A multiobjective model of oligopolies under uncertainty

It is assumed that in an n-firm single-product oligopoly without product differentiation the firms face an uncertain price function, which is considered random by the firms. At each time period each firm simultaneously maximizes its expected profit and minimizes the variance of the profit since it wants to receive as high as possible profit with the least possible uncertainty. It is assumed that the best response of each firm is obtained by the weighting method. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium, and investigate the local stability of the equilibrium

Dynamic oligopolies and intertemporal demand interaction

Dynamic oligopolies are examined with continuous time scales and under the assumption that the demand at each time period is affected by earlier demands and consumptions. After the mathematical model is introduced the local asymptotical stability of the equilibrium is examined, and then we will discuss how information delays alter the stability conditions. We will also investigate the occurrence of a Hopf bifurcation gving the possibility of the birth of limit cycles. Numerical examples will be shown toillustrate the theoretical results

Existence and uniqueness in Cournot models with cost externalities

In this paper we examine single product Cournot oligopolies, with- out product differentiation, under the assumption that the cost of each firm depends on its own output and also on the output of the rest of the industry. The competition of the firms on the secondary market for manpower, capital, energy, and so forth as well as the spillover effect of the R&D investments of the firms can be taken into account with this more general cost structure. The existence of a unique NashCournot equilibrium is proved under realistic conditions. Our result is a straightforward generalization of the well-known existence and uniqueness theorem of concave oligopolies

Reservoir Design under Random Sediment Yield

From the Proceedings of the 1976 Meetings of the Arizona Section - American Water Resources Assn. and the Hydrology Section - Arizona Academy of Science - April 29-May 1, 1976, Tucson, ArizonaThis article is part of the Hydrology and Water Resources in Arizona and the Southwest collections. Digital access to this material is made possible by the Arizona-Nevada Academy of Science and the University of Arizona Libraries. For more information about items in this collection, contact [email protected]

A MULTI-OBJECTIVE TRAIN SCHEDULING MODEL AND SOLUTION

Train scheduling is a highly complex task, since the physical railroad network is shared by a large number of both freight and passenger trains. This study develops a multi-objective optimization model for the passenger train-scheduling problem on a railroad network that includes single and multiple-tracks, as well as multiple platforms with different train capacities. In this study, lowering the fuel consumption cost is used as the measure of satisfaction of the railroad company and shortening the total passenger-time is being regarded as the passenger satisfaction criterion. The solution of the problem consists of two steps. To solve the problem, the Pareto frontier first is determined. Based on the obtained Pareto frontier, detailed multi-objective optimization then is performed using the distance-based method with three types of distances. A simple numerical example is given to illustrate the model, solution method and results. The sensitivity of the solutions was also examined. To demonstrate the applicability of the model and solution procedure, the results from 21 worked numerical examples are given

Bilateral oligopoly and quantity competition

Bilateral oligopoly is a market game with two commodities, allowing strategic behavior on both sides of the market. When the number of buyers is large, bilateral oligopoly approximates a game of quantity competition played by sellers. We present examples which show that this is not typically a Cournot game. Rather, we introduce an alternative game of quantity competition (the market share game) and, appealing to results in the literature on contests, show that this yields the same equilibria as the many-buyer limit of bilateral oligopoly, under standard assumptions on costs and preferences. \ We also show that the market share and Cournot games have the same equilibria if and only if the price elasticity of the latter is one, and investigate the differences in equilibria otherwise. These results lead to necessary and sufficient conditions for the Cournot game to be a good approximation to bilateral oligopoly with many buyers and to an ordering of total output when they are not satisfied