and transition countries, where local and federal environmental regulatory capacity is typically weak. We develop a dynamic theoretical model to examine the effect of VAs on investment in regulatory infrastructure and pollution abatement in such countries. We find that under certain conditions, VAs can improve welfare by generating more private-sector investment in pollution control and more public-sector investment in regulatory capacity than the status quo.voluntary environmental regulation, developing country

Salience Games: Keeping Environmental Issues in (and Out) of the Public Eye

Businesses and green activists seek to influence public attention to the social impacts of a sector -- they play salience games. An activist allocates funds between campaigning against a polluting industry and other environmental projects. When public attention is scarce, a greater campaign orientation induces industry to invest more heavily in symbolic action that cloaks damage and reduces the risk of salience. This makes fundraising more challenging for the activist, diminishing funds available for both campaign and non-campaign activities. The activist strategically biases its mission away from campaigns -- and in favor of broad versus narrow campaigns -- but not by as much as a welfare-motivated planner would wish. When salience is avoided by a mixture of symbolic and substantive action, a greater weight on the latter induces the NGO to become more campaign-oriented, with environmental damage lower and welfare higher. Concentrated industries prefer symbolic action, and un-concentrated industries prefer substantive action.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/120913/1/1318_Lyon.pd