Insiders-outsiders, transparency and the value of the ticker

We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors. Thus, investors’ average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price information can implement the fraction of insiders that maximizes investors’ average welfare. This market features a high price to curb excessive acquisition of ticker information. We also show that informational efficiency is greater when the dissemination of ticker information is broader and more timely

Stock price informativeness, cross-listings and investment decisions

In this paper, the authors show that a cross-listing allows a firm to make better investment decisions because it enhances stock price informativeness.Cross-listings; cross-listings premium; price informativeness; investment decisions; flow-back; ownership.

Information sharing, liquidity and transaction costs in floor-based trading systems

We consider information sharing between traders("floor brokers") who possess different types of information, namely information on the payoff of a risky security or information on the volume of liquidity trading in this security. We interpret these traders as dual -capacity brokers on the floor of an exchange. We identify conditions under which the traders are better off sharing information. We also show that information sharing improves price discovery, reduces volatility and lowers expected trading costs. Information sharing can improve or impair the depth of the market, depending on the values of the parameters. Overall our analysis suggests that information sharing among floor brokers improves the performance of floor-based trading systems.market microstructure; floor-based trading systems; open outcry; information sharing; information sales

Reputation-based pricing and price improvements in dealership markets

In many security markets, dealers trade with their regular clients at a discount relative to prevailing bid and ask quotes. In this article we provide an explanation to this phenomenon. We consider a dealer and an investor engaged in a long-term relationship. The dealer assigns a reputational index to his client. This index increases (reputation decreases) when the client conducts trades which results in a loss for the regular dealer. The dealer grants a price improvement if and only if the client's index is smaller than a threshold and suspends price improvements otherwise. We show that this pricing strategy induces the investor to refrain from exploiting private information against her regular dealer. We also find that it worsens the quotes posted by other dealers. For this reason, there are cases in which the investor is better off if long-term relationships are impossible (for instance, if trading is anonymous). Our model predicts that a dealer's decision to grant a price improvement depends on his past trading profits with the trader requesting the improvement.Market microstructure; Reputation and Implicit contracts; Non-Anonymous trading

Linkage principle, Multi-dimensional Signals and Blind Auctions

We compare the seller’s expected revenue in a second price sealed bid auction for a single object in which bidders receive multidimensional signals. Bidders’ valuations for the object depend on their signals and a signal observed privately by the seller. We show in various examples that the seller can be better off not revealing publicly his signal. Hence the linkage principle does not necessarily hold when bidders receive multidimensional signals.Auction Theory; Linkage Principle; Multidimensional Signals; Blind Auctions

Insiders-outsiders, transparency and the value of the ticker

In this paper, the authors consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay.market data sale; latency; transparency; price discovery; Hirsh-leifer effect

Equity Trading Systems in Europe - A survey of recent changes

This paper provides a survey of recent changes in the market microstructure of the 5 largest European Stock Exchanges. We first provide a brief statistical overview of European equity markets. Then we discuss how the introduction of the Investment Services Directive and the development of institutional trading have prompted European Stock Exchanges to modify their trading systems since 1994. We show that these exchanges have converged to a similar market organization. In this organization, trading takes place in an order-driven market but trading rules can vary according to the type of securities. We also describe the remaining differences between the trading systems, in particular with respect to the consolidation of the order flow and transparency.trading systems; trading rules; market microstructure; European equity markets

Competition for Listings

We develop a model in which two profit maximizing exchanges compete for IPO listings. They choose the listing fees paid by firms wishing to go public and control the trading costs incurred by investors. All firms prefer lower costs, however firms differ in how they value a decrease in trading costs. Hence, in equilibrium, the exchanges obtain positive expected profits by charging different trading fees and different listing fees. As a result, firms that list on different exchanges have different characteristics. The model has testable implications for the cross-sectional characteristics of IPOs' on different quality exchanges and the relationship between the level of trading costs and listing fees. We also find that competition does not guarantee that exchanges choose welfare maximizing trading rules. In some cases, welfare is larger with a monopolist exchange than with oligopolist exchanges.market microstructure; listings; competition; exchanges; regulation

Limit order book as a market for liquidity

We develop a dynamic model of an order-driven market populated by discretionary liquidity traders. These traders must trade, yet can choose the type of order and are fully strategic in their decision. Traders differ by their impatience: less patient traders demand liquidity, more patient traders provide it. Three equilibrium types are obtained - the type is determined by three parameters: the degree of impatience of the patient traders, which we interpret as the cost of execution delay in providing liquidity; their proportion in the population, which is the cost of the minimal price improvement. Despite its simplicity, the model generates a rich set empirical predictions on the relation between market parameters, time to execution, and spreads. We argue that the economic intuition of this model is robust, thus its main results will remain in more general models.limit and market orders; time-to-execution; market quality