The Global Child: A Roadmap for Becoming Culturally Responsive Educators

The program strategies and the assessment tools encourage early childhood teachers to adopt 26 strategies across three competency areas: 1) classroom design; 2) teachers’ rhythm and temperament; and 3) instructional strategies during the 10-month program year. Mentors are assigned to each teaching team and through supportive site visits and assessment visits help the teams change their thinking and practices to be more culturally and linguistically responsive

The Cost of Poverty: The Perpetuating Cycle of Concentrated Poverty in New Jersey Cities • A Comprehensive Budgetary Analysis of Four Urban New Jersey Municipalities

This report examines the problem of concentrated poverty in the State of New Jersey. Both the individual and the long-term economic consequences of concentrated poverty are well- documented in social science research. The report adds to that knowledge by examining the practical, budgetary consequences faced by urban centers that are characterized by high poverty levels. The report focuses on four cities, which are represented in the New Jersey Urban Mayors Association (NJUMA) — Bridgeton, Passaic, Perth Amboy, and Trenton. While these regions vary considerably, they all share one important fact: their poverty rates are double or triple the New Jersey average. Clearly, these cities know all too well the struggles that come with concentrated poverty. Poverty in New Jersey is often highly concentrated, particularly in urban areas. New Jersey is ranked as one of the wealthiest states in the country, yet this average wealth ignores two important realities. First, poverty tends to be concentrated, so that a large portion of the State’s population lives in areas with poverty rates above 20%. Second, the official poverty threshold bears no relation to the basic cost of living in New Jersey, so that households with incomes up to two and a half times the poverty level still struggle just to make ends meet. By this measure, in 2014 a remarkable 2.8 million New Jersey residents lived under this true measure of poverty, including 800,000 children. Both the breadth and the concentration of poverty create serious challenges, particularly in urban areas. Residents in poor urban areas present significant service needs. Due to the limits of public and affordable housing even in low-income areas, citizens of NJUMA cities must spend over half their income on rent, leaving little else for other basic needs. The constraints produced by low incomes are exacerbated by multiple systemic barriers, including poor access to health care, reliance on inadequate transportation, poor quality education, and substandard or overcrowded housing. Personal barriers like limited English proficiency, large families, and lack of two wage earners can also act as barriers to economic empowerment. The deck is stacked against impoverished municipalities. In recent years, funding from the State to individual municipalities has dwindled markedly. In response, local property taxes have soared, generating an ever-increasing burden on nearly all New Jersey residents. But, in impoverished cities, the burden is even greater. Because an ever- increasing reliance on property taxes is layered over a diminishing tax base, a counterintuitive scenario has resulted, whereby the most impoverished municipalities shoulder an unmanageable municipal tax burden — a greater burden than even their wealthy neighbors. As the budget analysis in this report reveals, services other than public safety and public works make up an all too negligible portion of municipal budgets in the examined cities, despite the significant need for public services created by the dynamics of concentrated poverty. Urgent strategies are needed to alleviate concentrated poverty in New Jersey. We need to strengthen the safety-net for poverty-stricken families and their children, while at the same time addressing the budgetary system that unfairly burdens both income-strapped families and impoverished municipalities. If New Jersey is to make real progress on reducing the systemic poverty that traps far too many of our residents, the entire state must recognize and respond to this crisis. This means promoting family financial success through supportive work/family policies, adjusting the allocation of municipal budget State aid and support programming so that it prioritizes areas of concentrated need, and reimagining the fundamental structure of New Jersey’s property tax system

Urban-Focused Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS)

This Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) is the outgrowth of a long running effort by the John S. Watson Institute for Public Policy at Thomas Edison State College (Watson Institute) to support economic and community development in New Jersey with a particular focus on urban areas in need of revitalization. The Watson Institute was previously awarded a United States Economic Development Administration (USEDA) grant to complete an economic analysis of the North Central New Jersey Region. The USEDA approved that analysis and awarded additional funds to continue our work, culminating in this CEDS plan. Several years ago, the Watson Institute recognized that there was an opportunity and need to engage in regional economic development planning and cooperation amongst members of the New Jersey Urban Mayors Association. Rapidly advancing technology and economies necessitate partnerships amongst local governments, non-profits, private firms, and universities to address broad economic development problems and reach long-term goals. Although many of the municipalities participating in the CEDS effort are not contiguous, they nonetheless share histories that have led to their current problems. Allowing geographic boundaries to limit the extent of opportunity is no longer a viable option for regions that want to see broad based and sustainable economic growth. The purpose of a CEDS is to bring together the public, non- profit, and private sectors to establish a comprehensive framework for economic growth and revitalization in a region. In this case, the “Region” is defined as 19 specific municipalities within a seven-county area of the state, including: Asbury Park, Bayonne, Bloomfield, East Orange, Elizabeth, Hoboken, Irvington, Jersey City, Lakewood, Neptune, New Brunswick, Newark, Orange, Passaic, Paterson, Perth Amboy, Plainfield, Roselle and Woodbridge. The geographic composition of this CEDS is unique in that the Region is not strictly speaking contiguous. What binds our Region together are the threads of common issues, opportunities, constraints, and the hope that, collectively, the communities can create solutions that would otherwise not be obtained individually. One of the most significant binding events of this region’s recent history is Superstorm Sandy. Minimizing disruption from natural disaster events is critical to any economic development goals and objectives of a community. There are a wide variety of reports and recommendations available to municipalities in helping them develop resiliency plans that are customized to meet the needs of their community. Discussions regarding resilient infrastructure have been an ongoing theme during this urban focused CEDS, and is reflected in several projects and initiatives focused on resiliency as well as it being a theme in projects that are not necessarily resiliency focused, but incorporate resiliency elements to reduce the stress put on other systems. Two of the more forward thinking projects included as part of resiliency strategies in this CEDS are the City of Hoboken’s flood wall and the Township of Woodbridge’s plan for a township wide microgrid. Although discussion about resiliency in general tends to focus on natural disaster, this CEDS discussion on resiliency also encompassed a wide variety of activities and topics. When at all possible, resilience focused projects should incorporate other resiliency related elements The steering committee met many times over the course of several years, for both the economic base analysis and for this CEDS plan. Steering committee members included representatives and officials from each community; non-profit organizations such as universities, community colleges, libraries and community-based organizations; and representatives of the private sector ranging from Fortune 100 corporations to small businesses. The steering committee’s work culminated in the Action Plan. The Action Plan serves as the roadmap that the Watson Institute, together with the New Jersey Urban Mayors Association and the CEDS steering committee itself, will use to implement sustainable economic development in the Region’s constituent municipalities. The challenges faced by the steering committee in formulating the CEDS plan were commensurate with those faced by each of the communities. The goals and objectives include: Enhancing, preserving and making resilient critical infrastructure assets; Promoting small business development; Addressing persistent and complex workforce issues; Marketing effectively to attract new businesses, residents and tourists; Promulgating best practices in economic development across all 19 communities; Providing adequate implementation assistance to execute the CEDS plan. The steering committee engaged in many planning exercises, including stakeholder and issues mapping, brainstorming, resource assessments, inventorying existing networks and programs, etc. The consulting team brought data, national economic development experience and certain stakeholder engagement techniques to elicit creative, non-linear thinking. The Watson Institute provided a Senior Fellow to meet and communicate with each community individually on multiple occasions to understand specific needs and encourage participation in the process. Following all these efforts, the steering committee agreed that, to be included in the CEDS plan, each action has to meet the following criteria: It must address one of the critical goals/objectives identified above, It must be realistic, clear and actionable, It must either require few local resources to implement or have a funding source identified, It must have a real and sustainable impact, and, It should be relatively short term to show progress and generate enthusiasm, It should be something that, if successful, can be quickly replicated across all 19 communities, It should have performance metrics that can be tracked and reported on. These criteria weighed considerably on the process and the steering committee’s deliberations. Unlike a “traditional” CEDS vested at the County or State level, with existing power structures and funding sources, this CEDS relies on the power of persuasion; the more effective utilization of existing resources; and the ability to realign stakeholders in a truly novel way

New Jersey Urban Enterprise Zone Program Assessment 2019

In 2019, the State of New Jersey sought an evaluation of its Urban Enterprise Zone (UEZ) Program to determine the program’s economic impact and make recommendations for the program’s future. The John S. Watson Institute of Public Policy of Thomas Edison State University joined with PEL Analytics and Anderson Economic Group to produce the following study. The main recommendation of this analysis is to retain the UEZ Program while instituting various changes to make it stronger. Recommended changes in brief include reinstating some form of Zone Assistance Funds (ZAFs), creating a better system to collect data and track outcomes, assisting smaller municipalities with issues such as administrating revolving loan funds, linking the UEZ Program with similar state supported incentives, graduating businesses out of the program after a maximum of 10 years, developing a marketing component and similar measures that will be outlined in full later in this Assessment. Both the quantitative and the qualitative data indicate that there are a variety of benefits that UEZ municipalities receive from the program, including suggestions that it assists with unemployment and poverty based on Municipal Revitalization Index data. However, it is unrealistic to believe that any single economic development program can lift a municipality with entrenched problems of distress and poverty to health and sustainability. The UEZ Program is only one tool in the state’s economic toolbox, but it appears to be a valuable tool. Therefore, there is no recommendation to replace or sunset the UEZ Program. Since 2013, the UEZ Program has generated increased economic activity that has led to new state revenues as UEZ-certified businesses experienced greater output, earnings, and employment growth than nonparticipating businesses that were also located in UEZs. In addition, the program has had some success in attracting businesses from outside of New Jersey to the state. However, while the program created jobs and fostered economic growth, it is not clear whether the new economic activity generated tax revenues in excess of the taxes foregone by the State due to UEZ incentives. The net economic and fiscal impact analysis of the program was limited by the available data, as discussed in Chapter 3. This led to one of the main recommendations — that the State should strengthen its data collection and tracking system of UEZs in order to better determine outcomes and pinpoint possible improvements. Although the program appears to benefit participating businesses, an analysis of several place-based socioeconomic metrics in Chapter 10, including household income, unemployment, and home value show that individuals living in UEZs are not necessarily better off than individuals living in comparable non-UEZ areas. The New Jersey UEZ Program was created in 1983 to stimulate revitalization in urban communities through various incentives, the most well-known of which is the ability of UEZ businesses to charge only half the standard sales tax rate. The program’s focus was job creation and economic development. Criteria for creating the zones mostly centered on unemployment figures. Currently, there are 32 zones, which are spread across 37 municipalities and home to approximately 6,800 UEZ-certified businesses. The first five municipalities joined the program in 1986; the most recent joined in 2002. The original UEZ designations granted to municipalities were set to expire after 20 years. Sixteen-year extensions were granted in 2001, and then another extension was given more recently to the original five UEZ municipalities whose designation had terminated. All UEZs are currently set to expire between 2023 and 2025. At its simplest form, UEZ is a dedicated funding source for local economic development. The dedicated funding source is the State sales tax. As the incentive exists today, these State sales tax funds are deployed in UEZ communities to promote economic development by allowing local businesses and consumers to pay less in State sales tax, which amounts to a State subsidy (and therefore an expense) to those same businesses and consumers. At the time of its inception, a portion of the sales tax generated by UEZ-certified businesses was used to create Zone Assistance Funds (ZAFs), a flexible revenue source used by UEZ communities for a broad range of activities in support of economic development. Following a study of the program in 2011, and under heavy criticism by the then-governor, ZAFs were eliminated. In addition, in the wake of the 2011 Assessment, administration changes were made to streamline the program’s certification, annual reporting, and recertification applications. Disagreement over the program and its benefits led to this Assessment. Critics maintained the program has been ineffective and sought to end it. Proponents laud its opportunities for disadvantaged communities and their residents and are interested in expanding it. This Assessment seeks to provide quantitative and qualitative data on the effectiveness of the UEZ Program and recommendations for its improvement as the State considers its future. New Jersey’s Municipal Revitalization Index (MRI) ranked all but one of the UEZ municipalities in the bottom 20th percentile with the majority in the 10th percentile. The UEZ municipalities also generally scored worse than the state average on factors like unemployment and median household income. But UEZ municipalities outperformed non-UEZ municipalities in terms of the average change in certain MRI indicators, indicating benefits from the program. For example, on average the unemployment rate in UEZ municipalities grew by 1.3 percent compared to an average increase of 1.6 percent in non-UEZ municipalities. Furthermore, a review of UEZ enabling statutes suggests that earlier eligibility criteria more closely aligned with legislative intent while recent designations relied only on population and place, which could have the impact of diluting the program. Statutory language also grants extension of the UEZ benefit for both communities and businesses with few requirements, a situation that merits review by the state. For businesses, granting them an advantage that in some cases has lasted for decades raises the question of whether they are viable or are simply being propped up by the state. As previously noted, the economic impact study in this Assessment determined that UEZ- certified businesses experienced more robust growth than non-UEZ-certified businesses located in zones, the program has attracted out-of-state businesses that would not have otherwise relocated, and the State has received new revenues from the program. However, these results must be viewed in the context of data limitations that makes a clear net economic impact difficult to discern. The research team conducted interviews and surveys with businesses, UEZ coordinators, local and state elected officials, and other program stakeholders which provided additional program insight and a review of UEZ accomplishments. Chapter 7 of this Assessment contains several New Jersey municipalities’ UEZ Program case studies. Among them includes the creation of Steamworks, a satellite college program that exposes students and other City of Bridgeton residents to STEM-related training; the construction of the $320 million Mills at Jersey Gardens on a brownfield site in the City of Elizabeth; and the City of Trenton’s$30 million Roebling Market, which employs 360 people. The projects were made possible not only by the UEZ designation, but by the ZAFs component that was removed from the program after the 2011 Assessment. During interviews, UEZ coordinators as a whole lamented the elimination of ZAFs, which have been used to remediate properties, build necessary and supporting infrastructure, demolish unstable structures, and support project funding to attract private equity, among other uses including marketing the UEZ Program. ZAFs were one of the few sources of flexible economic development funds available to these municipalities. UEZ coordinators called for the reinstatement of some form of ZAFs, along with better tracking of the UEZ Program, better linkage between UEZ and other state economic development incentives, using a more regional model to assist smaller municipalities and creating additional roles for the State board that oversees UEZs. Coordinators also cited marketing and advertising of the program as one of UEZ’s weaknesses due to the lack of ZAFs. The elimination of ZAFs profoundly changed the nature of the UEZ Program, which shifted from a comprehensive government program to a series of broad-based tax cuts and other smaller fiscal incentives. The pre-2011 UEZ Program made significant targeted investments back into UEZ communities through ZAFs. Municipalities were given the freedom to choose how to invest that funding, focusing on local priorities upon approval by the State and the Urban Enterprise Zone Board. The post-2011 UEZ Program makes investments only through broad-based tax expenditures — i.e., tax cuts — to businesses and consumers. The consumer sales tax incentive is by far the most widely known aspect of it. But for municipalities, it is the ZAFs that tend to be the most missed. The end of Zone Assistance Funds left a significant gap that no other program has replaced. While the state government and, to a lesser extent, the federal government, have enacted new significant place-based and other low-income community incentives that cover most UEZs, those new programs do not have the flexibility of the UEZ Program. The UEZ Program filled financial gaps for local priority projects when State and federal incentives came up short, often in the form of a direct grant or low interest loan. UEZ-certified businesses that responded to a survey for this Assessment were generally very satisfied with the program. Most of the respondents were small businesses, with retail and manufacturing the largest categories. A majority indicated that they made more capital investments than they would have without the program, while one-third indicated that they hired more employees. Not surprisingly, businesses cited the sales tax incentives as the most important benefit. Interestingly, UEZ businesses that responded to the survey have been certified an average of 13 years with some businesses receiving the tax incentive for more than 30 years. In a review of programs in other states, most limit similar tax incentives for businesses to 10 years. Less than one-quarter of the surveyed businesses said they would move if UEZ ended, raising the issue of how necessary the benefit is to those businesses that have been in the program at this point. Most businesses did not notice a change between the program as it exists now and its original version. Program administration, however, changed significantly with the elimination of ZAFs and other reforms. UEZ is administered by the New Jersey Urban Enterprise Zone Authority (UEZA) and its nine-member board, which is also responsible for disseminating criteria for zone designation. Currently, UEZA is mostly focused on the certification and recertification process of UEZ businesses, including reviews of required annual reporting. Prior to the elimination of ZAFs, the UEZA Board reviewed and approved use of those funds at the local level. With that task gone, the UEZA staff was reduced from 19 in 2011 to between six and nine since then. On the plus side, all UEZ applications are now streamlined through an online portal, thus reducing redundancies and more efficiently certifying businesses. But the post-2011 changes also diminished the relationship between the UEZA and the zones. Data is no longer collected on zone activity other than what is required for the certification process and marketing has greatly reduced, largely falling to local coordinators and host municipalities. The number of participating businesses also dropped in recent years due at least in part to the 2016 expiration of the UEZ designation in five municipalities. While the designation was reinstated in June 2018, the number of participating businesses has not fully recovered to the pre-2011 level. Besides the certification lapse, the lack of aggressive program marketing might be another factor in the failure to attract more new businesses. A review of Enterprise Zones in other states and internationally shows mixed results. It appears that some Enterprise Zone programs have been effective at creating jobs and increasing development, depending on how they are structured. In addition, local governments in certain cases have seen growth in local tax revenue. But critics of Enterprise Zones note that often jobs are simply cannibalized from neighboring municipalities or even from within the municipality itself, and frequently the jobs and development that are created have been highly subsidized. In some cases, the program appears to be benefiting wealthier areas as opposed to those that are more distressed. Programs should be structured to avoid excessive inflation of land values in order to prevent incentives to property owners to increase rents hence, limiting business expansion, retention, or attraction in the zone. To avoid pitfalls, the literature suggests targeting programs to needs of the specific geographic area rather than adopting a generic, blanket approach, and incorporating other resources such as job training and infrastructure development. New Jersey’s original UEZ Program appeared to be more robust than those reviewed in other states, in part because of the ZAFs that are now gone except for limited second-generation funds. However, one area where New Jersey could emulate other states is regulating the amount of time that businesses can be certified in the program, for example, a period of 10 years, so that the State is not supporting the business in perpetuity. In conclusion, the recommendation of this Assessment is not to eliminate the UEZ Program but to restructure and strengthen the program through measures like annual reviews of outcomes, increased collaboration between the UEZ Authority and the UEZ coordinators, more flexibility in the boundary revision procedure, development of a better data tracking system and data base, and related measures that are outlined throughout this Assessment and more specifically in the recommendations contained in Chapter 11

World Changers: Inspiring Cultural and Linguistic Excellence in Children, Parents and Teachers

The New Jersey Cultural Competency and English Language Learners Summer Institute and Mentoring Program hosted its 10th Anniversary, Three-Day Learning Institute, Aug. 23-25, 2016, with the theme, World Changers: Inspiring Cultural and Linguistic Excellence for Children, Parents and Teachers. After the Three- Day Learning Institute, classroom teachers were assigned a mentor who provided monthly supports to the classroom teachers in the adoption English language learners and cultural competency strategies with the goal of creating culturally and linguistic responsive classrooms. Twenty-three teachers from Trenton Public Schools were recruited and received 21 hours of training in best practices for engaging diverse learners. This 10-year, evident-based, model program, established in 2007, has provided professional development and mentored 224 educators in 115 classrooms in 85 schools across the state of New Jersey

The Assessment of Prior Learning and the Accrediting Process : Proceedings of the National Institute on the Assessment of Experiential Learning : June 9-12, 1991 /

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Benefits For All: The Economic Impact of the New Jersey Child Care Industry • Infant/Toddler, Preschool and Out-of-School Time Programs

The child care industry includes infant/toddler care and education, preschool and out-of-school time care and education programs in for-profit, nonprofit and public settings that educate and nurture children’s development and enable their parents to work and update their skills. This report examines the economic impact of New Jersey’s child care industry and presents a complete picture of its gross receipts, number of employees and how the industry provides benefits for all. The child care industry is integral to family and economic life of New Jersey residents: Child care and education programs with quality learning environments support New Jersey’s future economic success by preparing the next generation. Children who attend high-quality child care programs have improved math and language ability, enhanced cognitive and social skills and fewer behavioral issues. The Federal Reserve Bank in Minneapolis analyzed rates of return from investing in a model preschool program for low-income children. They found a 16 percent rate of return on investment— considerably higher than the long-term return from U.S. stocks of seven percent. High- quality early childhood programs can also serve as an effective “early warning system” to address risky situations and incorporate child abuse prevention strategies. Child care enables parents to maintain employment and/or obtain education and training. Almost one in five workers in New Jersey has a child between birth and age 13 and lives in a household where all parents work. Together these working parents earn $20.2 billion every year. Child care enables many of them to develop their careers and advance their education to increase their earning potential. Child care and education programs enable employers to attract and retain employees and increase their productivity. New Jersey businesses have indicated that their workers need quality, affordable and accessible child care arrangements. Meeting this need results in increased employee retention and reduced absenteeism, enhances the recruitment of skilled workers and increases on-the-job productivity. Working parents are better able to focus on their jobs if they know their children are in safe settings that provide high-quality care and education. For example, employees with inadequate child care are more likely to be late for work, absent or distracted on the job than parents who are confident about their children\u27s child care arrangements. Meeting child care needs benefits the bottom line of businesses. The child care industry (infant/toddler, preschool and out-of-school time care and education programs) generates$2.55 billion in gross receipts annually and provides more than 65,300 full-time equivalent jobs. This puts the child care industry on par with other significant New Jersey industries, including pharmaceutical manufacturing, insurance carriers, real estate, and scientific research and development. While the child care industry and other stakeholders have already made great strides to improve quality, affordability and accessibility, the child care industry still faces a number of challenges in meeting the needs of families, children and employers in the state. If New Jersey addresses these challenges, it can increase bottom-line returns for New Jersey employers and public returns on government investments. These challenges include but are not limited to a shortage of high-quality child care facilities; a shortage of qualified program administrators, child care teachers and providers; and a shortage of high-quality infant and toddler care. Furthermore, demographic and economic trends indicate that the reliance of New Jersey’s residents on the child care industry will only increase. New Jersey has one of the highest costs of living in the country, making it a difficult place to live and work for families with young children. Working parents need economic opportunities that lead to self-sufficiency and participation in the economic growth of the state. Growth in lower-wage jobs, work during nontraditional hours, and racial and ethnic diversity necessitate a child care system that is accessible to all New Jersey’s families, but particularly low- and moderate- income families. Lastly, growing diversity among the state’s population of children indicates a need for culturally and linguistically appropriate child care programs that can meet these explicit needs of children and their parents. To meet the increasing demand for high-quality, affordable and accessible child care services and benefit the New Jersey economy, all child care industry stakeholders, including businesses, government and the child care industry itself, must work and plan together to strengthen the existing industry to maximize its economic benefits. This report makes key recommendations on how government, businesses and the child care industry (for-profit, nonprofit and public) can increase the quality and effectiveness of New Jersey’s child care industry. The existing champions in businesses, corporations, foundations, government and in the industry alike demonstrate this is possible. The examples in this study highlight companies that invest substantial amounts of resources to help their employees balance their work and home responsibilities. The Introduction of this report presents a picture of the child care industry in New Jersey. Section Two demonstrates the long-term economic benefits of investing in high-quality child care. Section Three explores the links between child care, business and economic development. Section Four analyzes the overall economic effects of the child care industry as measured by industry earnings, employment and current levels of government investment. Section Five provides a demographic and economic profile of the state and the implications for the child care industry. Section Six addresses child care industry challenges and highlights some existing initiatives to overcome these barriers. Finally, Section Seven considers future implications for the state’s economy, provides conclusions and offers strategies on how to maximize the economic benefits of child care in New Jersey