Multimarket Contact in Vertically Related Markets

We analyze collusion in two comparable market structures. In the first market structure only one firm is vertically integrated; there is one more independent firm in the upstream industry and another independent firm in the downstream industry. In the second market structure, there are only two vertically integrated firms that can trade among themselves in the intermediate good market. The second market structure mimics markets like the California gasoline market where firms vertically integrated through refinery, and retail markets. We rank these two market structures in terms of ease of collusion and show that while under some circumstances collusion is not possible in the market with one vertically integrated firm, collusion is possible in the market structure with two vertically integrated firms. We conclude that vertical (multimarket) contact facilitates collusion and vertical mergers suspected to lead to subsequent vertical mergers in an industry should receive higher antitrust scrutiny relative to single isolated vertical mergers.Multimarket; collusion; vertical integration; gasoline markets

Investment Dynamics: Good News Principle

We study a dynamic Cournot game with capacity accumulation under demand uncertainty, in which the investment is perfectly divisible, irreversible, and productive with a lag. We characterize equilibrium investments under closed-loop and S-adapted open-loop information structures. Contrary to what is established usually in the dynamic games literature with deterministic demand, we find that the firms may invest at a higher level in the open-loop equilibrium (which in some cases coincides with Markov perfect equilibrium) than in the closed-loop Nash equilibrium. The rankings of the investment levels obtained in the two equilibria actually depend on the initial capacities and on the degree of asymmetry between the firms. We also observe, contrary to the bad news principle of investment, that firms may invest more as demand volatility increases and they invest as if high demand (i.e., good news) will unfold in the future.Capacity Investment, Dynamic Games, S-adapted Open-Loop Equilibrium, Closed-loop Equilibrium.

Investment in Electricity Markets with Asymmetric Technologies

We study competition between hydro and thermal electricity generators under de- mand uncertainty. Producers compete in quantities and each is constrained: the ther- mal generator by capacity and the hydro generator by water availability. We analyze a two-period game emphasizing the incentives for capacity investments by the ther- mal generator. We characterize both Markov perfect and open-loop equilibria. In the Markov perfect equilibrium, investment is discontinuous in initial capacity and higher than it is in the open-loop equilibrium. However, since there are two distortions in the model, equilibrium investment can be either higher or lower than the ecient investment.Electricity markets; Dynamic game; Duopoly; Capacity investment.

Dynamic Competition in Electricity Markets: Hydroelectric and Thermal Generation

We study competition between hydro and thermal electricity generators that face uncertainty over demand and water flows where the hydro generator is constrained by water flows and the thermal generator by capacity. We compute the Feedback equilibrium for the in?nite horizon game and show that there can be strategic withholding of water by the hydro generator. When water inflow is relatively low, however, the hydro generator may use more water than efficient as it faces an inefficiently low shadow price of water in this case. The inefficiency of the market outcome is tempered by the capacity constraints: for a large range of possible thermal production capacities and water flow levels, welfare loss under the duopoly market structure is much less than would occur in the absence of water and capacity constraints.Electricity markets; Electricity markets; Hydroelectricity; Imperfect Competition

Supply Function Equilibria with Capacity Constraints and Pivotal Suppliers

The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators’ bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm’s rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding output. However the SFE literature has not properly analyzed the impact of capacity constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for uniform price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for uniform price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output.supply function equilibrium, pivotal firm, wholesale electricity market

Equilibrium Predictions in Wholesale Electricity Markets

We review supply function equilibrium models and their predictions on market outcomes in the wholesale electricity auctions. We discuss how observable market characteristics such as capacity constraints, number of power suppliers, load distribution and auction format affect the behavior of suppliers and performance of the market. We specifically focus on the possible market power exerted by pivotal suppliers and the comparison between discriminatory and uniform-price auctions. We also describe capacity investment behavior of electricity producers in the restructured industry.Electricity markets; Supply function equilibrium; Markov perfect equilibrium; electricity auctions; pivotal suppliers; capacity investment.

Electricity Trade Patterns in a Network: Evidence from the Ontario Market

We investigate whether trade has any effect on the price formation process in a specific electricity market, and identify interconnected markets that have higher impacts on prices in that market. In particular, we study Ontario wholesale electricity market and its trade with 12 interconnected markets including New York, Michigan, and Minnesota markets. We find that imports are unambiguously related to prices, while exports are not. Furthermore, imports have a positive and significant relationship with prices. We argue that the results are associated with auction design, production constraints, and technological differences. Out of the 12 studied interties, only three have a significant impact on price, two of which are the largest ones.electricity trade; simultaneous trade; transmission network; electricity prices; nonlinear Granger causality; Ontario, New York, Michigan, Manitoba, Quebec wholesale electricity markets.

Who should own a renewable technology? Ownership theory and an application

We investigate the market implications of ownership of a new low-cost production technology. We relate our theoretical findings to measure the impact of renewable energy penetration into electricity markets and examine how the ownership of renewable capacity changes market outcomes (prices, outputs, emissions). As current public policies influence renewable energy ownership, this research provides useful insights for policy makers. We show how and why ownership of renewable capacity matters when there is market power in energy market. We apply our findings to the wholesale electricity market in Ontario, Canada, to analyze the impact of different ownership structures for wind capacity expansions. Using both simulation analysis and empirical analysis of market data, we show that the price-reducing effects of wind expansion are smaller when a larger strategic firm owns new wind capacity. Lastly, we show that the effect of wind ownership on emissions depends on both the amount of generation displaced by wind output and the emissions rate of displaced generation. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.24 Month Embargo: Published Online: 23 November 2018This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Supply Function Equilibria with Capacity Constraints and Pivotal Suppliers

The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators ’ bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm’s rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding output. However the SFE literature has not properly analyzed the impact of capacity constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for uniform price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for uniform price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output