The Great Race of Courts : Civil Justice System Competition in the European Union

The research aims to answer this question: How do civil justice systems compete in the European Union

The Party Autonomy Paradigm: European and Global Developments on Choice of Forum

One of the pillars of international commercial litigation is party autonomy as it has developed over the past fifty years. In Europe, the Brussels regime established considerable freedom for parties to select the court that would have jurisdiction. The enforceability of choice of court agreements has gained ground in many countries worldwide, and the freedom to select the competent forum is exercised widely in commercial practice. Early in 2015, the new Brussels Ibis Regulation became applicable, altering the rules on choice of court. These amendments, particularly the exception to the lis pendens rule, aim at increasing the efficiency of choice of court agreements and at preventing torpedo litigation tactics. This year also marks the entry into force of the Hague Choice of Court Convention that had been adopted ten years earlier. The present paper explores the concept and development of the party autonomy paradigm from the perspective of different disciplines, and discusses the empirical evidence available on the use of party autonomy in commercial practice. It also examines the main changes brought about by the Brussels I recast and the entry into force of the Hague Choice of Court Convention, and analyses these against the background of the party autonomy paradigm, as well as their contribution to effective litigation

International Commercial Courts Competition in Europe: A Litigation Experience Approach

Dispute resolution in general and court litigation in particular are considered as goods or services offered to conflicting parties in particular markets. Perhaps the recent surge in promoting international commercial courts in Europe serves best to exemplify this. Jurisdictions that invest in this type of court engage in promotion campaigns and try their best to win market shares over their direct competition. Research suggests that the supply side of international commercial litigation is composed of many institutions, which indicates that the supplied good is much more than simply court litigation. In my previous research, I argued that lawyers are the parties that create the demand output with regard to international commercial disputes. Lawyers make their choice of court based not only on the quality and functionality of the court but also on other factors often described as emotional and psychological. Despite this advancement, the question of how international commercial court competition unfolds remains open; at the same time, competing jurisdictions remain unsure about how to make their courts more attractive. This article contends that lawyers and companies – as the demand side – make their choice of court on the basis of their litigation experience. In fact, the demand side considers not only the quality of the service they purchase but also the services related to it, as well as their satisfaction with the purchase and with the emotional value they derive from the litigation. The customer experience framework can also be applied to explain the activities that competing jurisdictions undertake to attract litigants