A Re-Examination of the Border Effect

This paper reexamines the evidence on the border effect, the finding that the border drives a wedge between domestic and foreign prices. We argue that the border effect can be inflated by the volatility and persistence of the nominal exchange rate and by the cross-country heterogeneity in the distribution of within-country price differentials. We develop a simple framework to separate the border effect from these confounding factors. Using price data from Engel and Rogers (1996) and Parsley and Wei (2001), we show that after controlling for the confounding factors the border effect between the U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Japan is negligible.

A Re-Examination of the Border Effect

This paper reexamines the evidence on the border effect, the finding that the border drives a wedge between domestic and foreign prices. We argue that the border effect can be inflated by the volatility and persistence of the nominal exchange rate and by the cross-country heterogeneity in the distribution of within-country price differentials. We develop a simple framework to separate the border effect from these confounding factors. Using price data from Engel and Rogers (1996) and Parsley and Wei (2001), we show that after controlling for the confounding factors the border effect between the U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Japan is negligible.

Trade, Production Sharing and the International Transmission of Business Cycles

business cycle sychronization, production sharing,

A Re-Examination of Exchange Rate Exposure

Finance theory suggests that changes in exchange rates should have little influence on asset prices in a world with integrated capital markets. Indeed, the existing literature examining the relationship between international stock prices and exchange rates finds little evidence of systematic exchange rate exposure. We argue in this paper that the absence of evidence may be due to restrictions imposed on the sample of data and the empirical specifications used in previous studies. We study a broad sample of firms in eight countries over an eighteen-year period. We find that firm-level and industry-level share values are significantly influenced by exchange rates. Further, we do not find evidence that exchange rate exposure is falling (or becoming less statistically significant) over time. Our results suggest that significant firm, industry and country-specific differences remain even as financial markets become more and more "integrated".

International Borrowing and Macroeconomic Performance in Argentina

This paper provides an overview of the major economic events in Argentina from the adoption of the convertibility plan in 1991 to the collapse of the exchange rate regime in 2001. We focus on the relationship between the credibility of the currency board and capital flows, and the inescapable link between fiscal and monetary policy. Argentina inadvertently entered into a vicious circle with financial markets -- one in which it felt compelled to raise the exit costs from the currency board in order to maintain the regime%u2019s credibility. As exit costs mounted, financial markets became increasingly concerned about the dire implications of a devaluation, which in turn, compelled the government to raise exit costs further. In the late 1990s, when Argentina went into recession, it required some sort of stimulus -- either a loosening of monetary policy (i.e. a devaluation) or fiscal stimulus. But either way spelled disaster. The added pressure of capital outflow, first by international investors and then the withdrawal of deposits from the Argentine banking system, eventually tipped the scales.

Trade and Exposure

Are firms that engage in trade more vulnerable to exchange rate risk? In this paper we examine the relationship between exchange rate movements, firm value and trade. Our empirical work tests whether exchange rate exposure can be explained by variables that proxy for the level of international activity, firm size, industry affiliation and country affiliation. The results suggest that while a significant fraction of firms in these countries is exposed to exchange rate movements, there is little evidence of a systematic link between exposure and trade. Indeed, what little evidence there is of a link suggests that firms that engage in greater trade exhibit lower degrees of exposure. This may reflect the fact that those firms most engaged in trade are also the most aware of exchange rate risk, and therefore are the most likely to hedge their exposure.

A Re-Examination of Exchange Rate Exposure

Finance theory suggests that changes in exchange rates should have little influence on asset prices in a world that has become increasingly with integrated capital markets. Indeed, the existing literature examining the relationship between international stock prices and exchange rates finds little evidence of systematic exchange rate exposure. We argue in this paper that the absence of evidence may be due to restrictions imposed on the sample of data and the empirical specifications used in previous studies. We study a broad sample of firms in eight countries over an eighteen-year period. We find that firm-level and industry-level share values are significantly influenced by exchange rates. Further, we do not find evidence that exchange rate exposure is falling (or becoming less statistically significant) over time. Our results suggest that significant firm, industry and country-specific differences remain even as financial markets become more and more 'integrated'.

Winners and Losers of Tax Competition in the European Union

This paper quantifies the macroeconomic effects of capital income tax competition in the European Union using a two-country neoclassical dynamic general equilibrium model. This model incorporates three key externalities of tax competition: the relative price externality, the wealth distribution externality and the fiscal solvency externality. We consider tax strategies limited to the class of time-invariant taxes and allow governments to issue debt to smooth the tax burden. The analysis starts from a pre-tax-competition equilibrium calibrated to represent the United Kingdom and Continental Europe (France, Germany and Italy) using data from the early 1980s, just before the European integration of financial markets. When labor taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency, competition does not trigger a “race to the bottom” in capital taxes. The UK makes a large welfare gain and cuts its capital tax. Continental Europe increases both labor and capital taxes and suffers a large welfare loss. These results are consistent with evidence showing that over the last two decades the UK lowered its capital tax, while Continental Europe increased both capital and labor taxes. When consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency, there is a “race to the bottom” in capital taxes but both the UK and Continental Europe are better off than in the pre-tax-competition equilibrium. The gains from coordination in all of these experiments are trivial.