6 research outputs found
Disturbance of greedy publishing to academia
Questionable publications have been accused of "greedy" practices; however,
their influence on academia has not been gauged. Here, we probe the impact of
questionable publications through a systematic and comprehensive analysis with
various participants from academia and compare the results with those of their
unaccused counterparts using billions of citation records, including liaisons,
e.g., journals and publishers, and prosumers, e.g., authors. The analysis
reveals that questionable publications embellished their citation scores by
attributing publisher-level self-citations to their journals while also
controlling the journal-level self-citations to circumvent the evaluation of
journal-indexing services. This approach makes it difficult to detect
malpractice by conventional journal-level metrics. We propose
journal-publisher-hybrid metric that help detect malpractice. We also
demonstrate that the questionable publications had a weaker disruptiveness and
influence than their counterparts. This indicates the negative effect of
suspicious publishers in the academia. The findings provide a basis for
actionable policy making against questionable publications.Comment: 16 pages of main text including 4 figures + 32 pages of supplementary
information including 30 supplementary figure
Chaos and unpredictability in evolution of cooperation in continuous time
Cooperators benefit others with paying costs. Evolution of cooperation crucially depends on the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation, denoted as c. In thiswork, we investigate the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma for various values of c with four of the representative memory-one strategies, i.e., unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, tit-for-tat, and win-stay-lose-shift. We consider replicator dynamics which deterministically describes how the fraction of each strategy evolves over time in an infinite-sized well-mixed population in the presence of implementation error and mutation among the four strategies. Our finding is that this three-dimensional continuous-time dynamics exhibits chaos through a bifurcation sequence similar to that of a logistic map as c varies. If mutation occurs with rate muPeer reviewe
Chaos and unpredictability in evolution of cooperation in continuous time
Cooperators benefit others with paying costs. Evolution of cooperation crucially depends on the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation, denoted as c. In thiswork, we investigate the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma for various values of c with four of the representative memory-one strategies, i.e., unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, tit-for-tat, and win-stay-lose-shift. We consider replicator dynamics which deterministically describes how the fraction of each strategy evolves over time in an infinite-sized well-mixed population in the presence of implementation error and mutation among the four strategies. Our finding is that this three-dimensional continuous-time dynamics exhibits chaos through a bifurcation sequence similar to that of a logistic map as c varies. If mutation occurs with rate mu << 1, the position of the bifurcation sequence on the c axis is numerically found to scale as mu << 0.1, and such sensitivity to mu suggests that mutation may have nonperturbative effects on evolutionary paths. It demonstrates how the microscopic randomness of the mutation process can be amplified to macroscopic unpredictability by evolutionary dynamics.111Nsciescopu