Towards new background independent representations for Loop Quantum Gravity

Recently, uniqueness theorems were constructed for the representation used in Loop Quantum Gravity. We explore the existence of alternate representations by weakening the assumptions of the so called LOST uniqueness theorem. The weakened assumptions seem physically reasonable and retain the key requirement of explicit background independence. For simplicity, we restrict attention to the case of gauge group U(1).Comment: 22 pages, minor change

The Performance of Private Equity Funds: Does Diversification Matter?

This paper is the first systematic analysis of the impact of diversification on the performance of private equity funds. A unique data set allows the exact evaluation of diversification across the dimensions financing stages, industries, and countries. Very different levels of diversification can be observed across sample funds. While some funds are highly specialized others are highly diversified. The empirical results show that the rate of return of private equity funds declines with diversification across financing stages, but increases with diversification across industries. Accordingly, the fraction of portfolio companies which have a negative return or return nothing at all, increase with diversification across financing stages. Diversification across countries has no systematic effect on the performance of private equity funds

The price of rapid exit in venture capital-backed IPOs

This paper proposes an explanation for two empirical puzzles surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs). Firstly, it is well documented that IPO underpricing increases during “hot issue” periods. Secondly, venture capital (VC) backed IPOs are less underpriced than non-venture capital backed IPOs during normal periods of activity, but the reverse is true during hot issue periods: VC backed IPOs are more underpriced than non-VC backed ones. This paper shows that when IPOs are driven by the initial investor’s desire to exit from an existing investment in order to finance a new venture, both the value of the new venture and the value of the existing firm to be sold in the IPO drive the investor’s choice of price and fraction of shares sold in the IPO. When this is the case, the availability of attractive new ventures increases equilibrium underpricing, which is what we observe during hot issue periods. Moreover, I show that underpricing is affected by the severity of the moral hazard problem between an investor and the firm’s manager. In the presence of a moral hazard problem the degree of equilibrium underpricing is more sensitive to changes in the value of the new venture. This can explain why venture capitalists, who often finance firms with more severe moral hazard problems, underprice IPOs less in normal periods, but underprice more strongly during hot issue periods. Further empirical implications relating the fraction of shares sold and the degree of underpricing are presented

Arthroscopic partial meniscectomy versus placebo surgery for a degenerative meniscus tear: A 2-year follow-up of the randomised controlled trial

Objective: To assess if arthroscopic partial meniscectomy (APM) is superior to placebo surgery in the treatment of patients with degenerative tear of the medial meniscus.Methods: In this multicentre, randomised, participant-blinded and outcome assessor-blinded, placebo-surgery controlled trial, 146 adults, aged 35–65 years, with knee symptoms consistent with degenerative medial meniscus tear and no knee osteoarthritis were randomised to APM or placebo surgery. The primary outcome was the between-group difference in the change from baseline in the Western Ontario Meniscal Evaluation Tool (WOMET) and Lysholm knee scores and knee pain after exercise at 24 months after surgery. Secondary outcomes included the frequency of unblinding of the treatment-group allocation, participants' satisfaction, impression of change, return to normal activities, the incidence of serious adverse events and the presence of meniscal symptoms in clinical examination. Two subgroup analyses, assessing the outcome on those with mechanical symptoms and those with unstable meniscus tears, were also carried out.Results: In the intention-to-treat analysis, there were no significant between-group differences in the mean changes from baseline to 24 months in WOMET score: 27.3 in the APM group as compared with 31.6 in the placebo-surgery group (between-group difference, −4.3; 95% CI, −11.3 to 2.6); Lysholm knee score: 23.1 and 26.3, respectively (−3.2; −8.9 to 2.4) or knee pain after exercise, 3.5 and 3.9, respectively (−0.4; −1.3 to 0.5). There were no statistically significant differences between the two groups in any of the secondary outcomes or within the analysed subgroups.Conclusions: In this 2-year follow-up of patients without knee osteoarthritis but with symptoms of a degenerative medial meniscus tear, the outcomes after APM were no better than those after placebo surgery. No evidence could be found to support the prevailing ideas that patients with presence of mechanical symptoms or certain meniscus tear characteristics or those who have failed initial conservative treatment are more likely to benefit from APM.</p

Private Equity Entities and Conglomerates: What are the Differences?

We compare the characteristics of conglomerates and private equity entities. This is done by examining the differences among their business models. We analyze the relations of the two entity types to their investors on the one hand and to their investments on the other hand. The distinguishing characteristic of private equity entities is that they pursue a stand-alone-perspective with their investment policies, meaning that they treat each investment separately. Therefore, various linkages that exist in conglomerates do not occur in private equity entities. We describe these linkages in detail. We further argue that because of the lack of these linkages in private equity entities the shareholders and debtholders of a private equity entity and its portfolio companies are not faced with the following risks that are specific for a conglomerate: the asset shifting risk, the intra-group profit risk and the capital structure risk. Finally, we define crucial evaluation criteria for identifying a private equity entity and develop a way how regulators and other persons concerned with such a task could do so