The Past and Future of Evolutionary Economics : Some Reflections Based on New Bibliometric Evidence

This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of the following article: Geoffrey M. Hodgson, and Juha-Antti Lamberg, ‘The past and future of evolutionary economics: some reflections based on new bibliometric evidence’, Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, first online 20 June 2016. The final publication is available at Springer via doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40844-016-0044-3 © Japan Association for Evolutionary Economics 2016The modern wave of ‘evolutionary economics’ was launched with the classic study by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982). This paper reports a broad bibliometric analysis of ‘evolutionary’ research in the disciplines of management, business, economics, and sociology over 25 years from 1986 to 2010. It confirms that Nelson and Winter (1982) is an enduring nodal reference point for this broad field. The bibliometric evidence suggests that ‘evolutionary economics’ has benefitted from the rise of business schools and other interdisciplinary institutions, which have provided a home for evolutionary terminology, but it has failed to nurture a strong unifying core narrative or theory, which in turn could provide superior answers to important questions. This bibliometric evidence also shows that no strong cluster of general theoretical research immediately around Nelson and Winter (1982) has subsequently emerged. It identifies developmental problems in a partly successful but fragmented field. Future research in ‘evolutionary economics’ needs a more integrated research community with shared conceptual narratives and common research questions, to promote conversation and synergy between diverse clusters of research.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio

Are the affluent prepared to pay for the planet? Explaining willingness to pay for public and quasi-private environmental goods in Switzerland

A large number of ‘environmental justice’ studies show that wealthier people are less affected by environmental burdens and also consume more resources than poorer people. Given this double inequity, we ask, to what extent are affluent people prepared to pay to protect the environment? The analyses are couched within the compensation/affluence hypothesis, which states that wealthier persons are able to spend more for environmental protection than their poorer counterparts. Further, we take into account various competing economic, psychological and sociological determinants of individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP) for both public environmental goods (e.g., general environmental protection) and quasi-private environmental goods (e.g., CO2-neutral cars). Such a comprehensive approach contrasts with most other studies in this field that focus on a limited number of determinants and goods. Multivariate analyses are based on a general population survey in Switzerland (N = 3,369). Although income has a positive and significant effect on WTP supporting the compensation hypothesis, determinants such as generalized interpersonal trust that is assumed to be positively associated with civic engagement and environmental concern prove to be equally important. Moreover, we demonstrate for the first time that time preferences can considerably influence survey-based WTP for environmental goods; since investments in the environment typically pay off in the distant future, persons with a high subjective discount rate are less likely to commit

Choice, habit and evolution

The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com Copyright SpringerSeveral leading mainstream economists including Gary Becker have treated habit as serially correlated behaviour resulting from deliberate choices. This approach puts choice before habit but involves assumptions of extensive memory and decision-making capacity. By contrast, earlier authors such as William James, John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen saw deliberation and choice as a contingent outcome of habits, where the latter are defined in terms of acquired dispositions rather than overt behaviour. The approach of this second group is more consistent with an evolutionary perspective and the limited computational capacities of the human brain. © Springer-Verlag 2009.Peer reviewe

In defence of generalized Darwinism

The original publication is available at: www.springerlink.com Copyright SpringerDarwin himself suggested the idea of generalizing the core Darwinian principles to cover the evolution of social entities. Also in the nineteenth century, influential social scientists proposed their extension to political society and economic institutions. Nevertheless, misunderstanding and misrepresentation have hindered the realization of the powerful potential in this longstanding idea. Some critics confuse generalization with analogy. Others mistakenly presume that generalizing Darwinism necessarily involves biological reductionism. This essay outlines the types of phenomena to which a generalized Darwinism applies, and upholds that there is no reason to exclude social or economic entities. © 2008 Springer-Verlag.Peer reviewe