Controlling tropical deforestation : an analysis of alternative policies

After discussing ownership issues related to tropical forests, theauthor develops a simple general equilibrium model to represent - at least in a stylized way - the salient aspects of the deforestation process. He uses the model to generate first- and second-best policy options for controlling deforestation and, later, to assess the environmental consequences of government policies often cited in the literature on deforestation. Property rights, though important for understanding the process of tropical deforestation, do not necessarily point to a simple or straightfoward fix for environmental problems, particularly in developing countries. The sheer size, communal nature of service flows, and pervasiveness of individual access to tropical forests make monitoring and enforcement costly in some situations and unimaginable in others. Redefining nominal rights in ways that appear to correct inefficiencies may yield gains in some cases, but an approach to environmental protection that leans heavily on this prescription seems aimed more at symptoms than at causes, says the author. Moreover, policy approaches based on the use of Pigovian taxes or marketable permit schemes may yield efficiency gains in some cases, but such approaches generally involve the same monitoring and enforcement problems that prevent the market from solving allocation problems. Simple, direct solutions to deforestation and other environmental problems are unavailable, but an ability to understand the environmental and welfare consequences of policies adopted for other reasons is useful - if only to help policymakers avoid mistakes that would otherwise go unrecognized. The model the author develops for this purpose is highly stylized and intended primarily to provide a systematic way of thinking about the environmental and welfare effects of government policy - for example, by considering patterns of substitution among inputs and outputs, in cases where an environmental resource to which people have free access is exploited. If the use of first-best policies is infeasible - whether because of monitoringcosts, transboundary effects, or other reasons - then it becomes important to have detailed knowledge of patterns of substitution and complementarity among ordinary inputs and environmental resources, and information on the use of various environmental resources in the production of specific goods and services. Knowledge of such factors can permit policymakers to pursue policy goals in situations where first-best instruments are unavailable.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Forestry,Markets and Market Access

The Efficiency Gains from Fully Delineating Rights in an ITQ Fishery

Individual transferable quota (ITQ) regulation relies on a decentralized market mechanism and a single price to allocate access to a stock of fish. The resulting allocation will not be fully efficient if the stock being allocated is heterogeneous or if there are potential gains from centralized coordination of harvesting effort. If stocks are heterogeneous in their density, location, or unit value during the season, harvesters governed by an ITQ policy will not be indifferent to when or where they exercise their quotas. Stocks that are relatively dense and/or close to port will be preferred to those less dense or more remote. Because an ITQ policy assigns the same opportunity cost for each unit harvested, individual harvesters have an incentive to compete for higher-valued units, and such competition may dissipate part of the fishery’s potential rent. A similar phenomenon arises when stock densities vary in an unknown way over space or time, so harvesters must engage in costly search. Individual harvesters governed by an ITQ policy still face a collective action problem which limits the incentive to share information on stock locations. This can lead to redundant search effort. We demonstrate that both sources of inefficiency can be eliminated either by defining ITQ rights more precisely or by an agreement among harvesters to coordinate their effort. We develop models that illustrate these effects and identify the factors that determine their likely size. Anecdotal evidence on practices adopted by fishery cooperatives is presented to illustrate the practical relevance of the issues we raise.ITQ fishery, cooperative, search, game theory, property rights, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Relations/Trade, Q22, D23, K11,

Arms and the man, by George Bernard Shaw; directed by David T. Deacon (production book)

Thesis (M.F.A.)--Boston University. Thesis production book submitted in partial fulfillment of the Master of Fine Arts degree requirements, Boston University, School of Fine and Applied Arts, June 1963

User experience in an interactive music virtual reality system: An exploratory study

The Objects VR interface and study explores interactive music and virtual reality, focusing on user experience, understanding of musical functionality, and interaction issues. Our system offers spatio-temporal music interaction using 3D geometric shapes and their designed relationships. Control is provided by tracking of the hands, and the experience is rendered across a head-mounted display with binaural sound presented over headphones. The evaluation of the system uses a mixed methods approach based on semi-structured interviews, surveys and video-based interaction analysis. On average the system was positively received in terms of interview self-report, metrics for spatial presence and creative support. Interaction analysis and interview thematic analysis also revealed instances of frustration with interaction and levels of confusion with system functionality. Our results allow reflection on design criteria and discussion of implications for facilitating music engagement in virtual reality. Finally our work discusses the effectiveness of measures with respect to future evaluation of novel interactive music systems in virtual reality

Dynamical phase transition of a 1D transport process including death

Motivated by biological aspects related to fungus growth, we consider the competition of growth and corrosion. We study a modification of the totally asymmetric exclusion process, including the probabilities of injection $\alpha$ and death of the last particle $\delta$. The system presents a phase transition at $\delta_c(\alpha)$, where the average position of the last particle $$ grows as $\sqrt{t}$. For $\delta>\delta_c$, a non equilibrium stationary state exists while for $\delta<\delta_c$ the asymptotic state presents a low density and max current phases. We discuss the scaling of the density and current profiles for parallel and sequential updates.Comment: 4 pages, 5 figure

"It's cleaner, definitely": Collaborative Process in Audio Production.

Working from vague client instructions, how do audio producers collaborate to diagnose what specifically is wrong with a piece of music, where the problem is and what to do about it? This paper presents a design ethnography that uncovers some of the ways in which two music producers co-ordinate their understanding of complex representations of pieces of music while working together in a studio. Our analysis shows that audio producers constantly make judgements based on audio and visual evidence while working with complex digital tools, which can lead to ambiguity in assessments of issues. We show how multimodal conduct guides the process of work and that complex media objects are integrated as elements of interaction by the music producers. The findings provide an understanding how people currently collaborate when producing audio, to support the design of better tools and systems for collaborative audio production in the future