Regional policy, convergence and subsidiarity in the European Community

The aim of this paper is to shed light on how real income has developed across the member states and regions of the EC and to consider what demands this will place on regional policy. According to the principle of subsidiarity, a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for EC intervention would be to prove that the scale of regional problems is too great to be handled by member states. Using two concepts of convergence, it can be shown that income convergence across the member states and even across the regions of the EC is the norm. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, policy implications concerning the assignment of a complementary function for redistributive regional policy to the EC tier are derived from the empirical evidence.

The Political Economy of Bilateralism and Multilateralism: Institutional Choice in Trade and Taxation

Trade relations are governed by the multilateral GATT, whereas the avoidance of international double taxation rests on a network of around 2000 bilateral treaties. Given the two regimes’ similar economic rationales this difference between bilateralism in international double tax avoidance and multilateralism in the trade regime poses an empirical puzzle. In this paper we develop an answer to this puzzle. Differentiating between different stages of international cooperation, we first describe the institutional form in the bargaining and agreement stages of cooperation. This description shows that the regimes are quite similar in the bargaining stage, both exhibiting a mix of bilateral and multilateral bargaining. However, while agreement is multilateral in the trade regime it is bilateral in taxation. Based on stylized institutional histories of both cases we develop simple game theoretic models incorporating domestic level considerations. Building on these models we then go on to explain the institutional choice between bilateral and multilateral cooperation. We show that state concerns for the distribution of benefits can be best achieved under bilateral bargaining in both regimes. However, in order to lower transaction costs there are also elements of multilateral bargaining. Agreement is multilateral in trade in order to overcome a free-rider problem that results from an interaction of concerns for distribution and enforcement. Since such a problem of free-riding does not exist in taxation, there is no need for binding multilateral agreement.Theories of International Cooperation; International Trade; International Double Taxation; Bilateralism; Multilateralism

The political economy of bilateralism and multilateralism: Institutional choice in international trade and taxation

Trade relations are governed by the multilateral GATT, whereas the avoidance of international double taxation rests on a network of around 2000 bilateral treaties. Given the two regimes similar economic rationales this difference between bilateralism in international double tax avoidance and multilateralism in the trade regime poses an empirical puzzle. In this paper we develop an answer to this puzzle. Differentiating between different stages of international cooperation, we first describe the institutional form in the bargaining and agreement stages of cooperation. This description shows that the regimes are quite similar in the bargaining stage, both exhibiting a mix of bilateral and multilateral bargaining. However, while agreement is multilateral in the trade regime it is bilateral in taxation. Based on stylized institutional histories of both cases we develop simple game theoretic models incorporating domestic level considerations. Building on these models we then go on to explain the institutional choice between bilateral and multilateral cooperation. We show that state concerns for the distribution of benefits can be best achieved under bilateral bargaining in both regimes. However, in order to lower transaction costs there are also elements of multilateral bargaining. Agreement is multilateral in trade in order to overcome a free-rider problem that results from an interaction of concerns for distribution and enforcement. Since such a problem of free-riding does not exist in taxation, there is no need for binding multilateral agreement. -- Während Handelsbeziehungen durch das multilaterale GATT geregelt werden, beruht die Vermeidung internationaler Doppelbesteuerung auf einem Netzwerk von etwa 2000 bilateralen Verträgen. Da beide Regime die gleiche ökonomische Zielsetzung der Marktliberalisierung haben, stellt die unterschiedliche institutionelle Form ein empirisches Puzzle dar, das wir in diesem Papier lösen. Wir unterscheiden zwischen verschiedenen Phasen internationaler Kooperation und beschreiben zunächst die institutionelle Form in der Bargaining- und Agreement-Phase. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Systeme in der Bargaining-Phase sehr ähnlich sind: beide weisen einen Mix bilateraler und multilateraler Elemente auf. In der Agreement-Phase hingegen findet man Multilateralismus im Handelsregime und Bilateralismus im Steuerregime. Im zweiten Teil des Papiers leiten wir aus den nationalen Interessenkonstellationen in der Handels- und Steuerpolitik einfache spieltheoretische Modelle ab, mit deren Hilfe wir die institutionelle Wahl zwischen bilateraler und multilateraler Kooperation in beiden Phasen erklären. Wir zeigen, dass Staaten nach Verteilungsgewinnen streben, was am besten in bilateralen Verhandlungen erreicht werden kann. Bilaterales Verhandeln führt jedoch zu hohen Transaktionskosten, die durch multilaterale Elemente in den Verhandlungen reduziert werden können (Bargaining-Phase). Abkommen in Handelsbeziehungen sind multilateral, um ein free-riding zu vermeiden, das wiederum aus dem Streben nach Verteilungsgewinnen resultiert. Da free-riding im Steuerregime aufgrund der Spielstruktur kein gravierendes Problem ist, gibt es hier keine Notwendigkeit eines multilateralen Abkommens, so dass man hier Bilateralismus vorfindet (Agreement-Phase).

Multi-facet classification of e-mails in a helpdesk scenario

Helpdesks have to manage a huge amount of support requests which are usually submitted via e-mail. In order to be assigned to experts e ciently, incoming e-mails have to be classi- ed w. r. t. several facets, in particular topic, support type and priority. It is desirable to perform these classi cations automatically. We report on experiments using Support Vector Machines and k-Nearest-Neighbours, respectively, for the given multi-facet classi - cation task. The challenge is to de ne suitable features for each facet. Our results suggest that improvements can be gained for all facets, and they also reveal which features are promising for a particular facet

Comparison of Calculations for the Hubbard model obtained with Quantum-Monte-Carlo, exact and stochastic Diagonalization

In this paper we compare numerical results for the ground state of the Hubbard model obtained by Quantum-Monte-Carlo simulations with results from exact and stochastic diagonalizations. We find good agreement for the ground state energy and superconducting correlations for both, the repulsive and attractive Hubbard model. Special emphasis lies on the superconducting correlations in the repulsive Hubbard model, where the small magnitude of the values obtained by Monte-Carlo simulations gives rise to the question, whether these results might be caused by fluctuations or systematic errors of the method. Although we notice that the Quantum-Monte-Carlo method has convergence problems for large interactions, coinciding with a minus sign problem, we confirm the results of the diagonalization techniques for small and moderate interaction strengths. Additionally we investigate the numerical stability and the convergence of the Quantum-Monte-Carlo method in the attractive case, to study the influence of the minus sign problem on convergence. Also here in the absence of a minus sign problem we encounter convergence problems for strong interactions.Comment: 24 pages, 9 figure

From Boltzmann equations to steady wall velocities

By means of a relativistic microscopic approach we calculate the expansion velocity of bubbles generated during a first-order electroweak phase transition. In particular, we use the gradient expansion of the Kadanoff-Baym equations to set up the fluid system. This turns out to be equivalent to the one found in the semi-classical approach in the non-relativistic limit. Finally, by including hydrodynamic deflagration effects and solving the Higgs equations of motion in the fluid, we determine velocity and thickness of the bubble walls. Our findings are compared with phenomenological models of wall velocities. As illustrative examples, we apply these results to three theories providing first-order phase transitions with a particle content in the thermal plasma that resembles the Standard Model.Comment: 40 pages, 8 figures; v2: added references, version published in JCA

Socionics: Sociological Concepts for Social Systems of Artificial (and Human) Agents

Socionics is an interdisciplinary approach with the objective to use sociological knowledge about the structures, mechanisms and processes of social interaction and social communication as a source of inspiration for the development of multi-agent systems, both for the purposes of engineering applications and of social theory construction and social simulation. The approach has been spelled out from 1998 on within the Socionics priority program funded by the German National research foundation. This special issue of the JASSS presents research results from five interdisciplinary projects of the Socionics program. The introduction gives an overview over the basic ideas of the Socionics approach and summarizes the work of these projects.Socionics, Sociology, Multi-Agent Systems, Artificial Social Systems, Hybrid Systems, Social Simulation