Online File Sharing: Resolving the Tensions Between Privacy and Property

This essay expands upon an earlier work (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2005) in which we analyzed the implications of the Verizon v RIAA case for P2P Networks vis-à-vis concerns affecting personal privacy and intellectual property. In the present essay we revisit some of the concerns surrounding this case by analyzing the intellectual property and privacy issues that emerged in the MGM Studios v. Grokster case. These two cases illustrate some of the key tensions that exist between privacy and property interests in cyberspace. In our analysis, we contrast Digital Rights Management (DRM) and Interoperability and we examine some newer distribution models of sharing over P2P networks. We also analyze some privacy implications in the two cases in light of the theory of privacy as contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2004)

Applying the “Contextual Integrity” Model of Privacy to Personal Blogs in the Blogoshere

In this paper, we analyze some controversial aspects of blogging and the blogosphere from the perspective of privacy. In particular, we focus on Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of privacy as “contextual integrity” and apply it to personal blogs, in general, and the case of the “Washingtonienne” blogger, in particular. We examine the question of whether personal blogs that are not password protected can be considered “normatively private contexts” according to Nissenbaum’s principles of privacy. We argue that they cannot. Using Nissenbaum’s original model, we conclude that privacy expectations for those who disclose personal information in such blogs are unrealistic. We also suggest that Nissenbaum’s expanded theory (see Nissenbaum, 2010) can inform the contemporary debate about privacy and blogging in a wide variety of newer technological contexts, in addition to personal blogs, and we encourage researchers to apply Nissenbaum’s model in those contexts

Cyberstalking, Personal Privacy, and Moral Responsibility

This essay examines some ethical aspects of stalking incidents in cyberspace. Particular attention is focused on the Amy Boyer/Liam Youens case of cyberstalking, which has raised a number of controversial ethical questions. We limit our analysis to three issues involving this particular case. First, we suggest that the privacy of stalking victims is threatened because of the unrestricted access to on-line personal information, including on-line public records, currently available to stalkers. Second, we consider issues involving moral responsibility and legal liability for Internet service providers (ISPs) when stalking crimes occur in their `space\u27 on the Internet. Finally, we examine issues of moral responsibility for ordinary Internet users to determine whether they are obligated to inform persons whom they discover to be the targets of cyberstalkers

Ethical Reflections on Cyberstalking

This essay examines some ethical aspects of stalking behavior in cyberspace. We have argued elsewhere that recent online stalking incidents raise a wide range of ethical concerns, including issues affecting gender (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2001), personal privacy (Tavani and Grodzinsky, 2002), and physical vs. virtual harm (Grodzinsky and Tavani, 2002). The primary axis of discussion in this essay has to do with implications that cyberstalking has for our notion of moral responsibility, both at the collective (or group) and individual levels. For example, do collectivities and organizations such as Internet service providers (ISPs) have any moral obligations to cyberstalking victims, which go beyond legal obligations covered in strict liability law? And do ordinary Internet users have a moral obligation to inform (and possibly also to assist) persons whom they discover to be the targets of online stalkers? In our analysis of these questions, particular attention is paid to a cyberstalking incident involving Amy Boyer

Some Ethical Reflections on Cyberstalking

The present study examines a range of moral issues associated with recent cyberstalking cases. Particular attention is centered on the Amy Boyer/ Liam Youens case of cyberstalking, which raises a host of considerations that we believe have a significant impact for ethical behavior on the Internet. Among the questions we consider are those having to do with personal privacy and the use of certain kinds of Internet search facilities to stalk individuals in cyberspace. Also considered are questions having to do with legal liability and (possible) moral responsibility that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have for stalking crimes that occur in their space on the Internet. Finally, we examine issues of moral responsibility for individual online users to determine which obligations, if any, they might have to inform persons who are targeted by cyberstalkers, when it is in their power to do so

Responding to Some Challenges Posed by the Re-identification of Anonymized Personal Data

In this paper, we examine a cluster of ethical controversies generated by the re-identification of anonymized personal data in the context of big data analytics, with particular attention to the implications for personal privacy. Our paper is organized into two main parts. Part One examines some ethical problems involving re-identification of personally identifiable information (PII) in large data sets. Part Two begins with a brief description of Moor and Weckert’s Dynamic Ethics (DE) and Nissenbaum’s Contextual Integrity (CI) Frameworks. We then investigate whether these frameworks, used together, can provide us with a more robust scheme for analyzing privacy concerns that arise in the re-identification process (as well as within the larger context of big data analytics). This paper does not specifically address re-identification-related privacy concerns that arise in the context of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Instead, we examine those issues in a separate work

Not interesting enough to be followed by the NSA: An analysis of Dutch privacy attitudes

Open curtains and a careless attitude. The Dutch are described as holding an indifferent stance towards privacy in the aftermath of Snowden’s revelations of far-reaching government surveillance. But are Dutch reactions as aloof as often claimed? This study provides an in-depth overview of privacy attitudes in the Dutch debate about the National Security Agency (NSA) leaks, showing a greater variety of sentiments than anticipated. A qualitative frame analysis and a quantitative descriptive analysis resulted in six frames, which convey distinct privacy attitudes. Online and offline as well as professional and non-journalistic content in the debate displays a different distribution of frames. The frames, ranging from an “End justifies the means” attitude to an anxious fear of an “Orwellian dystopia”, are placed in a larger framework as the research demonstrates the connection to existing theories about privacy and surveillance. Dutch discussions about the NSA revelations often display a trade-off narrative balancing safety against privacy, and include (de)legitimisation strategies. These outcomes are in line with previous studies about mediated surveillance debates, which indicates that privacy attitudes transcend national boundaries. However, the inclusion of user-generated content adds an individual dimension to the existing body of research and reveals a personal perspective on surveillance issues

Incorporating a Critical Reasoning Component into the ICT–Ethics Methodological Framework

Is the standard/classic applied–ethics model used by philosophers adequate for analyzing issues in information and communication technology (ICT) ethics? A number of critics have argued that it is not, claiming instead that we need to revise and possibly also expand upon that model. In the various proposals advanced so far, however, no one has questioned whether we need to include an explicit critical reasoning (CR) component as part of an adequate ICT–ethics methodological framework. The purpose of the present study is to show why having such a component is not only useful but perhaps critical to ICT–ethics analysis. After defining what I mean by CR, and describing how it differs significantly from both formal logic and critical thinking, I show why incorporating a CR component can help us to achieve four of our key objectives as ICT–ethics professionals/instructors. First, CR provides us with a clear and systematic method for spotting logical fallacies, some of which might not initially seem either obvious or intuitive, in the various arguments that have been advanced to influence social policies affecting ICT. Second, CR provides us with techniques for testing our own arguments to ensure that they do not contain any logical fallacies. Third, CR provides us with a clear and fairly rigorous methodology for not only avoiding fallacies but also for constructing strong arguments to defend the views we advance. Finally, infusing a CR component into ICT–ethics courses will aid instructors in teaching their students how to detect and avoid logical fallacies, as well as teaching them how to construct strong arguments to defend their own positions on issues