Wholesale pricing in a small open economy

This paper addresses the empirical analysis of wholesale profit margins using data of the Dutch wholesale sector, 1986. At the heart of the analysis is the typical nature of wholesale production: wholesalers do not produce a tangible product, but offer a service capacity. This has an immediate impact on the identification, interprelation and measurement of determinants of profit variations. A model is set up to explain variations in wholesale profit margins, which is inspired by two widely applied approaches to industry pricing: the behavioural mark-up model and the marginalist price-cost model

Why do Underwriters Charge Low Underwriting Fees for Initial Public Offerings in Taiwan?

In Taiwan, underwriting fees for initial public offerings (IPOs) are extremely low compared to fees in other countries. From 1989 to 1999, the average underwriting fee for IPOs in Taiwan is 0.99%-far below the regulatory limit. Although the Taiwanese underwriting industry is highly concentrated, underwriting fees do not cluster at any particular level. We examine the underwriting fee and income structure in Taiwan and find support for an incentive hypothesis. Underwriters have an incentive to charge lower underwriting fees when market demand for IPO shares increases and capital gains account for a larger portion of their total income. Copyright 2006 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

US corporate interests and the political economy of trade policy

SIGLEAvailable from British Library Lending Division - LD:9116.770(78) / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreGBUnited Kingdo

Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence

This paper provides a novel explanation forthe formation of protectionist lobby groupsin imperfectly competitive sectors. Thelevel of collusion is shown to be a crucialdeterminant of the ability of firms tosustain lobbying. We show that greatercollusion reduces firm contributionsto tariff lobbying, when the governmentvalues welfare sufficiently and thecross-price elasticity between the domesticand foreign goods is sufficiently high. The empirical evidence from the U.S.supports the theory. Greater collusionreduces the level of PAC contributions. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004