Spirituality as a determinant of health – a health promotion perspective

Spirituality a recognised dimension of health in the field of health promotion and public health (Scriven, 2010). Good health and wellbeing includes spiritual health and wellbeing. The determinants of health and what should be done to address them to improve health is an important agenda globally. Interestingly however, although spirituality is important to health and wellbeing it does not appear in key models of determinants of health, such as the classic layer diagram of Dahlgren and Whitehead (1993). Nor does spirituality get included in influential frames for discourse. For example, the narrative/metaphor of the river and upstream versus downstream action on health which is central to so much of the language of intervention to improve health (Talley, 2010). The absence of spirituality in the discourses of health determinants and health improvement thus seems a significant omission. The work presented here therefore represents the beginning of a journey of exploration by the author to reflect on and address this conundrum. The early steps of thinking are described, including examination of models of health and wellbeing, and ways in which spirituality could be made integral to, if not central to, considering the origins of health, wellbeing and illness

The Necessary Conversation: Faith to Sustain Teaching Practices

In this essay, the author raises critical questions about the need for faith-based teacher preparation programs to consider engaging pre-service teachers in conversations about the connection between faith and the ability to persist in the work of teaching. Grounded in the ethic of care, the author suggests educators must begin with caring for self in order to maintain the ability of caring for students. Suggestions for Christian teacher education programs are explored

Bank holding companies : a better structure for conducting universal banking?

Banking systems in many countries have become increasingly unstable in recent years. At the same time, market forces have pushed banks to expand into a variety of universal banking activities without impairing the stability of the banking system. The basic bank holding company proposal contains three major elements : first, any bank that wants to operate as a universal bank must first form a holding company and then conduct all riskier activities in holding company units rather than directly in the bank. The bank would continue to engage in traditional banking activities that involve the usual level of risk; second, the government would develop laws and regulations designed as safeguards to insulate the bank from any financial problems that might occur in holding company affiliates of the bank; and lastly bank regulatory authorities would impose little or no supervision on holding company units. The use of the bank holding company device to conduct universal banking activities can promise important public benefits including : 1) a sounder commercial banking system; 2) less banking regulation; and 3) greater competitive equality between banking and nonbanking units.Microfinance,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Private Participation in Infrastructure,Small Scale Enterprise

Are failproof banking systems feasible? Desirable?

In recent years, instability of the banking system has returned as a major problem in many countries, particularly in the developing world. In many cases, this instability has been so threatening to financial intermediation and the functioning of the payments system that governments have felt compelled to intervene and restructure banks, often at considerable cost to the public budget. One response to these problems has been a proposal to create failproof banking systems - to radically transform the structure, priorities, and operation of the banking and financial system. Banks would be limited to issuing deposits, holding essentially riskless portfolios, and operating the payments system. To minimize the resulting disruptions to the financial system, banks would be authorized (and encouraged) to set up holding companies and then transfer to holding company affiliates all the functions - including lending - that banks would no longer be permitted to perform. So while the failproof banking proposal would severely restrict the activity of banks, it would not restrict the activities of banking organizations that convert to a holding company form of organization. This proposal would produce major public benefits. It would assure a nation of a smoothly functioning banking and payments system, would substantially reduce the resources committed to banking supervision, would prevent bank-type regulation from expanding to the rest of the financial system, and would place banking and nonbanking organizations on a level playing field for the financial activities in which they compete. There are two major problems with the proposal. First, it might be difficult to implement because of too few riskless assets in a nation's financial system. (The author suggests several modifications that would alleviate this problem in some countries.) Second, the proposal might hurt the financial market by: (a) increasing interest rates for higher-risk borrowers, forcing them out of the market; and (b) transfering greater risk to the nonbank sector of the financial system, making it more susceptible to crisis. Although the proposal would benefit developing countries (more prone to banking instability) more than industrial countries, it would also be more difficult to implement in developing countries. And the adverse effects of the proposal would be felt more severely in the financial markets of developing countries than in industrial countries, which have deeper, more responsive financial markets.Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Banking Law,Settlement of Investment Disputes

The Latvian banking crisis : lessons learned

In the spring of 1995, Latvia experienced the largest banking crisis in the Former Soviet Union to date, involving the loss of about 40 percent of the banking system's assets and liabilities. The authors outline the Latvian authorities'strategy for developing the banking system and identify how and why it unraveled. They discuss the World Bank's role and the lessons to be learned from the crisis, including the following: 1) banking systems are exposed to stress in several major ways. Enterprises - the main borrowers - are subject to hard budget constraints and are privatized. Inflation declines so enterprises can't rely on rapidly increasing revenues to service bank debts. Economic reform tends to produce banking systems that are mainly privately owned - making them vulnerable to withdrawals, as the public does not assume that failing banks will be bailed out; 2) the government must protect against this vulnerability by establishing a proper legal framework for banking, developing effective bank supervision and regulation, and implementing solid accounting, disclosure, and auditing standards. It must also develop effective ways to handle problem banks and to close insolvent banks promptly; 3) for banks in the state sector to be a source of strength to the banking system, they must have strong effective management and be relatively free from political influence; 4)"outlier"banks - those expanding assets very quickly or offering particularly high deposit rates - should be subject to intense supervision; and 5) four things must be done to prevent fraud, incompetent management and excessive risk taking: 1) careful screen thosewho want to get into banking; 2) subject all banks to thorough, frequent onsite examinations and assign the best examiners to the largest banks; 3) require annual audits of all banks by reputable auditing firms; and 4) act decisively when fraud or bank difficulties are detected or suspected.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Financial Intermediation,Labor Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Municipal Financial Management,Settlement of Investment Disputes

Optimal Liability for Terrorism

This paper analyzes the normative role for civil liability in aligning terrorism precaution incentives, when the perpetrators of terrorism are unreachable by courts or regulators. We consider the strategic interaction among targets, subsidiary victims, and terrorists within a sequential, game-theoretic model. The model reveals that, while an "optimal" liability regime indeed exists, its features appear at odds with conventional legal templates. For example, it frequently prescribes damages payments from seemingly unlikely defendants, directing them to seemingly unlikely plaintiffs. The challenge of introducing such a regime using existing tort law doctrines, therefore, is likely to be prohibitive. Instead, we argue, efficient precaution incentives may be best provided by alternative policy mechanisms, such as a mutual public insurance pool for potential targets of terrorism, coupled with direct compensation to victims of terrorist attacks.