Hacktivism and the male-only stereotype

This research explores hacktivism as a new form of online political activism. It uses qualitative interviews with a gender-equal sample of 10 self-defined hacktivists to address issues of gender and the discursive strategies used by males and females to handle the hacktivist community’s male-only stereotype. The semi-structured interviews are analysed using Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA). The analysis indicates that male hacktivists relate to this dominant male-only representation through discursive techniques such as the suppression of gender (Male Oblivious Discourse) or mechanisms of vindication (Male Justification Discourse). Female hacktivists use the accentuation of gender and sexism to counteract male-dominant discourses and establish Female Discourses of Resistance (Emphasis Discourse; Negation Discourse). These gender-related argumentative positions and rhetorical mechanisms demonstrate how the male-only stereotype is created and maintained and how it affects not only hacktivists’ talk and sense-making but also their identity and the hacktivist actions they perform

The Terrorist - Hacker/Hacktivist Distinction: An Investigation of Self-Identified Hackers and Hacktivists

The academic literature on terrorism is filled with references to online activities, and the equation of hacking and hacktivism (i.e., politically motivated hacking) with cyberterrorism. This perspective ignores differences in capacities, scope, and motives. Besides, scholarly research is lacking examinations of those perceived as alleged ‘security threats’. This chapter therefore uses interviews with self-identified hackers and hacktivists (N = 35) to address this gap. It examines the distinction between hacking, hacktivism, and cyberterrorism, and studies the discourses and practices of hackers and hacktivists. Building upon the theoretical concept of (in)securitisation and the method of thematic analysis, the findings provide insights into (a) perceptions of hackers and hacktivists by external actors and their (b) self-assessment that stands in contrast to the viewpoints expressed earlier. The results highlight interviewees' objections to the translation of hacking and hacktivism into violent acts of any nature, with participants articulating that the connection of these concepts poses threats to civil liberties and political rights online. The chapter therefore has implications both for academic as well as professional discourse. It seeks to foster a more reflected engagement with these concepts and points to the need for concrete terminological delineations

Hacking + Aktivismus = Männlich?

Anonymous, LulzSec oder Edward Snowden sind gegenwärtig Bestandteil der medialen Berichterstattung. Sie werden vielfach mit dem Begriff Hacktivismus assoziiert, eine Verschmelzung von Hacking und Aktivismus, die politisch motiviertes Hacking beschreibt¹. Diese Bezeichnung ist häufig vorurteils- und stereotypenbehaftet, weshalb ich mich im Rahmen meiner Forschung mit der Wahrnehmung befasst habe, alle HacktivistInnen seien junge Männer

‘I feel like we’re really behind the game’: perspectives of the United Kingdom’s intimate partner violence support sector on the rise of technology-facilitated abuse

Technology-facilitated abuse or ‘tech abuse’ in intimate partner violence (IPV) contexts describes the breadth of harms that can be enacted using digital systems and online tools. While the misappropriation of technologies in the context of IPV has been subject to prior research, a dedicated study on the United Kingdom’s IPV support sector has so far been missing. The present analysis summarises insights derived from semi-structured interviews with 34 UK voluntary and statutory sector representatives that were conducted over the course of two years (2018–2020). The analysis identifies four overarching themes that point out support services’ practices, concerns and challenges in relation to tech abuse, and specifically the Internet of Things (IoT). These themes include (a) technology-facilitated abuse, where interviewees outline their experiences and understanding of the concept of tech abuse; (b) IoT-enabled tech abuse, focusing on the changing dynamics of tech abuse due to the continuing rise of smart consumer products; (c) data, documentation and assessment, that directs our attention to the shortcomings of existing risk assessment and recording practices; and (d) training, support and assistance, in which participants point to the need for specialist support capabilities to be developed within and beyond existing services.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Key messages&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;UK statutory and voluntary support services do not feel well equipped to respond to tech abuse.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;Shortcomings in documentation and assessment practices make it difficult to estimate the full scale and nature of tech abuse.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;Tech abuse training and other support mechanisms are needed to amplify the UK sector’s ability to assist IPV victims/survivors.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt; </jats:p

IoT and Its Implications for Informed Consent

This report is based on a three-hour long workshop between representatives of the PETRAS IoT Hub, Pinsent Masons, and the HMG Department for Transport. The workshop is part of an ongoing investigation that explores the connections between some of the different dimensions likely to shape conceptions and applications of consent in the emerging Internet of Things (IoT). The impetus for the workshop was the recognition that two significant developments will challenge conventional approaches to online consent. From a technical perspective, the IoT will significantly increase personal data collection, use and re-use. From a regulatory perspective, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which comes into force in May 2018, will make much higher demands on practices of giving and obtaining consent. Combined, these two factors suggest that consent will be a major issue for all actors in the next five years and it requires some careful analysis now in order to adequately prepare for these developments

Receiving threatening or obscene messages from a partner and mental health, self-harm and suicidality: results from the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey

PURPOSE: Threatening or obscene messaging is repeated, unwanted texts, emails, letters or cards experienced by the recipient as threatening or obscene, and causing fear, alarm or distress. It is rarely examined as an aspect of intimate partner violence. We describe the prevalence of exposure to threatening/obscene messaging from a current or ex-partner; characteristics of victims; and associations with other forms of violence and abuse, mental disorder, self-harm, and suicidality. METHODS: Cross-sectional probability-sample survey of the general population in England aged 16 + . Multivariable regression modelling tested associations between receipt of threatening/obscene messaging and current common mental disorder, past-year self-harm and suicidality. RESULTS: Threatening/obscene messages were received from a current/ex-partner by 6.6% (95%CI: 5.9-7.3) of adults who had been in a relationship; 1.7% received these in the past year. Victims were more likely to be female, under 35, single or divorced, socioeconomically disadvantaged, and to have experienced other forms of sexual and partner violence and abuse. Those who received threatening/obscene messages in the past year were more likely to experience common mental disorder (adjusted odds ratio 1.89; 1.01-3.55), self-harm (2.31; 1.00-5.33), and suicidal thoughts (2.00; 1.06-3.78). CONCLUSION: Threatening/obscene messaging commonly occurs in the context of intimate partner violence. While often occurring alongside sexual and physical violence, messaging has an additional association with mental disorder and suicidality. Routine enquiry in service settings concerning safety, including those working with people who have escaped domestic violence, should ask about ongoing contact from previous as well as current partners. This should include asking about messaging, as well as other forms of potentially technology-enabled abuse which may become increasingly common

The UK code of practice for consumer IoT cybersecurity: where we are and what next

This report has been produced by the Geopolitics of Industrial Internet of Things Standards (GISt) research project led by Professors Madeline Carr and Stephen Hailes, and the Building Evidence for CoP Legislation (BECL) research project led by Dr Saheli Datta Burton and commisioned by the Secure-by-Design team of the United Kingdom Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). Both GISt and BECL projects are held at the Department of Science, Technology, Engineering and Public Policy (STEaPP), University College London and funded by The PETRAS National Centre of Excellence for IoT Systems Cybersecurity, a consortium of leading UK universities dedicated to understanding critical issues in the privacy, ethics, trust, reliability, acceptability, and security of the Internet of Things. Funding for PETRAS is provided by the UKRI’s Strategic Priorities Fund as part of the Security of Digital Technologies at the Periphery (SDTaP) programme

UK Cybersecurity Industrial Policy: An Analysis of Drivers, Market Failures and Interventions

The United Kingdom (UK) forms the largest internet economy in the G20 and has the stated ambition of being the ‘safest place in the world to live and work online’. Cybersecurity is, thus, regarded as both a challenge as much as an opportunity. Since the publication of UK's first National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) in November 2011, the government has implemented many proactive as well as reactive measures to enhance both its cybersecurity capabilities as well as its market power in this space. This article provides an analysis of the shift away from a reliance on market forces that dominated Western approaches to cybersecurity over the recent years. Specifically, it highlights three ‘market failures’ that have prompted UK's industrial policy responses: ongoing data breaches; inadequate private cybersecurity investments; and a continuous digital skills gap. An analysis of these drivers as well as UK government's responses demonstrates that the UK's cybersecurity strategy has evolved from an initial heavy reliance on market forces towards a more state-driven public-private partnership