The power not to tax: A search for effective controls

Although the primary purpose of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was to gain greater congressional control over federal spending, the act also represented a small but significant step toward controlling the substantial financial commitments made through the numerous exclusions, deductions, and credits in the federal income tax. In the Budget Act Congress, for the first time, recognized and defined these “tax expenditures” and adopted procedures for reviewing them. But tax expenditure budgeting has not had the beneficial effect that some had hoped, mainly because the 1974 effort failed to take adequate account of the organizational structure of Congress and of the political character of its decision-making. But these weaknesses can be overcome.

Strategy And Choice In Congressional Elections - The Role Of Political-Action Committees

The spectacular growth in the number and spending of political action committees has made this new breed of political organization an increasingly important actor in congressional elections. Indeed, the strategic use of PAC resources is an important element in the developing theory of how rational political expectations affect congressional elections. The evidence about PACs adduced in support of this theory has thus far emphasized changes in aggregate spending. Using a merged data set of Federal Election Commission records from both the 1980 and 1982 elections, the authors are able for the first time to trace the tactical shifts of individual PACs between years. The analysis provides strong support for the theory of political expectations. Predictable strategic behavior is found for PACs with different contributor motivations. The different motives, furthermore, appear to be quite durable, despite generally convergent behavior by many PACs in 1982. Yet the data also suggest that intraorganizational considerations constrain the strategic choice for some PACs, especially labor committees. Thus, the analysis reveals large disparities in the malleability of pro-Republican and pro-Democratic resources

Politics And Markets: Corporate Money In American National Elections

The current American debate about the relationship between business and government represents the most significant reopening of that issue since the New Deal. The debate is in part about government\u27s role in the economy, but the issue of business\u27s role in politics is being joined as well, joined in fact on several fronts. There are, of course, the polemics of corporations and their critics, in which business is cast alternately as victim and villain. The issue also divides more serious students of American politics and has fostered a wealth of theorizing about the role of the state. Finally, the issue of business influence pervades discussions about campaign finance

An Organizational Analysis Of Political Action Committees

As the number and putative importance of political action committees have grown, so too has scholarly attention to this new breed of political organization. Yet this attention has been uneven. Although much is now known about the aggregate spending patterns of PACs, much less is known about their internal lives. The present study attempts to open the PAC black box to empirical inquiry. Drawing on interviews with the managers of 70 Washington-based political action committees, we suggest how theoretical perspectives about formal voluntary associations may be usefully applied in explaining the behavior of PACs. After examining the relationships among several variables - organizational goals, constituency relations and decision making, strategy, and interorganizational relations - we show how these forces affect the behavior of corporate, trade/membership, labor, and nonconnected PACS. © 1985 Agathon Press, Inc